Tuesday, 22 July 2025

TUESDAY, 22 JULY 2025

TUESDAY, 22 JULY 2025

The Speaker took the Chair at 2 p.m.

Karakia/Prayers

Karakia/Prayers

SPEAKER: Almighty God, we give thanks for the blessings which have been bestowed on us. Laying aside all personal interests, we acknowledge the King and pray for guidance in our deliberations, that we may conduct the affairs of this House with wisdom, justice, mercy, and humility for the welfare and peace of New Zealand. Amen.

Petitions, Papers, Select Committee Reports, and Introduction of Bills

Petitions, Papers, Select Committee Reports, and Introduction of Bills

SPEAKER: A petition has been presented to the Clerk for presentation to the House.

CLERK: Petition of Simon Palmer requesting the House amend the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act to ensure no person requiring legal guardianship is discriminated against financially by the cost of annual auditing fees.

SPEAKER: That petition stands referred to the Petitions Committee. Ministers have delivered papers.

CLERK:

Government responses to the:

petition of Scott Savage

report of the Petitions Committee on the petition of Kylee Kelly

report of the Petitions Committee on the petition of Rhodes Farming Partnership

2025-30 statement of corporate intent for the:

Institute of Environmental Science and Research

New Zealand Institute for Public Health and Forensic Science Limited

2025-30 statement of intent for the External Reporting Board

2025-28 statement of intent for Whakaata Māori, Māori Television Service

2025-26 statement of performance expectations for:

External Reporting Board

Research and Education Advanced Network New Zealand Limited.

SPEAKER: I’ve received the annual report of the Parliamentary Service Commission for the year ending 30 June 2025. Those papers are published under the authority of the House. A select committee report has been delivered for presentation.

CLERK: Report of the Education and Workforce Committee on the Regulatory Systems (Occupational Regulation) Amendment Bill.

SPEAKER: The bill is set down for second reading. No bills have been introduced.

Ministerial Statements

Conflict in Middle East—Government Response

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): I seek leave to make a ministerial statement on the Middle East.

SPEAKER: You don’t need leave, sir.

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS: Thank you. Almost a month ago on 24 June 2025, we delivered our most recent ministerial statement on the Middle East to this House. At that time, the world was grappling with Israel and Iran bombing one another. New Zealanders were in harm’s way; the spectre of escalation and a wider regional war was very real. Back then, we called for de-escalation, dialogue, and ceasefire. Thankfully, the United States and Qatar were able to broker a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, and that wider regional war has, for now at least, been avoided.

A month later, though, we continue to be confronted by horrifying scenes playing out in Gaza. We have the horror of innocent Israeli families robbed of their loved ones—in October 2023, by Hamas’ heinous and immoral hostage-taking—still yearning and demanding for them to be free. We have the horror of more and more innocent Palestinian citizens and civilians starving, being deprived of their basic needs, and being killed every day—because Israel’s military response to the events of 7 October 2023 long ago ceased to be proportionate, reasonable, or moral, and because Hamas continues to act with complete disregard for civilian life.

The international community is united in its revulsion to what is happening in Gaza. This horror must end. Too many lives have been lost; too many people have been traumatised, polarised, and embittered, ensuring that yet another generation of Israeli and Palestinian children are born into a situation of insufferable conflict and enmity. That is why New Zealand has come together with Foreign Ministers from 27 other countries to state as clearly as we can that enough is enough, that this war must end now, that this suffering is intolerable. In that joint statement, we condemned Hamas’ continued detention of hostages and called for their immediate and unconditional release, and we condemned Israel’s policies, which are leading to untold and unimaginable suffering and death among Palestinian civilians, and we call for it to comply with its obligations under international humanitarian law.

The international community is joined by an overwhelming majority of Israelis and Palestinians in wanting an immediate ceasefire. That is understandable, because only a negotiated ceasefire offers the best hope of bringing Israeli hostages home, and of ending the immense suffering of Palestinian civilians in Gaza.

New Zealand has always accepted that it has limited influence over the course of this generations-long conflict. The Middle East is a long way away from New Zealand, but we can and must still do our part. New Zealand’s mission has for decades been consistent: we want dialogue, we want diplomacy, we want negotiation, and we want a two-State solution. We call out actions which undermine the conditions for a two-State solution. This New Zealand Government has designated the entirety of Hamas, whose standard objectives include the complete destruction of Israel, a terrorist organisation.

Steve Abel: What about the IDF?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS: We have also put in place travel bans against Israeli Ministers who have taken complete steps to undermine the two-State solution by advocating illegal settlements and settler violence. Sometimes, it pays to be patient and find out the facts before shouting from the rooftops.

As today’s joint statement by 28 Foreign Ministers, now joined by more, says, we strongly oppose any steps towards territorial or demographic change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Such steps seek to undermine the two-State solution and they must stop. The only way forward is an immediate, unconditional, and permanent ceasefire. Human suffering is indiscriminate in this conflict. It’s been inflicted in vast quantities on Israelis and Palestinians, Jews, Muslims, and Christians. Further bloodshed serves absolutely no purpose and, therefore, it must stop.

New Zealand, with our partners, reaffirms our complete support for the efforts of the United States, Qatar, and Egypt to achieve a ceasefire. We wish them well in this critically important task. Ultimately, what we must see is a political pathway towards peaceful Israelis and Palestinians living securely side by side. Only then can this long-running cycle of conflict be ended, in the hope that the next generation of Israeli and Palestinian children can know better, brighter days. No matter how hopeless the situation seems, that must be the international community’s objective, and New Zealand will continue to do what it can to contribute to those efforts. Thank you.

Hon PEENI HENARE (Labour): Tēnā koe, Mr Speaker. Thank you very much. The Labour Party welcomes the ministerial statement from this Government on very concerning matters in Gaza. We want to be very clear and upfront that we continue to be concerned with what’s transpiring across the entire Middle East region. We know, though, that action speaks louder than words.

Labour’s position has been clear: we support an immediate and permanent ceasefire and the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid and, of course, a two-State solution. We continue to denounce the actions of Hamas and will continue to do so into the future.

Israel’s ongoing military campaign and blockade have created one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent memory. Over 58,000 Palestinians have been killed in 19 months of relentless bombardment and attack. Ninety percent of Gaza’s population has been displaced. Infrastructure, homes, hospitals, and schools have been decimated. Nearly half a million people are facing catastrophic hunger. Approximately 71,000 children under five are expected to be acutely malnourished. Pregnant and breastfeeding women are starving. Children are dying from hunger and preventable disease.

We welcome the Government’s recent steps, sanctions against Israeli Ministers, and co-signing a joint international statement calling for an end to the war. But we must be honest: these moves come after 24 other countries have already taken action. There is more that New Zealand can do and must do. Silence is no longer the issue; inaction is. If we believe in international law and human rights, we must act with moral clarity and urgency.

I now have a series of questions for the Minister. The first question: will the Government now join South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice as a demonstration of support for international legal accountability; if not, why not?

SPEAKER: The Minister may choose to answer within the member’s time slot.

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Could I tell my colleague that I intend to take advice on that and get back to him with an informed answer.

Hon PEENI HENARE (Labour): Thank you, Minister. The next question: does the Government agree that allegations of genocide are a matter for the International Court of Justice to determine, and not for politicians to dismiss or decide unilaterally?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Yes, we agree in the sense that the court of which that member speaks has got a duty, but hitherto they have not found that. They have taken it by way of investigation and reviewed it, but they have not come down with a precedent, directive, or, dare I say, finding. However, that still doesn’t obviate the rest of us needing to be considering the merit or otherwise of such a claim and to see whether it is substantial or not.

Hon PEENI HENARE (Labour): Thank you to the Minister. My next question is: given the 20week total blockade on Gaza, what is New Zealand doing, diplomatically or otherwise, to press Israel to allow unimpeded aid access?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Well, as I said, in the last months we have made many, many statements. The last one was in June. Today, we’re updating it, with now a growing number of Foreign Ministers and Governments joining us. At the latest it looks like we’re at 28, plus we’ve been combined by the whole of the European Union, so it’s gathering momentum. Hopefully, in time, that level of pressure will prevail.

Hon PEENI HENARE (Labour): Thank you. The next question to the Minister: is the Government concerned by the widespread criticism of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, including by over 240 NGOs, and has New Zealand contributed funding to the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation; and if so, what conditions, if any, were attached?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): The reality is that we have a duty in these circumstances, no matter how desperate they are and inhumanitarian they are, to ensure we can recount to the New Zealand taxpayer. That’s why, when we ran into difficulties with the server of aid, and they were under suspicion and indeed under investigation by the United Nations themselves, we found other organisations with credibility to assist us to ensure that the aid continued. That has always been our course under successive Governments.

Hon PEENI HENARE (Labour): Thank you. In light of the Minister’s answer, the next question is very direct: will the Government commit to more aid resource to fill the need in this unfolding humanitarian crisis?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): I understand what the member has asked me for, but the reality is New Zealand has already given significant amounts of aid, and at a time when the international economy is facing uncertainty and so is the domestic economy as a consequence. We also have serious aid programmes in the Pacific, which are our number one priorities and have been under the last two Governments. So whilst we’ll carry on endeavouring to help out, remember this: it is an awful long way away from New Zealand, and we have the right to feel awfully frustrated that for decades of all of our lives, this issue has been there, at the centre of international news. We hope one day it would finally be over.

Hon PEENI HENARE (Labour): Thank you to the Minister for his answer. My next question is to the recent deployment made by this New Zealand Government, with respect to what has transpired between Israel and Iran, and whether or not the Government have considered, with respect to that deployment, offering any further support to what’s transpiring in Gaza?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): The reality is that we had teams working on the outskirts of that situation in Gaza and Israel and found no requests for our help. The other paradox, or irony, that we have faced is that we sent a full military plane all the way up, set to take 139 people out of Iran. We had teams brought over the border to use and facilitate the transport on those planes, and then the peace broke out and no one wanted to get on the plane. Now, that’s one of the things that we do as a country. It wasn’t a waste of time. We were there just in case there was an emergency, and we started from 36 people finding they needed help to, dramatically, 139 by the time the plane got there—and then peace broke out. We hope we have the same unusual circumstances happen when it comes to Gaza.

Hon PEENI HENARE (Labour): Thank you, Minister. My next question is: the large diaspora here in New Zealand who have families suffering in Gaza, the Palestinian community—has the Minister or this Government considered any support with their efforts in, one, trying to contact and, two, trying to support their families in Gaza?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): The successive situation, over many Governments, has been to help through international agencies. Whilst there are both sides of the story occupant in New Zealand, we hope they haven’t brought their politics with them—that they remember that this country is a peaceful country, it has got its values, there’s a flag to salute, there’s our laws to be obeyed, and there’s a political system and freedom that needs to be subscribed to, including the freedom of religion. The very lessons of success here need to be learnt back there—

Steve Abel: It’s not a religious conflict.

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS: Who said that? You must have come down the last shower.

SPEAKER: Just to advise the House not to make those sorts of interjections in a ministerial statement.

Hon PEENI HENARE (Labour): Thank you. My final comments on this matter: as we continue to encourage action from this Government, we welcome this ministerial statement, and we’ll continue to look towards what more New Zealand could possibly do to support. But I remind the House once again that silence is no longer the issue and action is, and that if we believe in international law and human rights, we must act with moral clarity and, most importantly, with urgency.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Green Party to respond to this ministerial statement. I acknowledge the statement, but we need to have more than words—we need to have more than words. We are beyond the point where we need to have action. I was watching the media last night, horrified to see that 19 people had died of starvation in Gaza. Hundreds and hundreds of people who had been lining up to get food have been shot and killed. We see over 17,000 children killed, over 70,000 people killed as well, and hundreds of thousands of people displaced.

I do hear around the House that it is far away and on the other side of the planet, and so on and so forth. It is far, but it is also close as well, as many MPs around the House will have been connected with the diaspora community—and we have that in Palmerston North as well, and I want to share one story. I was helping a family get their grandmother over so she could help with their children—they had come from Gaza—and she was here for one week before the bombs dropped on her apartment, destroying the apartment that she lived in. This is a family now living in New Zealand. Gaza might be far away, but it is also close as well. I want members around the House to remember that—that when they look overseas and see their grandmothers, their daughters, their grandfathers, their brothers and sisters dying, this is something that the House should take into account.

I also want to make the point as well that this House can actually move fast. A number of us were here in the last Parliament when Russia invaded Ukraine, and we passed sanctions—this House passed sanctions. So it can move quickly when the political will does exist. I think we’re getting late in the day where we need to actually take some action here.

We’ve got a bill in the members’ tin which would allow this Parliament to collect sanctions on Israel, because that is what is needed; that is what is being called for. We have the UN special rapporteur on the Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese, who had a report this week highlighting companies which are directly benefiting from the genocide in Gaza. These are actions that we can take; these are things that we can take as a Parliament.

Yes, ministerial statements show that the Government is taking note of what’s happening, but we need to have more than words. The people outside these walls want more than words. They want to know that their families are safe. They want to know that their brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers, and uncles and aunties, and all of that, are safe.

On that, I do have a series of questions that I would like to put to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Will the Government also join the multilateral actions of 12 States, led by South Africa and Colombia, who announced measures to prevent the provision of arms, including dual-use items, to Israel; prevent the docking of vessels that may carry arms to Israel; commence urgent reviews of public contracts to prevent public funds supporting the occupation; and investigate Israel’s war crimes?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): First of all, to liken the invasion of, first of all, Georgia, then Crimea, then Ukraine to 7 October and the Hamas terrorism is an extraordinary juxtaposition of history and fact.

The second thing I want to say is that the very question that’s being raised here obviates the fact that the South Africa v Israel case before the international court is yet to be decided, and it’s wrong to prejudge the court’s decisions, including on various huge allegations such as genocide. Only then, when there was such a finding and proven, would the kind of action being demanded by that member be warranted.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Another question. What concrete measures, if any, will the Government take to support the statement, such as public divestment from Israel, joining the case in the International Court of Justice—and I do acknowledge the Minister of Foreign Affairs did mention that—or sanctioning Israel as we did with Russia? In that context, I do make the point that the time has moved on. We have hundreds of thousands of people displaced, tens of thousands of people killed, people dying of starvation, and people being shot while they’re trying to get food. So I think that the situation has changed.

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Well, if the member thinks that the situation has changed, why haven’t Hamas given back the hostages they’ve got now—right here, right now? Why haven’t they done it months ago, years ago, when this thing was first requested by the international community? Why aren’t we talking about that?

The second thing I want to say is there are people who have been judged by New Zealand in Israel to have been terrorists. We’ve even said that of a couple of Ministers who have made statements, which in our view were terrorist in their nature. We’ve already done that. To make a finding that is unwarranted by international precedent is not what we’re going to do.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Has the Government spoken to any of the 27 other Governments involved in this statement about material measures to put concrete pressure on Israel to stop the genocide, such as economic sanctions, and if not, why not?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): The Government has spoken to all of those countries over the months. We have been to Egypt. We’ve spoken to the Palestinian Authority. We’ve spoken to Indonesia. We’ve spoken to countless countries who understand the plight we’re in trying to be helpful in a peaceful resolution of this tragedy.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Did those conversations include sanctions?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Pardon?

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Did those conversations include discussions on sanctions?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Well, obviously, the discussions have been wide ranging. We do not want to make a decision or actions which are purely symbolic in nature and of no real meaning in fact.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Why did New Zealand only implement travel restrictions on two Israeli Ministers and not also asset freezes like those announced by the UK and Canada?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Because we do not believe that the justification for that, at this point in time, has been established.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Does the Government share Australia’s position that Australia no longer sees recognition of a Palestinian State as only occurring at the end of negotiations, but rather as a way of building momentum towards a two-State solution, and if so, when will New Zealand recognise Palestinian statehood as a tool to help build peace?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): We have always said, this Government, that it’s not a matter of if but when, but the question that has to be answered, saving us lowering our standards of statehood, is who would we negotiate with? Who would we talk to? Who would establish the State sans or without an election? We have talked to Egypt about that. We’ve talked to many Middle Eastern countries about that. We’ve talked to Emirates about that. We’ve talked to Indonesia about that. We’re all on the same wavelength here. Who would we talk to, to establish this so-called State, or are we just virtue signalling? Virtue signalling is not what we’re going to do here.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): With six seconds, what concrete measures, if any, will the Government take to support the statement such as public divestment form Israel?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): I tried to point out that such a decision would have to be the result of international findings, and those findings have not been established. Even the court which was referenced in the previous questions here has not made the decision that is claimed by some members in this House. Those are not facts. We await those findings at this point in time.

SPEAKER: One of the vagaries of Standing Orders is that while we’ve agreed that the rosters for questions and other such might change, it’s not within the jurisdiction of the Business Committee to extend that to ministerial statements. However, the member might like to seek leave of the House.

RAWIRI WAITITI (Co-Leader—Te Pāti Māori): Mr Speaker, I seek leave from the House to take a call on this ministerial statement.

SPEAKER: Leave is sought. Is there any objection to that course of action? There appears to be none.

RAWIRI WAITITI: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Gaza is starving. Israel is deliberately engineering a famine. They blockade thousands and thousands of trucks that have lined up at the Rafah border. Food has been stockpiled in warehouses—in fact, enough food that could replenish the whole of Gaza for three months. Supply-ready, systems-ready, but they are being denied entry. A population of 2 million, including 1 million children, are being starved, with no access to food or water. Many are going weeks and days without food. Many are being shot, daily, by the Israel Defense Forces while lining up for food. This continuation of a genocide is the most cruel humanitarian crisis—the merciless butchering of people, children, while being deliberately starved. People can barely walk. They’re drowsy. They are slowly dying on livestream. Don’t dare turn a blind eye, saying we didn’t know. One in four children under five years in northern Gaza is severely malnourished—no baby formula. It’s not a food crisis if food is waiting at the border; it’s the deliberate starving of children and wiping out of people by wiping out their children.

This Government does many cruel things, but nothing is as cruel as being mates with those committing this genocide. They are complicit—for Israel to not open the gates. We do not accept this Government’s pathetic lip-service calling for a ceasefire. It’s your fifth time in two years. We must end this human crisis. Sanction Israel. Sanction everyone supporting them. Again, we demand: Israel, open the bloody gates and stop the genocide, democide, ethnic cleansing, and the massacre of mokopuna and the innocent. We need strong sanctions—expulsion of the Israel ambassador, as we have called for in the past. We don’t need whaiwhai pīhau solutions, which means following the flatulence of others like the US. We must lead with courage and humanity.

I also have questions of the Minister. Does the Minister, and this Government, recognise Palestine as a sovereign State—yes or no?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): They say the first victim of war is truth, and that’s a classic example. Do we recognise a Palestine State? We have made it clear that, for us, it’s a question of not if but when. But we need to ensure we do not lower the standards of what statehood comprises. There, in our conversation with the Middle East and with Egypt and other countries bordering there, knowing far more about the circumstances than us, they have an agreement with us. We need to establish who it is we’re going to negotiate with before we recognise.

RAWIRI WAITITI (Co-Leader—Te Pāti Māori): Thank you, Minister. Why does this ministerial statement not call for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire by Israel?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Well, perhaps, because one of the conditions has yet to be met, like giving back the hostages.

RAWIRI WAITITI (Co-Leader—Te Pāti Māori): Is the Government prepared to name the actions of Israel in Gaza as genocide or ethnic cleansing, as identified by United Nations experts and the International Court of Justice?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): That last claim is false; it has not been declared by the international courts to be that, so we are not going to add our support to something that is not based on facts but is based on what someone would hope to be the case regardless of legal precedent.

RAWIRI WAITITI (Co-Leader—Te Pāti Māori): Why does the ministerial statement fail to acknowledge New Zealand’s obligations under the genocide convention?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): The same answer for that question is given in the previous two answers I gave that member. Perhaps he should pay attention to the fact that the international courts are yet to make a judgment on that matter—or does he think he knows more about the law than they do?

RAWIRI WAITITI (Co-Leader—Te Pāti Māori): What tangible actions, beyond words, is the Government taking to stop arms sales, diplomatic ties, or trade with Israel?

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): New Zealand’s citizenry, on behalf of their Government, has made an enormous contribution in terms of the civil obligations we believe we have to the people who are caught by the strife. It is a very, very significant contribution and is about as much as we can afford, given the huge demands upon our purse when it comes to international aid in other troubled areas of the world as well.

SPEAKER: The Minister may like to exercise a right of reply.

Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs): Mr Speaker, thank you very much. I think we’ve taken too much time of the House already. I appreciate the comments made by those Ministers and those members of Parliament, who are, hopefully, understanding of just how difficult it is to achieve an outcome the control of which is not in our hands.

Urgent Debates Declined

War in Gaza—Government Signing Joint Statement

SPEAKER: Members, I’ve received a letter from the Hon Peeni Henare seeking to debate under Standing Order 399 the Government’s signing on to the joint statement, with 24 other countries, condemning Israel’s war in Gaza and calling for its end. This is a particular case of recent occurrence for which there is ministerial responsibility. The matter is an urgent one that warrants the attention of the House. It’s been well canvassed in the responses to the ministerial statement, and no further debate is warranted at this time.

Oral Questions

Questions to Ministers

Question No. 1—Finance

1. NANCY LU (National) to the Minister of Finance: What recent reports has she seen on the economy?

Hon NICOLA WILLIS (Minister of Finance): Yesterday, Stats NZ released the latest figures for the Consumers Price Index (CPI). These showed annual CPI inflation increasing slightly to 2.7 percent in the June quarter, remaining within the Reserve Bank’s target range of 1 to 3 percent.

Nancy Lu: How does this result compare to past inflation?

Hon NICOLA WILLIS: This is the fourth consecutive quarter that annual CPI inflation has been within the Reserve Bank’s target range. Prior to that, inflation was above the top of the band for three years. Annual inflation in 2022, for example, went like this: March quarter, 6.9 percent; June quarter, 7.3 percent; September quarter, 7.2 percent; and 7.2 again in the December quarter. Those were crippling price increases for Kiwi families and businesses.

Nancy Lu: What is driving the bump in annual CPI inflation?

Hon NICOLA WILLIS: This is largely due to an increase in global price pressures, including on food, that New Zealand is not immune to. Domestic price pressures, on the other hand, are continuing to ease. There remain some pockets of concern, however. Stats NZ noted that the largest single contributor to annual inflation was local authority rates and payments, which rose 12.2 percent in the year to June. That’s why the Government has been clear in its call to councils to focus on the basics and keep rates under control. I’d also reiterate that the CPI is a basket which has many different goods and services in it, and around a third of those actually went down in price over the past year. Stats NZ also notes that the average rate of inflation across the OECD is higher than New Zealand’s, at 4 percent.

Nancy Lu: What is the outlook for inflation and interest rates?

Hon NICOLA WILLIS: The current uptick in annual CPI inflation is expected to extend into the September quarter of this year but not persist beyond that. In its most recent monetary policy review, the Reserve Bank, in its own words, said, “Annual consumers price inflation will likely increase towards the top of the Monetary Policy Committee’s 1 to 3 percent target band over mid-2025. However, with spare productive capacity in the economy and declining domestic inflation pressures, headline inflation is expected to remain in the band and return to around 2 percent by early 2026.” Markets are expecting the Reserve Bank to continue reducing the official cash rate, including a likely 25 basis point reduction at the next opportunity in August.

Question No. 2—Child Poverty Reduction

2. RICARDO MENÉNDEZ MARCH (Green) to the Minister for Child Poverty Reduction: Does she agree with the findings of the Below the Income Floor: Modelling Income Adequacy for Low-Income New Zealand Households 2018 – 2026 report; if not, why not?

Hon LOUISE UPSTON (Minister for Child Poverty Reduction): This report highlights the impact the cost of living is having on New Zealand families, which is why our Government is tackling it head-on. Despite global economic pressures, we are taking steps to lift families out of hardship by focusing on growing the economy, dealing with the cost of living pressures, and helping families to get ahead. In Budget 2024, we delivered meaningful tax relief, an increased in-work tax credit, and the FamilyBoost childcare rebate. Further initiatives such as Working for Families in Budget 2025 are helping to ease financial pressure for families across the country. I do acknowledge that it is tough for many families right now, which is why we are taking these steps to support them.

Ricardo Menéndez March: Have any Government decisions made life worse for children living in poverty, and, if so, which ones?

Hon LOUISE UPSTON: There will be a range of policies that our Government is taking to tackle the cost of living and to grow the economy to support more Kiwis into jobs, and no one single policy should be treated in isolation.

Ricardo Menéndez March: Has she received advice in regards to any decision affecting children living in poverty that it could make life worse for them?

Hon LOUISE UPSTON: No, because our Government is tackling a wide range of issues, as I’ve just outlined, around growing the economy—which, of course, creates job opportunities—and reducing the cost of living, which I accept is tough right now for many families. The Minister of Finance has just, very appropriately, outlined the history behind inflation and the Consumers Price Index. I’m very grateful for the fact that it is now under 3 percent, but I accept and acknowledge that for some families, they are still doing it tough, which is why economic growth and turning the corner on the cost of living is so critical.

Ricardo Menéndez March: Does she agree with the Child Poverty Action Group’s report finding that “welfare transfers remain structurally inadequate”, and, if so, will she support increasing benefit levels beyond the automatic indexation changes?

Hon LOUISE UPSTON: No. In this House, I’ve said on multiple occasions that our Government’s focus is about supporting people into employment so they don’t have to rely on benefit payments. This side of the House wants to see more families and more children independent of the welfare system. Over 80,000 people exited the benefit into work in the last quarter, and we’re making progress.

Ricardo Menéndez March: Does she accept that her Government does not have a plan to get unemployment rates to zero percent, and, if so, does she think unemployed people deserve to live in poverty?

Hon LOUISE UPSTON: Well, I completely disagree with that. As I’ve just said, despite there being challenging economic times, we’ve seen over 80,000 people exit the jobseeker benefit into jobs. My colleagues, on Sunday, just this weekend, have announced infrastructure plans for projects that are starting in the next six months—in excess of 20,000 jobs in that. So the jobs are coming, and we are committed to ensuring more people on the jobseeker benefit exit into work.

Ricardo Menéndez March: Does she accept that her Government’s decisions are making it worse for people living in poverty, considering the report found that things actually improved between 2018 and 2024, but this Government has reversed this trend, and by 2026, according to the report, more families are expected to be unable to afford the basics such as housing, utilities, and food?

Hon LOUISE UPSTON: No, I completely refute that. If you look at where the Government has focused its effort around housing, around incomes, and around food, which are all related to the cost of living pressure, we’ve got a plan and we’re sticking to it.

Question No. 3—Prime Minister

3. Rt Hon CHRIS HIPKINS (Leader of the Opposition) to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by all of his Government’s statements and actions?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON (Prime Minister): Yes.

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: How many families with kids have been receiving the $250 extra a fortnight that he promised them?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: Well, as I said to the member last week, the good news with FamilyBoost—a policy that he and his party did not support—is that we have 62,000 families that have received payments to support them on their early childcare education costs. The changes that the Minister has made to expand the threshold and also the coverage means that there’s another 22,000 families and households that can participate in early childhood cost subsidisation.

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: Point of order, Mr Speaker.

SPEAKER: Yeah, I know what you’re going to say, but I couldn’t hear a word he was saying because I had an enormous amount of noise coming from my left, so it makes it very difficult for me to judge whether or not the question has been answered to your satisfaction.

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: Well, it could have been a relatively short answer. I only asked him how many families there were.

SPEAKER: That would be your opinion. But it’s quite often that Ministers will give a prelude to an answer, and that’s not something that’s new.

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: Well, it didn’t come anywhere near close to answering it.

SPEAKER: That’s your opinion.

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: I’ll ask it again: how many families with kids have been receiving the $250 extra a fortnight that he promised them?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: I’ll just say to the member: if he wants to put a specific question on notice, feel free to do so. But the great news here is that this is a Government that supports low and middle income working New Zealanders, the people the Labour Party purported to care about but don’t care about any more.

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: Point of order, Mr Speaker. How is it in order to refuse to answer a question and then immediately go into attacking the person who asked it? It’s a very straightforward question: how many people received the full benefit of a promise that he made them? He could answer it or he could not answer it, but pivoting straight into an attack on the Opposition is just a bit desperate.

SPEAKER: Well, thank you for the observation. Do you have another question?

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: Does he stand by Nicola Willis’ statement that the Government has delivered on every promise that they have made in relation to FamilyBoost; if so, why can’t he confirm that any families have received the $250 a fortnight that he promised them?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: Absolutely. What FamilyBoost is about—for the member, so that he understands it—is that depending upon your income and depending upon your costs, everyone receives their full entitlement. So the full entitlement that each family gets is subject to their income and also their costs. It’s a great scheme. I’d encourage the member to support it.

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: Why did he cancel 20 hours a week of free early childhood education that all families with young kids could’ve benefited from, given only 153 families have received the full benefit of his complicated tax rebate replacement?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: Well, in answer to the second leg of the question, I’ll just say to the member what I said before, which is that everyone who has applied has received their full entitlement. Their full entitlement is subject to their income level and it’s also subject to their costs. As I say, every member receives the full entitlement.

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: So is he saying that the reason that the 21,000 families he promised were going to be getting the full benefit of his FamilyBoost childcare tax rebate haven’t been getting it is because it’s their fault?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: No. What I said to the member is that we have put two initiatives into place to help support low and middle income working families, which I’m very, very, very proud about. Lifting income tax thresholds is not ideological. It’s just common sense in high-inflation environments created by the previous administration. The second thing I’d say is that FamilyBoost is actually there to help low and middle income working New Zealanders. I’d just encourage the member to put aside the petty politics and to get on board and actually help New Zealanders with their cost of living crisis, because I haven’t seen any proposals from the member as to what he would do differently.

Rt Hon Winston Peters: Could the Prime Minister answer this question very slowly: given that this is a sliding scale payment, are those entitled to their full amount on the sliding scale getting their full benefit?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: Well, I want to thank the member for his question, because that’s exactly the point that I’m making, which is that everybody who is eligible and then applies for the rebate actually gets their full entitlement, because it’s based off their income, it’s based off their costs. As a result, 62,000 families have received assistance, and that should be something that I would have thought the member opposite would be supporting.

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: Well, does he stand by David Seymour’s statement, “We’ve beaten inflation.”, given butter is up almost 50 percent, tomatoes 33 percent, lettuce and broccoli 30 percent, steaks up 22 percent, and rates, insurance, electricity, and other household costs continue to rise?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: Well, I find it a little bit ironic being asked that question by that member, don’t you think? Because it was his Government that created out-of-control spending, tripled the debt three times, ended up rising inflation, throwing interest rates through the absolute roof. Then he has the audacity to ask—when inflation now is back within the Reserve Bank band of 1 to 3 percent, when it was never in that band while he was Prime Minister—as to what the component parts of it are. I’ll just say to the member again: 12.2 percent is what the increase in council rates have been. That has driven an extra 35 basis points into our inflation number, and I’d love to hear the member’s position on rates caps.

Hon David Seymour: Why was inflation there to beat in the first place?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: Because the previous administration, to keep it simple, borrowed more, spent more, taxed more.

SPEAKER: No, no—sorry. I should have been quicker to stand on that, but it would have been—the question itself was probably not out of order, but the beginning of the answer most certainly was.

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: How many blocks of butter can he buy for the $60 a week he claims to spend on groceries?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: Well, it’s a smart-arse question, isn’t it? But I will just say to you: that member is supposed to be the Leader of the Opposition, and in Opposition, you oppose but you also propose. There’s no proposals from that side.

SPEAKER: I don’t want to stand up in the middle of the Prime Minister’s answers, but I would ask him to consider a number of rulings that I’ve made in the House in recent days about answers. Any further questions?

Question No. 4—Infrastructure

4. DAN BIDOIS (National—Northcote) to the Minister for Infrastructure: What recent announcements has he made about getting infrastructure built in New Zealand?

Hon CHRIS BISHOP (Minister for Infrastructure): On the weekend, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and I announced that there will be $6 billion of Government-funded infrastructure projects starting construction—not allocated money, not business cases being developed, but spades in the ground between now and Christmas, creating thousands of jobs across the economy, creating economic growth, and driving productivity. And this is just the start.

Dan Bidois: What projects are starting construction in the next six months?

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: There’s some crackers on this list. Soon we will turn the sod on the Ōtaki to North of Levin Expressway, the Melling interchange and RiverLink project—a long time coming for the good people of the Hutt Valley—the new Ōmanawa bridge on State Highway 29 in the Bay of Plenty, and $800 million worth of school property projects alone in the next six months. Because of the good work of Erica Stanford in driving down the cost of construction, we can do far more, because of standardised modular designs. A range of important health projects—Auckland City Hospital, Middlemore Hospital, Hawke’s Bay Hospital, and a new acute mental health unit at Hutt Valley Hospital—a new state-of-the-art biosecurity facility in Auckland, and the Papakura District Court interim courthouse.

Dan Bidois: What will these projects do for the construction sector?

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: The projects getting under way will create thousands of employment opportunities for New Zealanders. The numbers vary according to the nature, but, roughly, for a billion dollars of infrastructure investment, that equates to around 4,500 jobs. So there are thousands of jobs coming, and, as I say, this is just the start.

Dan Bidois: What is the difference between “agreeing to a project,” and “starting construction”?

SPEAKER: Careful with the answer—take care with the answer.

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: New Zealanders can’t drive on funding agreements, they can’t see doctors with mere appropriations, and they can’t go to new schools in endless business cases. What they can do is go to school in new classrooms, and drive on new roads and well-maintained roads. One of the interesting things about the projects that are starting construction in the next six months is that some of the funding was approved many years ago—for example, the Middlemore Hospital recladding was first appropriated in Budget 2018, and seven years later, it is starting; initial funding for State Highway 76 and Brougham Street, which I turned the sod on just last week, was initially approved in 2017; and the new acute mental health unit at Hutt Valley Hospital was appropriated in Budget 2019. This Government has made getting spades in the ground a priority, and we’ve made delivery a priority. You can’t drive on a road that is just funded. You actually have to get building.

Rt Hon Winston Peters: Being a Wellington Minister, in particular, why didn’t he mention the infrastructure work for our no-nonsense Cook Strait ferry programme that starts later this year—

Rt Hon Chris Hipkins: Ha, ha! Because Nicola Willis cancelled it.

Rt Hon Winston Peters: —saving the taxpayer billions of dollars, in stark contrast, sausage roll eater, to the profligate mess we inherited?

Hon CHRIS BISHOP: Well, the reason I didn’t mention it is that there’s so many good things happening around the country when it comes to infrastructure, and of course, when it comes to that great project, I leave the majority of the announcements—and the good news—to the Minister for Rail, who’s doing a very good job.

Question No. 5—Finance

5. Hon BARBARA EDMONDS (Labour—Mana) to the Minister of Finance: Does she stand by all her statements and actions?

Hon NICOLA WILLIS (Minister of Finance): In context, yes.

Hon Barbara Edmonds: Does she stand by her statement they had delivered on “every promise that we [had] made in relation to FamilyBoost”; and, if so, how many families have received the full $150?

Hon NICOLA WILLIS: Yes. What the National Party campaigned on in Opposition was that we would deliver a FamilyBoost childcare rebate scheme according to eligibility criteria relating to household income and the amount of early childhood fees that a family paid each week. We have delivered the scheme exactly according to the eligibility criteria we outlined in our campaign. In fact, more recently, we have gone further and made the scheme more generous so that now families can get up to 40 percent rebates on their early childhood fees, and families on higher incomes are now eligible for the scheme. If that member wants to rob more than 60,000 families of cost of living relief, I’d suggest to her that she’s out of touch.

Hon Barbara Edmonds: Why did she promise 21,000 families $150 a fortnight when only 153 families have received it?

Hon NICOLA WILLIS: Well, I’m afraid that this is the boy who cried wolf, because I did not make that promise. What I said—and I’ve gone and checked the transcript—is that, at the time that I was asked by journalists at our initial briefing on FamilyBoost how many families we thought would get the maximum entitlement, I said, “I can confirm that based on official modelling, around 21,000 families would be entitled to that payment.” Now, the point is this: first of all, I based that statement on the modelling that had been provided to me in good faith by IRD and, second of all, there is a difference that I encourage the member to contemplate between a maximum payment and a full payment. I can confirm this to this House: every family who has applied for FamilyBoost has received their full entitlement based on the eligibility criteria.

Hon Barbara Edmonds: Why did she promise that 130,000 families would receive FamilyBoost when less than half have actually received it?

Hon NICOLA WILLIS: I find it troubling when I’m misrepresented in this House. I did not say that. I said up to 130,000 families could benefit. You know what? We’ve got lots of years in office left to go, so I’m confident that might happen.

Hon Barbara Edmonds: How many families have received the full $250 that was promised?

Hon NICOLA WILLIS: Every single family who has applied for FamilyBoost has got the full entitlement to which they are eligible. But the thing is this: there are families out there who haven’t applied for their FamilyBoost rebate, who aren’t aware that they can get up to 40 percent of their early childhood fees back in a cash payment straight into their bank account. So I say to every family in New Zealand with kids in early childhood education: get online and apply. Our Government wants you to have that money in your bank account. Barbara Edmonds and Chris Hipkins would take it from you.

Hon Barbara Edmonds: How does 153 families fully benefiting from FamilyBoost compare to the 40,000 children who would have benefited from the 20 hours free extension that her Government cancelled?

Hon NICOLA WILLIS: I find this curious. We have, opposite us, a group of people who claim to be in touch with those who are struggling with the cost of living and yet, at the same time, they are dismissing the relevance of payments of $50 a week, $100 a week, $20 a week. They’re saying that that is not relevant to a working family, that the fact that 60,000 families having received cash rebates through the FamilyBoost scheme is not relevant, and that we should only focus on those who’ve got $150 a fortnight. I’d put to the members of this House that that is simply out of touch with the reality of working people, which is that every dollar counts. Second, I’d say this: you claim people would have benefited from a scheme that you didn’t fund and you couldn’t deliver—

SPEAKER: No, that’s enough.

Hon NICOLA WILLIS: That’s Labour to a T.

SPEAKER: That’s quite enough.

Question No. 6—Health

6. TODD STEPHENSON (ACT) to the Associate Minister of Health: What recent announcements has he made about Pharmac?

Hon DAVID SEYMOUR (Associate Minister of Health): Yesterday, I had an excellent visit hosted by Pharmac, where I delivered the latest letter of expectations for that organisation, asking it to continue modernising and innovating to deliver the medicines and medical technology that Kiwis need. For many New Zealanders, funding for pharmaceuticals is life or death, or the difference between a life of pain and suffering or living freely. Since my first letter of expectations, I think Pharmac has made very good progress. However, as the new letter states, there is still a lot more improvement to be done over at Pharmac.

Todd Stephenson: Can the Minister please outline what progress has been made since his last letter of expectations?

Hon DAVID SEYMOUR: Very proudly, and I think that the staff and the people who’ve worked very hard at Pharmac, including their chair, Paula Bennett, and their board, deserve a lot of thanks for the really heroic work that they’ve done: $604 million of additional taxpayer money put into buying medicines by the Government means that an additional 200,000 New Zealanders benefit. However, the process of assessing and procuring those medicines to make sure they get maximum value for that taxpayer money is very hard work. They’ve also changed the way that they operate, being much more prepared to listen and change. For example, you may have seen with hormone replacement patches and with insulin pumps, they’ve actually been prepared to go back and revisit their original decision. I think that shows that they are really changing their culture. They’ve undertaken quite a serious and in-depth cultural review, and I think the organisation’s been very honest with itself, and now they are about to welcome a new chief executive after a global search: Natalie McMurtry, who is coming from Alberta.

Todd Stephenson: What challenges has he set out in his new letter of expectations?

Hon DAVID SEYMOUR: Despite some excellent improvements and high performance from Pharmac, there are still continued challenges which I’ve asked them to address. One of them is faster assessments. The assessment speed for new medicines has been lower, perhaps because there’s been so much more funding and new medicines to assess. None the less, they need to go faster. They need to become better at assessing the impact of new medicines and technologies on the whole of society in order that they can seek greater uplifts in their budget, where medicines can actually save the health system and the society money by investing in better medicines and technologies. Their culture must continue to improve and they must finally get to a point of clarity on their responsibility for devices—a matter on which I’m working with the Minister of Health, Simeon Brown.

Question No. 7—Health

7. RYAN HAMILTON (National—Hamilton East) to the Minister of Health: What recent announcements has the Government made about strengthening New Zealand’s domestically trained doctor workforce?

Hon SIMEON BROWN (Minister of Health): Great news: yesterday, the Government announced that a new medical school will be established at the University of Waikato. This is more than just a new medical school; it is a bold investment in the future of our health system. With a strong focus on training doctors for primary care and rural communities, we will grow the workforce where it’s needed most. This is exactly the kind of forward-thinking, practical solution that New Zealanders elected us to deliver, and we’re delivering it.

Ryan Hamilton: What impact will the new medical school have on doctorate training in New Zealand?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: This is a transformational step. From 2028, the Waikato medical school will train 120 new doctors every year, adding to our homegrown workforce. It uses a new graduate-entry model that brings in people with real-world experience and a broad range of backgrounds, the kind of experience that our system will benefit from. This is about building a pipeline of capable, community-minded Kiwi doctors who are ready to serve and deliver the access to timely, quality healthcare that New Zealanders deserve.

Hon Louise Upston: How will the new Waikato medical school impact the rural health workforce?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: I thank the member for her question. For too long, a focus on regional New Zealand has been left behind. This Government is changing that by ensuring we have a third medical school, focusing on rural medicine. By supporting the establishment of a medical school based in the heart of the Waikato and focusing the model on rural and primary care, we’re directly addressing the healthcare needs of our rural communities. That is because we know that when people train in place, they stay in place. This is a great step forward for rural communities.

Ryan Hamilton: What other steps is the Government taking to increasing our health workforce?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: Well, this is just one announcement as part of our Government’s wider plan to rebuild our health workforce after six years of neglect. On top of the Waikato medical school, 100 additional medical training places have been added over the term of this Government across the University of Auckland and the University of Otago. We’re also cutting red tape so international doctors can work here more easily. While others talked, we’re delivering. This is a Government that backs our health professionals and is serious about getting our health system back on track.

Question No. 8—Commerce and Consumer Affairs

8. ARENA WILLIAMS (Labour—Manurewa) to the Minister of Commerce and Consumer Affairs: Does he stand by his statement that “Having better competition means that we can bring down the cost of living for Kiwis”; if so, what is he doing, if anything, that reduces the cost of living?

Hon SCOTT SIMPSON (Minister of Commerce and Consumer Affairs): Yes. Boosting competition is a central part of the Government’s plan for economic growth. Stronger competition helps lower the cost of living and improves living standards for all New Zealanders. That’s why I’m advancing a comprehensive review of our competition framework, including the first major overhaul of the Commerce Act in over 20 years. Getting these foundations right is essential to driving competition in our economy.

Arena Williams: Why does his finance Minister talk tough on banks, while he changes the law at their request to ensure that they don’t have to pay hundreds of millions in debts owed to their customers?

Hon SCOTT SIMPSON: As has previously been answered in this House, in questions related to this matter, that is not the intent of the legislation that is currently before the Finance and Expenditure Committee. That legislation seeks only to give the courts a discretion to come to a fair and equitable decision relating to that litigation.

Arena Williams: Is he telling the House that he is not letting Aussie banks off the hook for hundreds of millions of dollars of debt owed to 150,000 Kiwis who would be in line for some help with their mortgages and loans?

Hon SCOTT SIMPSON: There is no suggestion that the litigation that the member refers to will not proceed. What the legislation currently before the Finance and Expenditure Committee seeks to do is give the courts an opportunity to come to a fair and equitable decision about those matters that are before them.

Arena Williams: Has his tough talk on competition helped with the cost of living, when the price of butter is up almost 50 percent in the last 12 months and Kiwis are currently paying more than $8.60 per block?

Hon SCOTT SIMPSON: This is an obvious and appropriate opportunity for me to highlight the great work that the finance Minister, Nicola Willis, is doing in regard to supermarkets. But the member will know that I am conflicted on matters relating to groceries and supermarkets, and so I will defer answers on those matters to the Hon Nicola Willis.

Rt Hon Winston Peters: Why is the Minister taking responsibility for a 2015 banking law which the Labour Party supported?

Hon SCOTT SIMPSON: That’s a very good question. It’s a matter of taking responsibility for an action that should have been corrected by a previous administration that simply failed to do it.

Arena Williams: Has his tough talk on electricity competition helped with the cost of living, when electricity prices are up 8 percent?

Hon SCOTT SIMPSON: One of the pieces of legislation that this coalition Government has passed is the Customer and Product Data Act earlier this year. It was finally passed in March of this year. Now, that is a piece of legislation that enables for what is often referred to as open banking. Now, banking is the first sector that will ultimately be disrupted by new, smart, intelligent, exciting fintech companies that are going to bring a range of new tools and abilities for New Zealand consumers to interact on banking in a way that they haven’t previously been able to do. Now, in relation to electricity, I’ve already indicated that the next sector that will be considered under that open data legislation will be the electricity sector.

Arena Williams: Does he accept that the rising cost of living, and his inaction, despite talk like that, has driven 47,000 New Zealanders to leave our shores last year?

Hon SCOTT SIMPSON: No.

Question No. 9—Prime Minister

9. RAWIRI WAITITI (Co-Leader—Te Pāti Māori ) to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by all his Government’s statements and actions?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON (Prime Minister): Yes.

Rawiri Waititi: Does the Prime Minister agree that the SuperGold card is vital for ensuring the wellbeing and the dignity of senior citizens, especially in regional and rural communities, where public transport and essential services are already limited?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: I’m very proud of the work that we’ve done to support our seniors across New Zealand, and I want to thank the New Zealand First party, in particular. As you saw at the last Budget, there is a rates rebate for 60,000 gold card holders that need support with their rates payments. I think that’s a good initiative to help people in a tough time and a cost of living crisis.

Rawiri Waititi: Has the Government received any advice on whether the regulatory principles in the bill could be used to justify removing or weakening SuperGold card benefits on the principle that every person is equal before the law?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: Not that I’m aware of, but again, I think the member may be mixing the drinks a little. The Regulatory Standards Bill is really about ensuring we have better-quality regulations so we don’t add compliance costs and therefore drive up inflation, which makes the cost of living difficult for people.

Rawiri Waititi: Cheers! Does the Regulatory Standards Bill principle that every person is equal before the law mean that everyone gets a gold card or that senior citizens get theirs taken away?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: Look, as has been discussed before, this is a bill with a narrow focus on improving the quality of regulation. That will benefit both Māori and non-Māori and all New Zealanders in due course.

Rawiri Waititi: Can you answer this very slowly: what assurances, if any, can the Prime Minister give to the Rt Hon Winston Peters that his gold card entitlements would not be restricted or removed by the passing of the Regulatory Standards Bill?

Rt Hon Winston Peters: Point of order, Mr Speaker. Speaking with the greatest respect, that question should not be approved, because the Prime Minister is not responsible for giving me assurances, and if I have to rely upon that questioner for support, my party would be truly desperate.

SPEAKER: The Minister is quite right. I had thought that the latter part of the question may have related to ministerial responsibility. So without a penalty, Rawiri Waititi, have another crack.

Rawiri Waititi: Speaking to the point of order, Mr Speaker.

SPEAKER: Well, I’ve just ruled on it.

Rawiri Waititi: Oh, you’ve ruled on it—OK. What assurances, if any, can the Prime Minister give to senior citizens that their gold card entitlements will not be restricted or removed by the passing of the Regulatory Standards Bill?

Rt Hon CHRISTOPHER LUXON: Well, I think senior citizens can actually see this is a Government that’s helping them on fixed incomes. As I said, a rates rebate expansion to 60,000 gold card members is important. It’s also a Government that has delivered up to $130 a couple in extra super payments as a result of us getting incomes growing faster than costs.

Question No. 10—Health

10. JENNY MARCROFT (NZ First) to the Associate Minister of Health: What recent reports has she seen about smoking in New Zealand?

Hon CASEY COSTELLO (Associate Minister of Health): A recent article by emeritus professor Robert Beaglehole, founder and chair of Action for Smokefree 2025, states that “New Zealand is on the cusp of making history—soon to be … the first truly smokefree nations.” We should be celebrating this. It’s easy to forget that before 2018, we were way off course. We’re not any more, with vaping playing a role in well over 200,000 people quitting smoking since then. On this side of the House, we’re focused on continuing to deliver what we know works and what has worked to get people off cigarettes—clear, supported, reduced-harm pathways away from smoking.

Jenny Marcroft: What do we know about current smokers?

Hon CASEY COSTELLO: Since New Zealand adopted the smokefree targets 14 years ago, one demographic has been particularly challenging: older smokers. It is no surprise that the highest rates of daily smoking are among those aged between 45 and 64. These people are long-term addicted smokers. We also know that Māori and Pasifika smoking rates remain higher than those for other demographics. However, we’re also seeing substantial decline in daily smoking for those groups, with quit rates accelerating, particularly since 2018. We know this is a serious matter. For the first five years of smokefree, from 2011, the number of smokers actually increased for Māori. In the last five years, the number of Māori smokers has more than halved.

Hon Kieran McAnulty: Labour Government.

Rt Hon Winston Peters: Labour Government, my backside.

JENNY MARCROFT: Does knowing who’s smoking help to target cessation efforts—

SPEAKER: No, hang on. Too much noise during that question, and quite frankly too much interjection during the answers, given the nature of the question. Jenny Marcroft.

JENNY MARCROFT: Mr Speaker, thank you. Does knowing who’s smoking help to target cessation efforts?

Hon CASEY COSTELLO: Absolutely it does. There has been significant focus in the past on young smokers, and we’ve had phenomenal success. When the New Zealand Health Survey started, there were 119,000 smokers between the ages of 15 and 24; last year, there were just 19,000. For under17s, we already have a smokefree generation; their smoking rates are 0.6 percent, and we should celebrate that. Now, we need to refocus our efforts on older smokers, on Māori, and on Pasifika. They’re the groups that need the most support and they’re the ones that need to be provided with reduced-harm options to suit their needs.

Jenny Marcroft: What updates does she have on possible regulatory changes to smoking and vaping?

Hon CASEY COSTELLO: A smokefree technical advisory group has been established by the Ministry of Health to discuss what further opportunities there are for changes to the smokefree regulatory framework, what more we can do to support people to quit and stay smokefree, and what more can be done to prevent young people from taking up vaping, and we will report back in September of this year. Of note, engagement with these stakeholders won’t end with this group. We are committed to getting the settings right. That is why Government departments and officials, such as Customs and the Ministry of Health, proactively and regularly meet with industry stakeholders, including even the tobacco companies—as they have done multiple times in the past, including with previous Labour Governments—for input and advice on developing policies and legislation that impact them. This is a basis for good lawmaking.

Question No. 11—Universities

11. SHANAN HALBERT (Labour) to the Minister for Universities: Does he stand by all his statements and actions regarding the Waikato medical school?

Hon SIMEON BROWN (Minister of Health) on behalf of the Minister for Universities: In the context in which the statements were made, yes. This Government is committed to building a stronger health workforce, especially in our GP clinics and rural communities, where the need is greatest. We’ve backed the Waikato medical school with serious investment and a clear plan to deliver a long-term pipeline of doctors—120 more trained every year from 2028. It’s a forward-looking decision that supports our health system, strengthens the economy, boosts regional New Zealand, and gives more Kiwis a pathway into medicine. We’re getting on with it and we’re delivering.

Shanan Halbert: Will the Government commit to funding all of the medical student places at all medical schools in the country, including those currently funded at Otago and Auckland, and the additional 120 expected from 2028?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: As we announced yesterday, we are delivering a third medical school and, on top of that, we are also investing in additional places at the University of Auckland and the University of Otago. We have increased the number of doctor training places by 100 over the term of this Government, and this will increase it by another 120 from 2028.

Shanan Halbert: So is it correct, then, that the Minister is deliberately not committing to fund all medical students from 2028?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: Well, we’ve announced a new medical school and we’ve announced that we will be increasing the number of medical training places from 2028 to ensure that we are increasing—I think it’s going to over 750 doctor training places being allocated every year, from 2028. That is a significant increase in investment by this Government into medical training under this Government.

Shanan Halbert: Can he guarantee that clinical placements for Waikato medical school students will be new placements and not taken from Otago or Auckland universities?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: It is critically important to ensure that we have the clinical placements to go alongside the increased number of doctor training places, and that is all part of the business case, which has been approved by Cabinet yesterday—to ensure we are investing not only in the increased training in the universities but also in the clinical placements. The Tertiary Education Commission and the universities will work closely with Health New Zealand to make sure that we are delivering the clinical placements required for this record investment in more doctor training places across New Zealand.

Shanan Halbert: Why, given serious questions around conflicts of interest and the rejection of Otago’s proposal, hasn’t the Government released the business case already?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: As the Minister of Health said yesterday, the decision was made by Cabinet yesterday, and officials have been instructed to prepare all of the material for proactive release very shortly, and I hope that would be done by the end of the week.

Question No. 12—Universities

12. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (Green) to the Minister for Universities: Does he stand by his announcement about the establishment of a new medical school and that it will “build a stronger, more diverse workforce”; if so, why?

Hon SIMEON BROWN (Minister of Health) on behalf of the Minister for Universities: In the context in which the statement was made, yes. This new medical school is designed as a graduate entry programme, which helps attract students from a broader range of backgrounds and experiences. That’s how we build a stronger, more diverse workforce, one that better reflects the communities it serves, especially in rural and regional New Zealand. It’s a forward-looking decision backed by serious investment, focused on delivering better access to care to put patients first. As I said in my last primary answer, we’re getting on with it and we’re delivering.

Francisco Hernandez: Is the Minister certain that the Waikato medical school will deliver more graduate doctors faster than alternative proposals from Auckland and Otago universities, and, if not, why not?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: Well, as we’ve been incredibly clear on this side of the House, we need to be training more doctors, and we need to ensure that we are investing both in our existing medical schools as well as investing in the Waikato medical school proposal, which the business case and the cost-benefit analysis has shown is the best of those options. So we are doing both. It’s not one or the other; it is both. On this side of the House, we are increasing the number of doctor training spaces at the University of Otago, at the University of Auckland, and we’re investing in the University of Waikato. This is a great day for New Zealand.

Francisco Hernandez: Why did the Minister reject the alternative proposals from Otago and Auckland universities, which would have seen twice as many doctors trained each year, years before the new medical school is stood up, and without the nearly quarter of a billion dollars in establishment costs?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: Well, the proposal was subject to a cost-benefit analysis, and the analysis showed this had the best benefits in terms of training the doctors needed for New Zealand’s future. This Government is not just investing in this proposal; we are also investing in the University of Otago and in the University of Auckland, because we know we need to be training more doctors for the long-term benefit of the healthcare of New Zealanders. That is what we’re doing, and we’re proud to be doing it.

Francisco Hernandez: Can Waikato University still afford the new school without extra Government funding if the big philanthropist backers don’t eventuate, and, if not, will the Government rule out further funding?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: On behalf of the Minister for Universities: the Tertiary Education Commission has provided advice which shows that Waikato University is in a very strong financial position. There has been very strong, rigorous testing around the philanthropic support. And we have been very clear about our funding: that the Government, on behalf of taxpayers, is investing in the Waikato medical school. I just say to members opposite, this is a great day for New Zealand: a third medical school, more doctors being trained. Just say yes. Get on the side of the positive news this is for our country, rather than keeping on complaining. [Interruption]

SPEAKER: Just wait for a bit of courtesy from the House.

Francisco Hernandez: Why is the Government progressing a project that they were advised would raise the risk profile of Waikato University from medium to high even before Waikato University increased their share of the costs from $100 million to $150 million?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: On behalf of the Minister for Universities: we’re investing in this proposal because it has passed the cost-benefit analysis, because it is about making sure we have a third option for medical training in New Zealand—a postgraduate model based on what we see in Australia, where postgraduate students are able to study medicine, people who’ve had other careers can study medicine, and enter the workforce. It’s an exciting proposal, and I encourage members on the other side of the House to get on board and share the excitement.

Mariameno Kapa-Kingi: In the context of a cultural-benefit analysis, how many numbers are dedicated in that to Māori and Māori women doctors in your rural programme, where many of our Māori communities reside?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: On behalf of the Minister for Universities: that mission criteria will obviously be developed, but the intent is to ensure that a wide range of New Zealanders are able to apply. Postgraduate students will be able to apply, and they will be assessed. The aim of this new medical school is to encourage people from rural and regional New Zealand to put their names forward to apply through the admission so they can bring their experience to train to be a doctor and then to work in place and to train in place so they stay in place in regional New Zealand, where we need those doctors to be working.

Francisco Hernandez: If the goal is to create a more diverse workforce, as the Minister affirmed in his previous answers, does he agree with Vice-Chancellor Neil Quigley’s decision that there would not be a programme similar to the Māori and Pacific admissions scheme that they have in Auckland?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: On behalf of the Minister for Universities: what we want to see is the opportunity for all New Zealanders who meet the admission criteria to be able to take up the opportunity. We are backing this proposal because it increases the number of doctors being trained in New Zealand, it attracts people from regional New Zealand and provides them an opportunity to train to be a doctor and to then be able to train in place so they stay in place, serving those regional communities where we know we need more doctors.

Hon Nicola Willis: Can the Minister also confirm that those who are concerned with equity of access to medical training might consider that more people will be able to afford the living costs associated with their education if they are living in Hamilton and attending medical school in Hamilton?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: On behalf of the Minister for Universities: absolutely. The focus of this programme is to provide another choice, another option, for people to be able to become medically trained. I’d also say to members opposite who are worried about the ability to access medicine: what we need is more doctors, and so we need to be training more doctors so we’re able to actually have the access to the healthcare professionals that we need as a country.

Hon Mark Patterson: Has the Minister seen any feedback from stakeholders, like Hauora Taiwhenua Rural Health Network, commenting on this proposal?

Hon SIMEON BROWN: On behalf of the Minister for Universities: yes, I have. I’ve seen significant feedback from organisations such as the one he just mentioned, welcoming this Government’s investment in a third medical school and the opportunity this provides for people from rural and regional New Zealand to be able to enter as postgraduates into this programme, to study for four years rather than six, and to be able to train in place and stay in place, serving their communities. I welcome the members opposite to get on board and get excited about this opportunity.

Mariameno Kapa-Kingi: Supplementary.

SPEAKER: Time for oral question—sorry, wait on. Was there a supplementary?

Mariameno Kapa-Kingi: Thank you. May I?

SPEAKER: Yes.

Mariameno Kapa-Kingi: The advice from the Iwi Māori Partnership Boards, Minister, which I’m hoping you know that—what was their response to what you’re calling a great idea, particularly in regard to Iwi Māori Partnership Boards?

SPEAKER: I’d invite the Minister to give a very calm answer to the question.

Hon SIMEON BROWN: Look, on behalf of the Minister for Universities: I’ve seen a wide range of stakeholders provide support for this proposal, and I note that many of our regional and rural communities have high degrees of deprivation and people who require increased health needs, and they will benefit from this programme, which invests in training in those communities so they can access the healthcare that they need.

SPEAKER: The time for oral questions has expired. Members will take 30 seconds to leave the House quickly and without conversation on the way.

Points of Order

Speaker’s Rulings—Oral Questions

Hon KIERAN McANULTY (Labour): Thank you, Mr Speaker. There’s a trend that I’ve been observing over the last wee while that I’d like to bring to your attention and invite some consideration of. It was evident in the last question, but I make my points in a general sense, not necessarily specific to that question. There are two things that I’m considering here: Speaker’s ruling 205/4 that indicates that Ministers should not bring parties not involved in the question into their answer, and also the rules around footage in the House.

Now, all parties use footage from question time and the House on social media, but there is a requirement that when doing so, it accurately reflects what occurs in the House. When a Minister uses a response to a question from one party that says, “those members on the other side of the House”, whilst being a legitimate contribution in a debate in question time, when presented on social media, it may give the impression that all parties are of that view. In this particular instance, I would argue that the responses to the Minister, if portrayed in isolation, would be an inaccurate reflection of the views of the members that make up the Opposition.

I just request that you consider that and whether some requirements be imposed that when Ministers are responding to a particular party, they be required to be specific in that response so that some potentially unintended misrepresentations aren’t made later.

SPEAKER: Well, look, I thank the member for that. Strictly speaking, the answers should be presented to the Speaker for the House. It is certainly a breach of the Standing Orders and Speakers’ rulings to misuse footage from the House to convey anything other than what factually happened in the House, so I’ll take a look at that. If the member has something specifically for me to look at, I’d like to do that, because in the age of raging misinformation, members of Parliament contributing to that would be quite unacceptable.

Bills

Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill

First Reading

Hon SIMEON BROWN (Minister of Health): I present a legislative statement on the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill.

SPEAKER: That legislative statement is published under the authority of the House and can be found on the Parliament website.

Hon SIMEON BROWN: I move, That the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill be now read a first time. I nominate the Health Committee to consider the bill. At the appropriate time, I intend to move that the bill be reported to the House by 24 November 2025.

This bill is about cutting through bureaucracy, restoring accountability, and, most importantly, putting patients first, because for too long we’ve had a health system where the focus has been on reports, strategies, committees, and union processes while patients sat waiting in pain. As we say on this side of the House: less Wellington waffle, more results. This bill will help clear some of the barnacles off the ship while we steer it in the right direction towards timely, quality healthcare for every New Zealander.

This Government is firmly focused on delivery. That’s why we’re legislating health targets—not just talking about outcomes but making them law—because what gets measured gets managed. Let’s be clear about what those targets are: shorter wait-times in emergency departments; faster access to elective surgeries like hips, knees, and cataracts; on-time immunisations for our children; faster access to cancer treatment; shorter delays for first specialist appointments. These are not abstract statistics; they are the difference between a grandfather regaining his ability to walk after a stroke or spending the rest of his life in a wheelchair, whether a young mum’s cancer is caught early or missed altogether, whether a teenager gets answers today or spends weeks in fear, waiting.

Let’s take a look at the numbers. In 2018, Labour removed the health targets. Emergency department wait-times fell from 90 percent of patients being seen within six hours in 2017 to just 61 percent by late 2023. The number of those waiting over four months for a first specialist assessment skyrocketed by 6,400 percent between 2017-18 and 2023-24, while the number of patients waiting over four months for elective treatment skyrocketed by 2,500 percent over that same time period. At the same time, childhood immunisation rates plummeted to a 10-year low. These are not just numbers; they represent real people: mums, dads, tradies, nurses, grandparents, children. That’s the legacy of Labour’s so-called reform. They promised transformation; what they delivered was longer waits and less care.

Now, they’ll claim it’s all because of their COVID-19 restrictions, but the reality is that performance fell off the cliff the moment they scrapped the National Government’s health targets. Speaking of COVID-19, in the middle of a pandemic, Labour decided that was the best time to restructure the entire health system. And the result? A public health system riddled with failures that should shock every single member of this House. Earlier this year, an independent report from Deloitte found that, under their reforms, Health New Zealand even lacked the basic financial oversights, with no clear accountability, poor performance-tracking, and inadequate systems to manage public funds. In fact, their entire financial system, which we inherited when we came into Government, was that they were running a financial system on an Excel spreadsheet—a multibillion-dollar organisation. That is what the last Government gave us.

There are also several examples across New Zealand where infrastructure projects identified and funded by the previous Government have suffered from poor management and significant delays. Take the Hutt Valley acute mental health unit, funded back in 2019, yet construction only just began under this Government; or the upgrades to Middlemore Hospital; also, the Kidz First work, which we announced on the weekend, also funded in 2019 but not due to begin construction until later this year—again, under this Government. It’s essential that our health infrastructure must be as good as it can be. It should also be commissioned and built as efficiently as possible, by people who are qualified to do it.

The purpose of our public health system should be to give patients timely, quality access to health services. We are fortunate that our health system is staffed by expert nurses, doctors, support staff, and others, who work hard every single day to provide the best care they can to our patients, but they’re let down by a system, and legislation the last Government passed, that has promoted a large and inefficient bureaucracy, a lack of accountability, and confusion about direction instead of a laser focus on delivering the best outcomes we can for patients. That’s why, for this Government, one of the first steps we took was to reinstate the health targets to ensure that there is transparency and accountability for patients. We have put patients back at the heart of our health system to ensure the system is delivering for them, and today this bill takes the next step.

I’m proud to present this bill to Parliament as a core component of this Government’s health delivery plan. The primary aim of this bill is to refocus our public health system, in particular Health New Zealand, and strengthen the arrangements that it has. These changes will ensure we can all be confident the health system gets back on track. This bill does four main things. First, it inserts a new purpose in the Pae Ora (Healthy Futures) Act, which will ensure that patients—patients—get timely access to quality health services. It’s hard to believe that this Act, which is so central to our country’s health system, does not have this purpose at its core—the word “patients”. This purpose will ensure the Government’s priorities are the core of this legislation and will form the basis for what Health New Zealand, in particular, is expected to achieve.

Secondly, it repeals the health sector principles and charter. Let’s be clear: we don’t need another 16-page charter that forgets to mention the word “patient” yet references “unions” 11 times. We need shorter wait-times, faster surgeries, more kids being immunised—that’s the job that we need done. The health sector principles, in particular, are a recipe of unfocused and diffused decision-making, and set no less than 21 different matters that every decision maker must be guided and informed by when making decisions. The principles will be replaced by mandated health targets, which must be included in the Government Policy Statement on Health. This will ensure that the health system has a laser focus on delivery in the core areas where the Government expects results.

Mandating the health targets in legislation provides clarity and certainty for the entire health sector going forward. All health entities, including Health New Zealand, will be required to give effect to the targets. The health strategy will also be required to give effect to them. We expect results against these targets. We expect the entire health system to be focused on them. We also expect transparency about whether they are being achieved, and that’s why we’re reporting on them every three months. The situation under the previous Government—where waiting times for emergency departments ballooned and childhood immunisation rates plummeted—cannot be allowed to repeat itself.

Thirdly, the bill will strengthen the governance arrangements for Health New Zealand and give the Crown entity a much-needed objective and function for Health New Zealand relating to infrastructure. The Government is already making steps to strengthen this area and will be putting in place a permanent Health Infrastructure Committee, whose members will be appointed by the Minister so we have stronger governance in this area. This bill will also clarify that a function of Health New Zealand is to work with private healthcare providers. When they get a hip operation, New Zealanders do not care which operating theatre they’re in; they just want it done, and that’s what this Government is focused on delivering.

Fourthly, the bill will complete the reform that began with the disestablishment of the Māori Health Authority by strengthening the role of the Hauora Māori Advisory Committee (HMAC) and providing greater focus for iwi-Māori partnership boards (IMPBs). HMAC includes some of the best-qualified people in New Zealand to advise on Māori health. Its role will be elevated so it provides advice both to the Minister and to the ministry and to the board of Health New Zealand. It will be given a clear statutory function, and the board will be required to take account of its advice. The role of IMPBs will be refocused to engage with their communities and provide advice to HMAC about local needs and priorities and advice to Health New Zealand and the Minister.

It is important also that this bill will ensure that Health New Zealand has a clear focus on public service delivery. We’ll be making sure that Health New Zealand staff must uphold the Public Service principle of political neutrality and follow the Public Service code of conduct.

This Government has put record funding in place for our health system—an additional $16.68 billion over three Budgets—and now we expect results. This bill is not complicated. It’s not ideological. It’s common sense. It puts targets in law, it reduces the bureaucracy, and it puts patients back at the centre of the health system, where they belong. At the end of the day, the job is simple: the Government sets the priorities in the Budget, Health New Zealand delivers care to the people, and we hold them to account for results. That’s what this legislation is about, and that’s why I commend it to the House. I look forward to the Health Committee’s consideration of the bill, and I invite the committee to particularly consider whether there are other further refinements that can be made to streamline our health system. I commend this bill to the House.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Hon Dr AYESHA VERRALL (Labour): The claim that this bill is not ideological is really a bald one to make—one that directs the health system to engage more with the private sector is “not ideological”; one where the legislative statement says the name of the Act is changed so that the English one is first and the Māori is second is “not ideological”. Goodness me, I don’t know what that Minister means by “not ideological”.

I’ll tell you what this bill isn’t: it isn’t anything to fix anything in the health system. Of course, we recognise that the Government has a right to set targets, and it has done so through its Government policy statement. What is passing that into law going to change? It is not going to give the Government any more powers with respect to achieving its policy direction. So I would say this bill is both ideological and utterly political, and not actually directed at changing anything meaningful in the health system.

The Minister took quite a few liberties with talking about the past Government’s actions, and I intend to take the same liberties myself. Let us recall what this Government has done in its management of the health system. It came in and its first action was to institute a hiring freeze. They have avoided owning up to it, but doctors and nurses on the ground have told us again and again they cannot get gaps in their services filled. It is getting harder and more expensive to get the care you need under Christopher Luxon’s Government because of this Government’s actions.

They went about trying to claim that they had spent record amounts in the health system, and brought to select committee accounts that had over $200 million misrepresented in terms of which year they should have fallen in as expenses—a change that supported the Government’s narrative of there being a problem that they were fixing, but, in fact, the reverse was the truth. This Government did try to misrepresent the health system’s books so New Zealanders would expect that they were going to get less care. They went looking for savings in the health system and what did they do? Well, they found they could cut toast at Wellington Hospital. They took so many of these reforms behind closed doors.

I want to draw some attention to some of our concerns about this bill. Firstly, it has removed much of the power from and decision-making role of iwi-Māori partnership boards. Now, it was one of the few avenues for Māori to have their needs elevated in the health system that remained when the Government didn’t repeal this part of the Pae Ora (Healthy Futures) Act. But they’re further weakening the ability of iwi-Māori partnership boards to positively improve health at the local level. They’re no longer permitted to have a perspective on how the health system is performing. They’re losing their role in evaluating local Māori health needs. They are not able to expect accountability for services at the local level. Their job is now to report back to an advisory committee in Wellington. That’s a terrible loss of Māori voice, and our health system will be worse for it.

But I want to tell you something else: they’ve also removed all the local voice for patients altogether. They have delayed localities in their last amendment to this Act. They are going about gutting the consumer and whānau voice sections of the health system as we speak. It’s so ironic, because they campaigned against a centralised health system, and what have they done? Vested power in one man and created four giant regional bureaucracies and removed opportunities for locals to be involved. So I look forward to the members of the Health Committee, sitting opposite, learning that that is in fact what’s happened to their health system at select committee. We stand against this bill.

HŪHANA LYNDON (Green): Tēnā koe, Mr Speaker. I stand on behalf of the Green Party to say kāhore. This is not Pae Ora anymore. This Government has turned its back on Te Tiriti o Waitangi and on the recommendations from Wai 2575 of the Waitangi Tribunal, which informed the Pae Ora (Healthy Futures) legislation. That’s what this Government’s done—they’re turning their back on te iwi Māori and those most vulnerable in our communities.

Now, let’s look at the way that these amendments have been rushed through with no evidence, based on vibes. There was no issue in the first place that this legislation is meant to be fixing. There has been no engagement with any of the public on this. There has been little to no kōrero between our Government departments and agencies, right down to the Ministry of Health and also Te Whatu Ora. There has been only a discussion with the Māori health advisory committee, and what did they say? There’s nothing reported as to what the feedback was that the Minister received. That’s a part of the issue—the speed of change that is coming is not evidence-based and is based on vibes.

Te Whatu Ora has an obligation through the existing Pae Ora to give effect to Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Now, these changes are the Regulatory Standards Bill hauora Māori. This is coming through by stealth. This is a tāhae and a kuhu. This is he mahi huna nā tēnei Kāwanatanga ki te iwi Māori, ki te hapori whānui [a deception by this Government on the Māori people and the wider community].

That’s what you’re doing—coming through quietly, like a thief in the night, to strip back the powers, our voice, of local whānau, community, and our workforce. If we look at the health charter, Te Mauri o Rongo, it was something that was built up through solid consultation with the workforce, with our unions, and with kaimahi. Te Mauri o Rongo is there for the entire health sector to be supported in the way that they can provide safety of care to patients, whānau, and communities within the health system. But no, no, no, this Government is taking away the health charter, Te Mauri o Rongo, which gave effect, again, to the Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 2575. It’s a huri kōaro once again.

This Government, through this legislation, is also stripping back anything population health - based. It’s like going back to the 1990s, I would say. If you’re anybody with any difference—whether you’re Māori, whether you’re takatāpui, whether you’re whaikaha, whether you’re migrant, refugee, anybody with difference, anyone who’s facing challenges in community—no, no, no; no strategy for you now. All of the strategies that are meant to be delivered on and developed so that we can see and feel ourselves within the health system are being stripped back, because it’s all going to the health strategy alone—one thing. We’re going to become a chapter. That’s what our people are going to become—a chapter. We won’t have the Hauora Māori strategy, we won’t have the Pacific health strategy, we won’t have the health and disability, and we won’t have women’s health, rural health, or mental health and wellbeing, because it’s all being stripped back.

Patients are the focus, forgetting the rest of the population, the whānau and community. That was the vision of Tā Mason Durie—the vision was healthy, thriving individuals, whānau, and community. This is not Pae Ora; this is “Pae Mate”. Let’s be clear. You tāhae our kupu Māori, and then you go and takahē on us and treat us like we’re tūtūā. Te iwi Māori ain’t no tūtūā. He iwi rangatira te iwi Māori. Kāhore mātou i te tūtūā, engari ngā mahi a tēnei Kāwanatanga e takahi ana i te Tiriti, e takahi ana i te iwi Māori, e takahi ana i ērā o ngā mātāpono, e ū tonu tō tātou iwi ināia tonu nei.

[The Māori people are a noble people. We are not dishonourable, but the actions of this Government are an abuse of the Treaty, they are an abuse of the Māori people, and they are an abuse of those particular principles that our people are resolute right now.]

Iwi-Māori partnership boards—what are they now? They’re only advisory, up to the Māori health advisory committee. Let’s talk about the Māori health advisory committee. They are a shoulder-tapped, ministry-appointed role in the system. They aren’t here through iwi mandate, iwi-Māori partnership boards. They were mandated through the people. The Hauora Māori Advisory Committee, which has been elevated to ngā rangi tūhāhā [the independent heavens], is through the Minister. They have no accountability back to te iwi Māori, and our iwi-Māori partnership boards are merely whānau voice. Meinga, meinga! Moumou te wā ki te mahi tahi a-iwi nei ki roto i te pūnaha hauora. Moumou te wā.

[Is that so! It is a waste of time to collaborate on an iwi basis within the health system. A waste of time.]

That’s what the Government is doing. It’s forgetting about inclusion and equity for all of us who face challenges within our communities. Those of us most vulnerable are not seeing ourselves in this bill moving forward. Kia ora.

TODD STEPHENSON (ACT): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I rise on behalf of ACT to speak on the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill, and I want to thank the Minister for bringing this bill to the House. It makes some important changes to actually put the focus back on patients. I want to say it’s actually quite astounding to think that we have to insert a section into the purpose to say that patients should be getting timely access to quality health services, so that’s a really, really important change.

I also want to thank the Minister, because he’s picked up on some of the things that ACT campaigned on in making some changes. ACT supported and campaigned on some of these changes in healthcare, because we want to make sure that what we’re delivering in healthcare is based on need, not race. Every New Zealander deserves timely, quality healthcare, regardless of their ethnicity. The changes that are being made in this legislation stop embedding some of the race-based criteria into what was being done around appointments and service delivery. We think that is wrong and we think the focus needs to be on skills, experience, and outcome, not identity.

Repealing some of the provisions in here that require Health New Zealand to do specific report-backs to Māori, and maintaining some cultural frameworks, is actually about streamlining the processes our health system works under and ensuring that universal standards apply. We are certainly not saying that Māori health outcomes don’t matter, but what we’re saying is that the focus for the system needs to be designed for everyone equally, and we need to make sure everyone gets access to healthcare when they need it. So let’s get rid of these race-based obligations.

It’s also very encouraging to see that we’re adding targets into the Act and making sure we actually measure things that are going to make a difference in our health system. I also welcome the Minister clarifying that the health system needs to work with private providers. Really, it should go without saying, but having to introduce political neutrality sections into the bill is important, but we do expect our health system and our public servants to be politically neutral and actually be delivering for New Zealanders.

So I really do welcome this, and I do thank the Minister for also saying that the select committee can look at other refinements in the Act. We hope that that will be a fruitful discussion for this bill, and we look forward to supporting it in later readings.

JENNY MARCROFT (NZ First): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I’m pleased to stand on behalf of New Zealand First in support of the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill. Now, the purpose of this bill is a really good one. It’s to improve the effectiveness of health service delivery to all New Zealanders. Who can disagree with that?

The health system, during the COVID period, was in total disarray because the former Government, under the cloak of COVID, decided to basically pull apart the health system and then try to put it back together into one big entity. All whilst those in the health service, those workers, were dealing with a country under COVID conditions. It was exactly the wrong time in which to do major once-in-a-generation reform of the health sector.

Dr David Wilson: Madness.

JENNY MARCROFT: It was absolutely madness, as my colleague has just said. What we require, though, of this health system is to actually refocus and put patients first. We need better access to the care that they need, when they need it, in a timely manner.

The objective of the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill is to improve the effectiveness of the health services delivery for patients. It will refocus the purpose, objectives, and functions of Health New Zealand so that patients get the quality and timely access to health services they need. It will also add a new objective so that Health New Zealand will deliver effective and timely services. It will also have a focus on the infrastructure that’s often forgotten over the years—actually having a focus on infrastructure so that we don’t have these massive deficits moving forward. It also notes the targets and puts in place legislated targets to ensure there’s faster elective treatments, shorter delays for cancer treatments, faster specialist assessments, more childhood immunisations rolled out, and greater access to primary care.

It’s on primary care that I’d like to focus now, because primary care is the gatekeeper to the health system. It’s the first port of call when someone is ill, so we need a really strong primary care setting. Addressing need, real need, in the primary care setting will mean that people will have much better health outcomes, which is so important. As Dr Bryan Betty from General Practice NZ has said, “Quality, comprehensive, continuous access to primary care in general practice will reduce demand for hospital-level care.”

Having that primary care focus inside this legislation, I believe, is a really important way to focus the health system, to get patients seen to, and to put patients first. I commend this bill to the House.

DEBBIE NGAREWA-PACKER (Co-Leader—Te Pāti Māori): First of all, we stand in absolute fierce opposition to this ridiculous bill. What we agree with, with the Minister, is that we should have a top-quality health system. We shouldn’t have the high wait-list we have, we shouldn’t have health staff under-resourced and underpaid, and we shouldn’t have the failings that we’ve seen through consecutive Governments coming through in our health. But we do, and that should be improved, but not at the cost of Māori equity.

That’s what this is about. The proposition being put to ordinary Kiwis—and I love that terminology, “ordinary Kiwis”—out there is that Māori are the reason why the health system has been failing Māori, and the fact that we had inequities is the reason why we’re removing Te Tiriti from the legislation. That is why we’re repealing the legislation. That is why we’re saying to iwi-Māori partnership boards, “You will no longer be in charge. You will no longer be co-designing what your districts want. You will no longer be sitting there having a strong Māori iwi voice. You’re relegated to being advisory only. You’re relegated down.”, because you know what? We have a Government that believes the only way to address this nation’s problems is to whitewash it. That’s what we have happening in this health system, and it happened when they destroyed Te Aka Whai Ora.

I want to be really clear: I’m not opposed just to this settler Government; I’m opposed to other settler Governments that put these kaupapa in place and didn’t follow through, because when it came to COVID, I’ll tell you who took the weight off the health system. I’ll tell you who helped their whole communities. I’ll tell you who went out there on the line and took the hits when the Government’s one-stop-shop solutions for the public health system failed Māori. It was iwi and Māori. It was iwi and Māori. When we weren’t recognised as needing vaccination support, it was iwi and Māori.

We have a long memory, and what we have here is a bill that is proposing to take away Māori health targets. We have a bill, whānau mā—I’ll be really clear: surprise, surprise, the Government is repealing Te Tiriti in this legislation. It is taking away any equity Māori targets. It is reducing, demoting, whitewashing the role of iwi-Māori partnership boards. Iwi mā, your economic dollars are wanted, your economic partnerships are wanted, but do not come and talk to them about your social aspirations. New Zealand First were in bed with Labour in 2017, so let’s stop having that argument. The reality is no one is going to back a Māori-led solution for Māori health other than Māori, and every expert across the motu—Māori and non-Māori—has talked about it.

I want to share some of their w’akaaro. We have the likes of Naida Glavish, who said that this is a direct attack—a direct attack—on Māori wellbeing. We have Professor Sue Crengle, who said that this bill is devastating—it’s devastating—to the aspirations of Māori and our ability to not want to be at the bottom of the queue, to not want to die seven to eight years earlier than everyone else, and to not want to have the worst statistics. We don’t want that to be our solution, and we don’t believe that we are the reason why the health system has to be revamped at the cost of Māori equity. What we have is also Dr Rawiri Keenan, who called it what it is: control over care.

It’s ethnocide. It’s ethnocide. That’s what this Government has done. It has continued to claw back the national Iwi Chairs Forum, the New Zealand Public Service Association Māori caucus, New Zealand Medical Students’ Association, Hāpai Te Hauora. All the Waitangi Tribunal claimants have called this out for what it is: it is clawing back, rolling back, our wellbeing, Māori wellbeing, for everyone else for the reason, the rationale, of equality—one law, one procedure, one policy, one legislation for all. It’s trying to deny the historical context of why Māori were historically disadvantaged in the first place. This bill is creating waves of distrust—and the fact that the Minister tried to stand up and say, “I am going to make your health system better by getting rid of all the equity roles and measurement, those iwi-Māori partnerships, those Māori targets, and all of those.”

Despite that, Māori mā, a COVID could come down tomorrow. We would all stand up and look after the wider community. This Government is cruel, and it does not value you in any way or form. I want to make sure that this bill, if it doesn’t fail, will be the first thing to be repealed when you’re no longer here. I can’t wait to get the opportunity in Government in 2026 to repeal this bill as fast as we can. Kia ora rā.

SAM UFFINDELL (National—Tauranga): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I want to commend the Minister of Health for bringing this bill to the House. It’s a fantastic bill. It finally puts patients at the centre of our healthcare system. For too long, we’ve wandered off, looking at bureaucracy and a number of other things. It’s putting back health targets; it’s putting them in place so that we will hold the health system accountable for delivering it. It removes the clutter. There were a lot of unrelated items in there related to things that didn’t actually enhance patient outcomes. We’re focused on delivering for all New Zealanders.

That previous speech was one of the worst I’ve ever heard in the House. The Minister’s one, which was the first one, was spot on. I’m looking forward to looking at this in the Health Committee. I commend this bill to the House.

INGRID LEARY (Labour—Taieri): This bill is the epitome of arrogance. It is promoting an autocratic style for the health system. It erodes public system and public sector neutrality. But, most disturbingly, by taking away looking at equity, it really does make it about pae mate [sickness] rather than pae ora. It completely takes it away from prevention. By focusing on patients rather than on equity, it pretty much, in one fell swoop, wipes away any kind of public health initiatives or things that keep people healthy, and that is just the wrong approach.

It is so disingenuous of the health Minister to suddenly talk about how hard the healthcare sector workers work and how much time he has for them, when we know that they are burnt out, we know that they are going in droves to Australia. In fact, he accused nurses with the nurse union of politicising the patient ratio numbers, when all they were trying to do is get safe numbers so that people can safely be cared for.

It is so disingenuous for him to stand in this House now and say that he is on the side of the healthcare sector and then workers, when it is his Government’s reforms, his Government’s cuts, his Government’s autocratic style that has got them so burnt out and so concerned for the health system, and now the way of responding instead of actually doing something to rebuild the system and to fund it properly—the way that they respond is to try to put into the legislation things to send a message to healthcare workers that they cannot criticise this Government. There is no other reason to put the health neutrality statements into the legislation except to try to put fear into the hearts of the clinicians who have bravely stood up because of the oath that they have taken around making healthcare available to all people.

When I look at what is being repealed—I mean, it’s quite disturbing. There are principles about being equitable. There are principles about engaging with Māori population groups and others to reflect their needs and aspirations. I do not see either of those as clutter. That is about equity. There are principles that will be removed about providing choice of quality services to Māori and other population groups—other population groups, like rural groups, who we know don’t have the same access to healthcare. It also removes principles about protecting and promoting people’s health and wellbeing.

When we look at what is happening now, despite all the rhetoric coming from the Government, it is true that patient wait times are longer, that people are getting sicker, that they cannot get access to healthcare close to home at costs that they can afford. Those are the aspirations that our health system should have. But the numbers do not lie and neither do the clinicians who are making those statements—and many of them are.

When we look at the targets that the Government is so wedded to, are they measuring the right things? I don’t think so. We have, for example, targets that talk about getting cancer treatments, but we don’t have any targets about cancer screening—surely that is one of the most important targets, and in terms of equity, an incredibly important target if we want to keep people well for longer.

When I look at the changes that have come, first with the cut to the Māori Health Authority, and now the diminishment to the iwi-Māori advisory board, which is just placing it as something that has to respond and confer upwards rather than be able to have any kind of say over the health of its people—all of this is about centralisation. It’s about one-size-fits-all. It’s about putting fear into people who dare to speak out. These are absolutely contrary to the promises that Christopher Luxon made at the last election.

It is so disingenuous for people like the Minister of Health to stand up here now and say that this is all about creating a better healthcare system. It’s short-sighted. He clearly doesn’t place any value on preventative health, on understanding the health inequities which are demonstrated through the seven-year life expectancy of Māori and six-year life expectancy of Pacific people. It is a terrible bill, and I do not commend it.

Dr HAMISH CAMPBELL (National—Ilam): I rise to support the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill in this first reading. This legislation is a critical step in strengthening and making our healthcare system more effective. Our healthcare system has been stymied by the previous reforms. The bureaucracy has overshadowed health outcomes, and we just need to look at the purpose of what we’re doing here today. We are adding a new purpose to this bill, one which ensures that patients get timely access to quality healthcare.

It is amazing that we actually have to put that in the purpose, that it’s not there already, because I think most New Zealanders want to have quality, timely healthcare. Crucially, health targets are now going to be enshrined in law. This provides clarity and certainty and ensures a laser focus on getting real results for patients. This is things like cancer care, it is immunisation, it’s emergency department times—it is about accountability. Therefore, I commend this bill to the House.

Dr TRACEY McLELLAN (Labour): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I find it quite ironic that the Minister would say, and the contributors would say, in one breath that this bill seeks to improve the health system and then systematically go through and do so many things that do just the opposite. One thing that we do agree on is that everybody deserves the chance to stay healthy and, when they’re not, they deserve the opportunity to have access to healthcare—good quality healthcare—no matter where they live and where cost isn’t a barrier. Nothing in this bill actually does that, apart from pretty words that are written in a purpose statement, which are then completely contravened by the further parts to this bill.

The Minister made a bit of a hoo-ha about the fact that he was addressing some sort of ideological mishap, or some sort of ideological slant that he took exception to, and he has then gone along himself and planted heaps of ideological slants in this bill that don’t serve people’s purposes. Two things that disturb me, which haven’t been spoken about in great depth so far, are what I will perceive as a silencing of the health workforce. I think that the bill fundamentally misuses the Public Service neutrality aspect to do that. That is a chilling thing to do. Front-line health workers, who have a professional obligation, an ethical and a legal obligation, to call out things that they see in their professional practice—it is not political; it is professional, and they should not in any way, shape, or form have this hanging over them, this concept of the misuse of Public Service neutrality.

Speaking out is not a political move, as I said; it is absolutely professional, and there are those obligations. Those obligations are, in fact, embedded in their code of conduct—in the Medical Council, in the Nursing Council, and in other regulatory bodies—and it’s incredibly important. As a society and as consumers of the health system, we absolutely rely on those health workers to be able to speak out freely. I do think this has a chilling effect, and I do look forward to the fact that, when this goes to select committee, we will hear evidence from people who actually do know what they’re talking about, about what the potential unintended consequences of that could be.

The second thing that piqued my interest in this bill—that, as I said, has an opportunity to actually do what it says it wants to do, and that’s to improve the health system. For goodness’ sake, we know that things are getting worse and worse. Over the last 18 months, dozens and dozens of stories have permeated through the media about how hard it is out there and how the last thing we want is for it to be more expensive. Under this Government, it is certainly going backwards. The privatisation by stealth, the risk to that universal public healthcare, that is open in this bill is not the answer. The bill opens the door to making it a formal objective—a formal objective of Health New Zealand—to work with private health providers.

We’ve heard the Minister say trite statements like, “People don’t care where as long as they get their operation.” It’s not as simple as that. It’s the same health workforce. The provisions in this bill are not about using private care simply to fill urgent gaps. It’s actually about embedding what is a parallel system and moving money from the public system, increasingly flowing it into private interests. I think that is incredibly dangerous. Once private provisions become normalised—and we’ve heard this time and time again, and there are some real stalwart experts who have been working to make sure that this issue comes to the forefront—it’s incredibly hard to peel that back. We know that the service shifts to where there is profit, we know that providers can then cherry pick lower-risk and higher-paying patients, and we know that the long-term investment in the public system simply dries up.

I also think that it has been incredibly sad to listen to some of the rhetoric. Taking steps to overcome inequities isn’t inherently race-based at all, as has been projected on the other side of the House. It just so happens that New Zealand’s ethnicity, in New Zealand, is a genuine factor in those inequities, and there is nothing wrong with seeking to reverse that. I do not commend this bill to the House.

Dr VANESSA WEENINK (National—Banks Peninsula): Thank you, Mr Speaker. It is a pleasure to speak on the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill. The previous Government’s changes to the health system were a complete omni-shambles, or to put it another way from the military, we would call it FUBAR—and I won’t spell out what that stands for. But the overall effect of the previous administration’s changes have been to disorientate the decision making and communication. No one has had either the authority or, frankly, the temerity to make any decisions, and the responsibility for the consequences of that have been opaque as well. This brings back direction to the health system. I commend the bill to the House.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill be now read a first time.

Ayes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 54

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 5.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill be reported to the House by 24 November 2025.

Ayes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 54

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 5.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill be considered by the Economic Development, Science and Innovation Committee.

Ayes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 54

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 5.

Motion agreed to.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read a first time.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): The question is, That the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill be considered by the Health Committee.

Motion agreed to.

Bill referred to the Health Committee.

Instruction to Health Committee

Hon CASEY COSTELLO (Associate Minister of Health): I move, That the Healthy Futures (Pae Ora) Amendment Bill be reported to the House by 24 November 2025.

Motion agreed to.

Bills

Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill

First Reading

Hon NICOLE McKEE (Associate Minister of Justice): I present a legislative statement on the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill.

SPEAKER: That legislative statement is published under the authority of the House and can be found on the Parliament website.

Hon NICOLE McKEE: I move, That the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill be now read a first time. I nominate the Economic Development, Science and Innovation Committee to consider the bill, and, at the appropriate time, I intend to move that the bill be reported to the House by 24 November 2025.

An effective anti - money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism—which I will now call the AML/CFT—system is critical to New Zealand’s efforts to detect, prevent, and disrupt financial crime. In order to work, the system needs a consistent, coordinated approach across all responsible agencies. However, it also needs to be pragmatic, engaging with industry and recognising the real-world challenges that businesses face in meeting the AML/CFT obligations. As Minister, I’ve heard from many New Zealanders about the frustrations of the current system: it’s complex, obstructive, and places repetitive, burdensome obligations on businesses. It fails to take a truly risk-based approach, and often treats all businesses the same, regardless of the risks that they pose.

When the legislation was first enacted, three independent supervisors were created. Even then, it was recognised that this structure would make it difficult to deliver a consistent approach. That has proven true. The current model is expensive and fragmented. It creates confusion, delays progress, and relies on rigid regulations rather than flexible, practical tools like rules, guidelines, and notices. As a result, the system is no longer fit for purpose. It struggles to respond to emerging risks, new business models, and advances in technology. It doesn’t strike the right balance, over-regulating low-risk activity while failing to keep pace with high-risk threats.

Regulation must be aligned with the fundamental purpose of the AML/CFT, and that is to combat crime. That’s why the changes proposed in this legislation deliver on the coalition Government’s priorities of cracking down on crime while also cutting red tape for New Zealand businesses. This bill modernises our AML/CFT framework to reflect international best practice and support a smarter, risk-based approach. No more one-size-fits-all compliance—we’re moving away from a tip-box model to one that distinguishes between real risk and routine business activity.

The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill seeks to make four key, structural reforms. The first major reform is to appoint the Department of Internal Affairs as the AML/CFT supervisor—the sole supervisor. This change will streamline decision making, improve consistency, and reduce unnecessary compliance burdens, especially for low-risk businesses and transactions. It will also allow for quicker, more coordinated responses to emerging issues, and provide businesses with clearer and more practical guidelines. The Department of Internal Affairs will also be better positioned to advance digital solutions, like identity verification technologies, that they have stalled under the current, fragmented model.

The second reform updates the roles and powers of the remaining regulatory agencies: the Department of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and also the Police. As we’ve expanded the scope of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act beyond traditional financial services, we’ve uncovered gaps. For instance, many obligated businesses now operate from private dwellings. While most comply, some do not, and the supervisors currently lack the tools to effectively monitor them. This amendment will give the supervisor the power to enter private dwellings used for business activities captured under the Act, ensuring enforcement can occur where it is most needed.

The third reform shifts many prescriptive regulatory requirements into more flexible secondary legislation, such as codes of practice, rules, and notices. The over-reliance on rigid regulations has been a direct result of the three-supervisor model. With a single supervisor, we can now adopt more agile, responsive ways of setting and updating obligations, tailored to evolving risks and business needs.

The fourth reform is the introduction of an industry levy to support a new hybrid funding model. This model ensures the AML/CFT system is sustainably resourced while maintaining the flexibility to reform and improve. The levy will be proportionate to risk and capacity to pay, targeting larger, profitable, high-risk sectors such as banking, while protecting the viability of smaller businesses. This is consistent with international practice and will ensure that those who benefit most from a safe financial system contribute to maintaining it. Importantly, the levy will be developed in consultation with industry and tied to a national AML/CFT strategy so it reflects both business realities and the Government’s crime-fighting priorities.

These changes are significant. They ensure that our AML/CFT system continues to protect New Zealand from financial crime, while also supporting businesses to meet their obligations in a fair, proportionate, and practical way. This bill enhances clarity, reduces compliance costs, and delivers stronger oversight. By introducing a single supervisor and a modern funding approach, it sets the foundation for an AML/CFT regime that is both effective and enduring. I commend this bill to the House.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central): Kia ora, Mr Speaker. Kia orana. Thank you for that. Look, first of all, straight out of the gate, we are going to support this bill to select committee. That’s not to say that it has our wholehearted support. We want to see it at select committee because we want to really have a close, close look at it.

The first thing I want to say is this: effective anti - money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism laws and regulations is not “red tape”. It’s the opposite of red tape. It is a critical part of our financial infrastructure, and a critical part of the effective detection, prosecution, and prevention of serious organised crime. When we see methamphetamines skyrocketing—and, clearly, the sale of methamphetamines is skyrocketing in our community—the suggestion that we should be just lowering the bar across the board is a real concern.

Now, we agree with the principle of proportionality and risk-based regulation, but we need to be very cautious when we say family trusts are safe—because some of them might be, but some of them also are not—or that we should just open the gates and kids can open bank accounts. Well, kids’ bank accounts can be used for money laundering and for the financing of terrorism. Caution is really, really important here. So, yes, let’s have a look at it.

One of the key things that this bill does is it moves the place where the rules are made down substantially—essentially, into Government, into the Department of Internal Affairs. Now, we agree with flexibility, and we agree that laws and rules should be made at the lowest, effective, and accountable level. But if we’re going to be changing rules about money laundering, I think we need to exercise some caution, and we need to make sure that there is accountability. There is a real risk if the real rules, where they interface with the supervised entities, is policy, where it’s the manual that’s been written by some policy adviser in internal affairs rather than been given the scrutiny, certainly, that this place gives the laws that we make but also in terms of actual regulations. Orders in Council get scrutinised by the Regulations Review Committee and are subject to much more rigorous procedures. So, yes, we agree with risk-based regulation, but we don’t agree with throwing the doors wide open.

I guess the other thing I would say about this, in terms of the levy—yes, the idea that, you know, all of this is done by regulation. The bill itself is very neutral as to what the levy will be and who will pay it. It just empowers the Minister, essentially, by Order in Council to impose these levies. That’s OK if it’s done right. But, again, we need to be really cautious here. The detection of organised crime—the prosecution of money laundering—is a core function of the State. It isn’t something which is kind of a collateral benefit to the finance industry and they should pay for. I’ve read the paper on the levy, and it recognises that. It appears, if I’ve read it correctly, to cap the levy at around $22 million. I do think we need to make it absolutely clear that in terms of the detection of crime, the enforcement of crime, prevention of crime, and prosecution, that should come from a general appropriation, because that is a core function of the State, rather than something which should be funded out of a levy because it gives a private benefit to an industry or a group of people.

Again, we’re supporting this bill, but you’ll have picked up that we have genuine concerns about it. We do want to see a workable functioning anti - money laundering and countering of financing of terrorism framework. We’re committed to that. That’s why we’ll agree—and why we need a four-month report-back date, is the final thing I’ll say. Six months would have been fine—a much better idea.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand to speak on the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill. The Green Party, too, will support this bill to select committee, as well, and I just want to detail a few of the reasons for that.

I think, more broadly, let’s look at the context in terms of this bill. This is part of a suite of legislation that has been introduced around anti - money-laundering and countering financing of terrorism, or AML/CFT. But in this particular case, what we’re looking at here—more broadly, one of the reasons for this—is around the idea of simplifying and making more flexible in terms of some of the regulations. Those are introducing a single supervisor for AML/CFT obligations on regulated entities as opposed to three, which is what we currently have.

I think if we’re looking at the even broader picture, in terms of our AML/CFT regulations, we do need to see some changes, and this is something that was recommended by the Financial Action Task Force, and this is something that we do see is kind of needed. But I think, in the context of this particular bill, there are a lot of conditions, and, also, we talked about levies and other matters that have been included in this bill; however, what we’re not seeing in terms of the legislation itself is potentially the ramifications that this bill will have on addressing the broader idea of AML/CFT.

Now, understandably, one of the concerns that the Financial Action Task Force has raised is around our regulatory environment. I think the previous speaker has mentioned that regulations in this case are needed for a reason, in terms of the safety and security of our financial infrastructure, but also so that people don’t get away with things, particularly when it comes to financial and white-collar crime. Indeed, one of the things that we saw also in recent times is around the fact that the Serious Fraud Office, although it got a small reduction—from memory—in the Budget, is planning on ramping up some of its potential investigation around corruption and also fraud. I would go further in saying that this is a real opportunity for agencies such as IRD to also ramp up and support and fund the oversight and investigation of tax evasion and tax avoidance in a more constructive and proper manner.

On the bill itself, one of the things that we do see is a potential concern—and this is one of the things we would like to seek further advice from the select committee and, when we get a chance, to hear from both the public and from experts in the field, as well as from officials—is this idea of, well, if there are certain areas that can be loosened, what risk are we opening our financial institutes up to? What sort of conversations, for example, have there been with the banking sector at this stage on this particular legislation?

Again, one of the things we’ve heard is around the fact that, yes, there is this idea that we want to make it easier for people to open bank accounts—absolutely. But at the same time, we have seen in the past where bank accounts, and particularly bank accounts of children, have been used for AML/CFT purposes. On the other hand, in contrast, what we are also wanting to tease out as a part of this bill during the select committee stage is: what are some of the measures as a result of this? What are some of the measures around financial inclusion—particularly when we’re looking at our rural communities, or even communities that have concerns and struggles with the banking environment in the first place?

There are some good things that this bill has introduced. Like I mentioned, it is something that is much needed in terms of our update of AML/CFT regulations and regulatory environment, but it’s also some of the nuances we want to see. I think the last thing that I want to also mention in terms of this particular point is the extent the bill extends the delegation of secondary legislation under this Act to better enable risk-based regulations. I also think this is an interesting perspective—that we are moving things from primary to a secondary legislation. What does that potentially also mean from the perspective of regulation-making power, and also the ability for people and for Ministers to make those kinds of Orders in Council that facilitate some of the secondary legislation? So the Green Party will support this bill to select committee, and we’re looking forward to hearing more about it.

Hon CASEY COSTELLO (Minister of Customs): I rise on behalf of New Zealand First to speak on the first reading of the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill, and New Zealand First will be supporting this piece of legislation.

It is an important part of the coalition agreement commitments to reduce regulatory burdens and to make sure New Zealand meets its international obligations to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. We believe that the move to a single supervisor will create regulatory efficiencies and reduce some of the complexity that is currently facing the system. We support the introduction of an industry levy to balance the cost, and, most importantly, that we are delivering a risk-based legislation that is proportional to the risks we’re dealing with and allows us to streamline some of the approaches.

New Zealand First supports the measures to strengthen our financial system’s integrity without stifling economic growth. We encourage the Justice Committee to thoroughly review submissions to ensure the levy structure is fair and the single supervised model delivers on its promise of efficiency. New Zealand First supports the bill at the first reading and looks forward to the analysis of the select committee. We commend the bill to the House.

Dr VANESSA WEENINK (National—Banks Peninsula): Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise in support on behalf of the National Party on the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill. I look forward to discussing this at select committee. The Economic Development, Science and Innovation Committee is very collegial, and I’m sure that we’ll have lots of discussion. I commend the bill to the House.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): We don’t have Te Pāti Māori here, so the next call will be a National call.

TOM RUTHERFORD (National—Bay of Plenty): Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. I just want to echo the comments made by my colleague Vanessa Weenink in her speech that we support the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill and are supportive of this moving to the select committee stage to improve and enhance the legislation, and to receive the submissions from the general public on it.

I’m looking forward to seeing it go to the Economic Development, Science and Innovation Committee for a change, rather than the Justice Committee, which, I know—as Vanessa Weenink outlined—will make some very positive contributions to the bill. Therefore, I commend it to the House.

Hon GINNY ANDERSEN (Labour): Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. This is the second anti - money-laundering bill that we’ve had recently, and I understand it’s two of three: the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill. I’m interested to know, and I’m sure we’ll find out down the line, why we’ve had three separate ones and why they weren’t bundled as one piece of legislation. Whether the Government hasn’t got enough legislation—is that why it’s been torn apart? I’m not sure why they’re separate. However, as indicated previously, we’ll be supporting this at least into select committee.

We, to be clear, support the fact that there is good practice and it’s not unnecessarily burdensome to have the anti - money-laundering and counter financing of terrorism. It’s a sensible change but makes the regulatory environment easier to navigate with international counterparts, such as Australia. But we also need to be clear that it’s not actually making anything easier for organised criminal networks. It sometimes sits at odds with some of the advice that has been received by the ministerial advisory group on organised crime, which has indicated not only that methamphetamine has reached record-high levels in New Zealand, a 97 percent increase, and that organised criminal networks—I think the quote in the ministerial advisory group is that the Government is “losing the fight” on organised crime in New Zealand. We know that organised criminal networks are very smart at using money laundering as a way of processing the proceeds they make from the record amounts of methamphetamine that they are currently selling within New Zealand.

Our word of warning is that while we support legitimate changes to make it easier for legitimate actors to navigate the system, we still think it’s important that it operates in a way that prevents and deters criminals and organised crime from laundering money in New Zealand. We know, in the past, we have been a target for shell companies for purchases even of residential property, and that organised criminal networks have used New Zealand because it has been seen as an easy target, in a way, to clean money. There were significant changes that began under a previous National Government, under John Key, and continued with changes to that to make sure that we had a tight system and that there was reporting. It was sometimes considered to be onerous, but there was a view that it was important that that was in place to deter and also to prevent organised criminal networks from taking advantage of being able to shift their money around without being detected by the authorities in New Zealand and also our international counterparts that work to uncover how those networks are cleaning their money around.

We’re concerned that these kinds of important decisions are potentially going to be made by secondary legislation. In true Nicole McKee style, it all comes in the regulations, as we’ve seen with firearms. That means it’s not within the full scrutiny that Parliament is able to give it, if those changes are in the regulations. We want to know exactly what is being proposed by that secondary legislation before we’re going to rush around and say it’s amazing.

One example is that children’s bank accounts and real estate transactions can both be a significant vector for money laundering. We do need to ensure that children do not become a way of creating a false identity and getting access to a bank account simply to enable criminal networks to exploit loopholes or weaknesses within our system.

We know that we have a massive methamphetamine problem in New Zealand, and we know that criminals are importing and peddling methamphetamine. They look to ways of cleansing that money. It does seem really strange that we’re seeing the cutting of red tape at a time in New Zealand when we should be really looking closely at what additional loopholes we can be closing to strengthen the protection of our communities against organised criminal networks.

Look, we’ll commend this to select committee, and I look forward to seeing how those submissions develop. We commend the bill to the House.

RIMA NAKHLE (National—Takanini): It’s a pleasure to rise and add my support in the first reading of this bill, the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill. I can understand why we have a focus on this side in cutting red tape, because we want to see the average mum and dad with a little family be able to purchase a little home, their first home, without having to go through the burdens that gang members that get $2.7 million from former Labour Governments didn’t go through. With that, I’m looking forward to seeing what comes out of this bill, and I commend this bill to the House.

VANUSHI WALTERS (Labour): Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise in support of sending the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill through to select committee at first reading—a bill which introduces a single supervisory for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, and placing obligations on regulated entities. We’ve heard from colleagues across the way, from the Minister, that the intention is to reduce complexity in the regulatory system and, essentially, to increase efficiency.

While I do rise in support of the bill, I would like to echo some of the comments made by my colleague Dr Duncan Webb, firstly, in terms of whether it’s appropriate for some of the regulation or some of the rules to be pushed down into regulation. I do think that what we are tending to see in terms of parliamentary process is a shift to what’s called “framework legislation”, which means that a lot more regulations are being made that concern substantive matters. Certainly, members of the Regulations Review Committee will be aware that there’s been comment on that and whether it’s more appropriate for some of those rules to sit within primary legislation. So I look forward to having that conversation at select committee.

I did want to focus my other comments on the section 7 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act vet, where I thought some interesting issues were raised both about search and seizure but also around detention. Again, I do hope that we receive submissions on this, because I do think they warrant further exploration. Clause 21 of the bill amends section 132, and that has a mixture of both powers that it gives the supervisor that affect search and seizure rights as well as detention rights. So, in terms of search and seizure, that clause clarifies that the supervisor has the ability to conduct on-site inspections, and it also clarifies that the supervisor is able to request the production of or access to documents or information required under the existing power.

In my view, it’s quite interesting that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act vet says that this can be deemed to be a search. The other example of a search is probably more obvious, contained within the bill—that’s clause 23, and that’s the one which essentially prohibits the supervisor from entering a dwellinghouse unless they have consent of the occupier or they have a warrant to do so. Now, in the initial drafting of this section, there was Crown Law advice that raised issues with the way in which the provisions had been drafted. Essentially, the Crown Law advice resulted in a more stringent test for when a warrant could be granted and when a supervisor could enter a dwellinghouse.

The conclusion of the New Zealand Bill of Rights vet is that while there are, prima facie, search and seizure issues raised, those have been managed within the revised text, if you like, so that there are reasonable limitations in there and the individual will still retain the right against self-incrimination, so they are not forced to respond to certain things. I do think it presents a question of empowerment in terms of the individual understanding their rights and knowing when they can refuse production. So that is one thing that I will be asking questions about.

The other issue is one of detention, because there is a new power regarding the requirement for the individual to attend a meeting; however, there is no provision relating to the individual being able to end the meeting. I thought that there was quite an interesting comment in the section 7 vet, where essentially the advice is that the supervisor will need to be careful when compelling attendance of an in-person meeting—not the audio-visual link but an in-person meeting. Certainly, we will need to have a conversation about what rights the individual has to draw a close to that meeting without being subjected to penalties that are currently in the legislative framework.

Again, I do commend the bill to the House, but I look forward to interrogating the provisions in particular that relate to search and that relate to detention.

PAULO GARCIA (National—New Lynn): Thank you, Mr Speaker. The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill consolidates anti - money-laundering and countering financing of terrorism oversight under one regulatory body, replacing the multi-agency model that it is in now. Regulated entities will benefit from the simplified compliance requirements. We support this bill, and I commend it to the House.

RAWIRI WAITITI (Co-Leader—Te Pāti Māori): [Interruption] That is a very good tactic, Todd, to distract me. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to rise and speak to the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill.

The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act, which this bill will amend, was developed without input from tangata whenua, and it shows. This Act has prevented tangata whenua from accessing financial services and capital for two decades, because many of our people do not have proper documentation. These requirements have been blocking our people from buying their own homes. They are completely unnecessary. A large amount of our land is held in Māori trusts established under the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, such as whānau trusts, ahu whenua trusts, or Māori incorporations. Many governance structures established following a Treaty settlement also operate as trusts.

The Crown alienated and stole our land by forcing us to individualise our whenua. To this day, they are punishing us for refusing to individualise. Holding whenua in trusts is one of the only ways we have left to hold our land collectively, as our tīpuna did. Our people are scrutinised far more than any other people in Aotearoa because of this fact. Because of this Act, we are vetted at every stage, and this makes it extremely difficult to access and manage our funds and our whenua. This is the context as to why we take our position today on this bill.

Cameron, don’t fall off your seat; we will be supporting the bill in front of us today, because it loosens the verification requirements that have been blocking our people from accessing financial services and capital, and because it will reduce the amount of scrutiny our trustees and beneficiaries face for simply owning land as a collective. Therefore, we commend this bill to the House.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read a first time.

Bill referred to the Economic Development, Science and Innovation Committee

Instruction to Economic Development, Science and Innovation Committee

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister of Justice): I move, That the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill be reported to the House by 24 November 2025.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the motion be agreed to.

Ayes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 54

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 5.

Motion agreed to.

Bills

United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill

Third Reading

Hon TODD McCLAY (Minister for Trade and Investment): I present a legislative statement on the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): That legislative statement is published under the authority of the House and can be found on the Parliament website.

Hon TODD McCLAY: I move, That the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill be now read a third time.

It’s a pleasure to move in support of this bill. Following the bill’s first reading in April, the bill was referred to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, where it was extensively examined. The committee considered the bill between 10 April and 19 June, and it recommended that the bill proceed into law.

I want to express my thanks to all those involved in this important examination process, from members of the committee through the civil society and business representatives. The New Zealand - United Arab Emirates (UAE) Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, or CEPA, is a high-quality free-trade agreement (FTA) that will provide real benefits for New Zealand and for New Zealanders.

The Government recognises that trade is crucial to our economic success. We know that one in four New Zealanders jobs depends on trade. The income derived from trade helps pay for our health and education systems, our conservation work, and a range of other programmes and services delivered by the Government. That’s why we’re focused on doubling exports by value over 10 years, and growing our free-trade agreement network is a key component of this.

We have a warm relationship with the United Arab Emirates, and the CEPA is a significant new milestone towards deepening our bilateral relationship. It, along with the accompanying bilateral investment treaty, will provide opportunities to grow our trade and people-to-people links with the UAE. It provides New Zealand better access to a dynamic and internationally well-connected economy that’s both an important trade investment partner, as the world’s 20th largest economy, with a GDP of over US$500 billion. The UAE is also aiming to be the world’s best-connected trade hub by 2031. This means more opportunities and increased jobs and incomes for New Zealanders. This represents real benefits for Māori; for small to medium sized enterprises; for our regions like Southland, the West Coast, and Gisborne; for our consumers; and a lot more.

It’s worth reflecting that in New Zealand’s most recent FTA which entered into force, namely the EU, we saw a 24 percent increase in our total goods exports to the EU in the first eight months after entry into force, equalling a billion dollars extra of goods exports to the EU in the first 12 months. The opportunities here are considerable. The CEPA, once in force, will improve conditions for New Zealand exporters into the UAE market with tariff elimination on 98.5 percent of our goods exports immediately. This will benefit our producers of dairy and of beef and sheep meat, horticulture, commodities including apples and kiwifruit, seafood, forestry, as well as all industrial items, with full tariff elimination increasing to 99 percent within three years.

On top of these high-quality commitments for our goods exporters, the CEPA contains trade-facilitation rules designed to reduce behind-the-border barriers. This includes commitments to release goods within clear time frames, to ensure that customs processes and practices are transparent and as efficient as possible, and to further strengthen existing sanitary and phytosanitary measures.

Our services exporters will also benefit from the CEPA, with improved commitments in a range of priority sectors such as education, professional services like engineering and environment, and audio-visual. On top of this, most favoured nation commitments in key sectors mean that our exporters will always enjoy the best available treatment in the UAE market into the future. Other provisions agreed under the CEPA mean our services suppliers will benefit from more transparency and certainty, and enjoy the assurances of fair treatment in covered sectors.

The CEPA will also contribute to the further diversification of New Zealand’s FTA network. The Middle East is a significant missing piece in our overall FTA network. Having the CEPA in place represents a critical first step in expanding our FTA coverage in this important region, which is why we pushed for the CEPA to be New Zealand’s fastest ever free-trade agreement. Negotiation concluded in just over four months. I was very pleased to sign it in January of this year, with the Prime Minister, when we visited the UAE.

The importance of our network of FTAs has never been so relevant as in the current global context, where the rules-based international trading system is facing acute challenges. Without FTAs like the New Zealand - UAE CEPA, New Zealand would find it harder to compete internationally. Therefore, we can’t stand still, which is why we’re doing all that we can to progress our recently concluded free-trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as investing in our FTA negotiations with India.

The UAE isn’t standing still either. Not only does it have around 20 CEPAs signed, but it has commenced negotiations with over a dozen more trading partners. The New Zealand - UAE CEPA is the highest quality and most liberalising of any of the more than 20 free-trade agreements that the UAE has concluded to date. This is a tremendous achievement for New Zealand, and can I recognise the exemplary work of our trade negotiators. At the same time, the CEPA preserves the Government’s right to regulate in the public interest and preserves the status of the Treaty of Waitangi. It also contains the most comprehensive commitments on inclusive and sustainable trade in any FTA agreed by the UAE.

There are a limited number of legislative and regulatory amendments that are required to align New Zealand’s domestic law with our obligations under the CEPA. This bill makes the changes required for New Zealand to implement these obligations and bring it into force. Specifically, the bill amends the Overseas Investment Act 2005, the Overseas Investment Regulations 2005, the Customs and Excise Act 2018, and the tariff and Customs and Excise Regulations 1996.

The bill will enable an increase in investment-screening thresholds from NZ$100 million to NZ$200 million for non-Government UAE investors; the designation of an authorised certification body to certify that goods originate in New Zealand; the application of preferential tariff rates under the CEPA; and the implementation of obligations relating to the tariff treatment of goods returned to New Zealand after repair or alteration in the UAE, giving effect to the rules of origin applicable to imports into New Zealand that originate from the UAE.

These legislative and regulatory changes are consistent with the changes required for almost all of our previous free-trade agreements. Both the UAE and this Government are working to ratify the CEPA as soon as possible to quickly realise the benefits of the agreement. Once both countries have concluded all the necessary steps, we will be ready to bring the CEPA into force.

New Zealand has secured this free-trade agreement at a critical time in the current global trade landscape. It will provide concrete, long-term benefits for our economy and to our exporters as New Zealand navigates the increasingly turbulent trade world we are now facing.

Can I recognise the work of our officials and how hard they worked in just four months to deliver this high-quality agreement. We ask a lot of them, and in this instance asked even more, and they worked hard, and they delivered for us. Can I also recognise my counterpart, Dr Thani, the newly appointed, or upgraded, Minister of international trade from the UAE, for his commitment to the relationship. Without his understanding and the support of his Government, we would not have concluded such a high-quality agreement as quickly as we did.

I commend the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill to this House.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Hon PHIL TWYFORD (Labour—Te Atatū): Thank you, Mr Speaker. This is one of those debates where it’s not that difficult to find points on which we agree across the House. Labour is supporting this bill and has all the way through. I want to give credit to the current Minister, Todd McClay, for his leadership in bringing this agreement to fruition and this bill to the House, and also, of course, to acknowledge, as I know the Minister always does, the excellent team of trade negotiators and officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, who serve this country so well and have done for a long time in this area.

As the Minister said, we must trade. We’re a trading nation and we couldn’t survive if we didn’t trade. He noted that one in four jobs are in firms who are highly exposed to international markets and trading. It’s also worth noting that jobs in firms that export are, in general, more skilled and better paid than other jobs. So we must trade and we need trade.

I also want to make the point that trade is the way we build interdependence. It’s one of the main ways that we knit a fabric of relationships internationally, along with our diplomacy and the work we do in multilateral organisations. It’s often the basis for developing closer links with countries that often then are accompanied by people-to-people connections and deeper security and other relationships.

This has been the case for successive New Zealand Governments for a very long time, that our commitment to open trading relationships internationally is an integral part of the way that we make our way in the world, which is all the more why it is such an unhappy feature of the current international environment that the Trump administration in the United States has so destabilised the world of international trade with its arbitrary, unprovoked, and capricious tariffs that have been imposed unilaterally on dozens of countries around the world. It is disturbing and extremely unfortunate. I think it’s up to countries like New Zealand and our friends in Europe and across Asia and elsewhere not to give up on the dream of a multilaterally governed rules-based system based on the idea of open trading relationships. It’s been good to see Europe and China, for instance, reaching out and making connections and discussing the possibility of, for example, China joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership—the CPTPP—which I think is a really positive move that we should welcome.

It’s a challenging environment for a trade Minister or a trade negotiator right now. For New Zealand, when you think about it, all of the really big opportunities have been realised. If you think about the CPTPP, if you think about the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the China free-trade agreement (FTA), of course, the European Union FTA, all of the really big ones have been nailed and are delivering substantial economic benefits for New Zealand. It’s now the higher-hanging fruit, perhaps, and the smaller trade agreements, like the one we’re discussing tonight—the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement—that are left. But all credit to those who have pursued this valuable and positive agreement.

We have to focus on these bilateral agreements, because, unfortunately, due to the efforts of not only the United States but a number of other players, the World Trade Organization that we invested so much hope in for so long as the arbiter of a global open trading regime has been, effectively, immobilised. The dream of multilateral free trade has all but ended. So bilateral initiatives like this and some of the smaller plurilateral initiatives are really all that’s left on the table for us.

We’ve had some interesting debates as this bill has gone through the House. We had some, I think, interesting exchanges both at select committee and in this Chamber on the question of human rights and labour standards in relation to the UAE agreement, and I made some remarks about the possibilities and the limits of applying human rights standards in trade agreements. We talked about one of the most notable features of this bill, and that is the increase in the screening threshold from $100 million to $200 million. What that does is it reduces the level of investment screening that doesn’t require a consent for investment.

One of the other things that’s worth remarking on is the absence of something in this bill, and that is the investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. I saw that the Minister was quoted in a piece in Newsroom, pointing out that the ISDS, the investor-State dispute settlement, mechanism, which has been such a flashpoint of debating this disagreement in trade policy for quite a long time—the Minister now sees it as kind of settled and bipartisan or nonpartisan policy in this House. That’s great. It’s something that Labour fought for in Opposition before the Ardern Government came to office, something that we implemented to say that we would not sign trade agreements with these ISDS mechanisms that gave private corporations the opportunity to sue Governments in private sector tribunals. We regarded that as abhorrent to democracy. I know a number of other countries around the world are taking this position too, and it’s great to see that it is now settled policy.

The other thing I think that’s worth commenting on about this bill, other than the fact, and kind of the central fact, that the effect of this agreement will be to eliminate tariffs and give duty-free status within three years to 99 percent of New Zealand’s exported goods to the United Arab Emirates—and that’s going to have really big advantages for meat, for dairy, and for horticulture particularly. But the other thing I wanted to mention is that, notwithstanding the fact that labour standards in the United Arab Emirates are not at the standard that we would hold ourselves to and see as being universally important—and the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, in their submission, made that point very forcibly—there was an effort and the New Zealand Government successfully secured commitment to the Treaty provisions, which are now a standard part of our trade agreements. It’s a shame they’re not a standard part of legislation under this current Government, but there we are. They’re still in our trade agreements, which is a good thing—also, as the Minister mentioned, I think, the provisions around inclusive and sustainable trade. Those things are all kind of important so that we’re trying to deliver holistic benefits to all sides in a trade agreement, not just on the dollars and cents. So, yeah, that is my contribution to the third reading of this bill. Thank you.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Green Party, and we will not be supporting this particular bill. Again, the reason for that is we didn’t support the agreement, so I don’t know why the House is so surprised that we wouldn’t be supporting this particular bill.

Now, let me unpack that, because it actually makes a great deal of sense. Let’s start with the agreement that is the foundation of this particular bill. One of the things I addressed in the first reading of this bill—and also we addressed this when we spoke on the agreement itself—is fundamentally the concern when we’re looking at the treaty examination process here in Aotearoa New Zealand, specifically Standing Orders 405 to 408. Now, in 2023—and there is a reason why I’m mentioning this—as part of the Standing Orders review, it was recommended to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee that this particular part be examined, because it is a problematic—and also could be considered non-democratic—process where any sort of international agreement or treaty can be signed on by a Minister without any form of scrutiny or consultation by the New Zealand public, either through a select committee process or just genuinely hearing from the New Zealand public.

Granted, there are ways that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) allows for public consultation, but it is incredibly opaque. There is no public forum. There is no way for you to submit. You send an email to MFAT, and that just disappears into thin air, and it’s very hard to get any sort of commitment or information from MFAT from there on about what happens to the public consultation.

That, combined with the fact that the national interest analysis is drafted by MFAT on their own negotiation—and we have highlighted through the select committee process that when we’re examining a particular agreement, post-signing, I might add, it might be inappropriate for someone to, essentially, mark their own homework or assessment after they’ve completed it.

Then we get to any form of bill. Because of the dual system that we see here in Aotearoa New Zealand, if there are any changes, the agreement itself doesn’t need to be agreed to, or endorsed, by this House unless it affects domestic legislation, which is what we see here in this particular bill. This bill covers a very tiny component of what is in the original agreement. There is a possibility that if there were no significant changes, this bill could have been even smaller. Now, granted there are definitely elements, as we see here in this particular bill—particularly around, let’s say, the schedules, and also around things like tariffs and amendments to the Customs and Excise Act 2018—that are necessary with any new free-trade agreement, FTA, or comprehensive economic partnership agreement, CEPA, that Aotearoa New Zealand signed up to.

Here lies the concern that we have from a process perspective that anyone, and any Minister, is able to sign on to this really important document—that affects Aotearoa New Zealand in a really profound way—without any public input or without any proper input from this House. Again, by the time that agreement has been signed, it goes to select committee, and the deed is kind of done. It’s really hard to go back to your partner to say, “Hey, our select committee doesn’t like it, so can we just unsign it?”

It’s not something that we have seen happening in the past. Indeed, some of these have generated issues, particularly when we’re looking at the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement around ISDS, or the investor-State dispute settlement process, which is something that the Government signed up to at the time without realising the enormous backlash that they would receive from the New Zealand public as a result—which is also one of the reasons why we do not see ISDS, at least as a commitment from the Minister, in FTAs and CEPAs in this term.

Now, in terms of the bill, the other thing that is of importance is the only chance that we actually got to ask questions regarding both the bill but also the agreement that is the foundation of this bill—the only chance we actually got to have this proper engagement with the Minister—was during the committee stage of this particular bill, which is what we had in the last sitting week. Because of that, we actually got some really important information from the Minister. One of the things that we have discussed is around the labour concerns that we see in terms of the kafala system that is present in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Now, granted that UAE domestic legislation has changed over time and we have seen improvements of the kafala system, that still has concerns, particularly the way that employees are able to, essentially, hold the employees—and migrant employees, in particular—through the kafala sponsorship system, in some ways, in shackles and as hostages, unless they comply with certain requests such as overtime or additional working hours or lower pay. It is something that is a concern from an international labour rights perspective, and it’s something that we as Aotearoa New Zealand are rightfully concerned about. During the committee stage, one of the things that we did get some sort of response from the Minister—which is more than what we got during the scrutiny of the agreement—is that we do look at the way that we import some of those goods coming from UAE that do need to fulfil certain requirements of our domestic legislation here in Aotearoa New Zealand.

Now, this is a milestone in terms of the way we are able to get information or have this sort of back and forth with the Minister. But, again, that is on the basis that the bill is introduced here in the House well after an agreement has been signed, thus highlighting the problematic process we have with the way we look at international treaties. That is one of the reasons why we, as the Green Party, cannot support this bill in the way that it is structured, and also the agreement in the way that it is structured, because it fundamentally goes against the rule of law and the values that we hold here as New Zealanders.

Now, in terms of the bill itself, and also tangentially when we’re looking at the agreement, one of the other things that has been highlighted—and to say that the Green Party does support trade; we do care about trade. Trade, in fact, is one of the oldest professions in the world. In fact, when we’re looking at things around freedom of expression, that comes from the original Greek concept of isēgoria agora, the freedom to debate in the marketplace, which are some of the original trade institutions that you see in the ancient world.

We do absolutely think that trade is fundamental to our country and the way that it interacts on a global stage. The Green Party has supported the NZ-EU FTA because of the fact that we look to the EU to also improve our own ability to uphold things like indigenous rights, to uphold things like data protection, to uphold privacy, to uphold sustainability, to uphold climate action, to uphold environmental protection and workers’ rights. That is something that we do see being reflected in the NZ-EU FTA.

However, when we are looking at this—and, yes, I understand the motivation of us having the starting point of an agreement with a Gulf Cooperation Council country. It is important in terms of opening that particular pathway. But at the same time, it also comes down to what are we compromising on in terms of our own values as a country by this particular agreement.

Again, the Minister has mentioned that this is something that we managed to negotiate in four months. Fast doesn’t necessarily mean good. That applies to half the bills that the Government has introduced this term. What it also highlights is what is missing as part of that potential negotiation, and what are we compromising.

Going back to this bill, when we’re looking at, for example, increasing the threshold of $100 million to $200 million of the monetary threshold above which consent is a requirement and any form of consent is required from LINZ, or Land Information New Zealand, as a requirement of the Overseas Investment Act, it was something that was discussed during the committee stages: how would we be able to hold a particular country and how would we be able to scrutinise this more publicly if one of the parties does indeed violate this agreement?

So there are definitely issues with this particular bill and with the agreement on the whole. In its current form, the Green Party cannot, in good conscience, support the bill.

Dr PARMJEET PARMAR (ACT): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m taking this call on behalf of ACT to support the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill. We are actually really excited to see this bill is going through the third reading today, because we really want to see that this agreement is ratified as soon as possible so that New Zealanders can avail the opportunities that are going to become available because of this agreement.

I’m not surprised to see the Green Party is not supporting this bill, because the Green Party only knows how to spend money. They don’t know how to bring the revenue into our country. It’s very clear from that speech that, yes, on one side they’re saying that trade is good, but they don’t know how trade works—they don’t know how trade agreements work. They don’t know how we have to work in this global market to make sure that New Zealanders are getting the opportunities that they deserve. It’s true with these kinds of trade agreements that employees will be able to earn more, businesses will be able to expand. It’s not because of those kinds of speeches that the Green Party member was making, standing here. Those kinds of speeches are not going to help people earn more.

We are really focused on making sure that we are bringing opportunities for businesses. Yes, the trade with the United Arab Emirates is great, but we want to enhance that trade, we want to expand that trade. This agreement is going to make sure that both sides are able to benefit from this. On this side—yes, of course, we have diverse communities living here in New Zealand, coming from so many different parts of the world, and people here will be able to enjoy the products coming from that part of the world, and, of course, our products are quite highly valued in that part of the world. They will be able to enjoy more and more of our products.

This agreement actually shows that both sides are willing to come together to showcase that we are collaborative, to grow our economy, to diversify our markets, and to support our people. That’s why we are really excited to see that this bill is going through the third reading. I want to finish by commending the Minister for Trade and Investment for getting this agreement done in just four months. It was signed at the start of this year and now it’s going through the third reading. The ACT Party is really excited to support this bill and commend this bill to the House. Thank you.

Hon MARK PATTERSON (Minister for Rural Communities): Thanks, Madam Speaker. New Zealand First wholeheartedly support the United Arab Emirates free-trade deal. It is a very high-quality deal and we absolutely need deals of this type to build our economic resilience. Of course, it’s extremely good news particularly for our primary sector, for rural New Zealand, as we open up yet more markets and take some of those tariff barriers down.

What a remarkable achievement from Minister McClay, probably started—it wasn’t very long, was it? It was a fastest ever trade deal, and Vangelis Vitalis and the team at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) that managed to get this over the line in short time—what a remarkable achievement in this global, geopolitical environment.

I just can’t help but comment on the Green Party position. Look, is there no ivory tower high enough for them? Do you think that the farmers, the exporters, the foresters give a rat’s arse about Greek philosophy?

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): Order! Just keep it seemly, please, Mr Patterson.

Hon MARK PATTERSON: Sorry—

Jenny Marcroft: Derrière.

Hon MARK PATTERSON: Rat’s derrière, Madam Speaker. But do they give a toss about what Greek philosophy might have said about trade? What they want is access to markets, they want a fair return on their product, they want to be able to create jobs, and that’s certainly where—

Joseph Mooney: Shameful!

Hon MARK PATTERSON: It is, actually, quite shameful. I mean, I don’t think you can take them seriously as a political party when, essentially, a gift horse is being looked in the mouth here, at this time of incredible geopolitical, economic uncertainty, particularly around issues of trade. We’ve done a phenomenal job in the last wee while, and some of that goes back to the last Government in terms of the EU, the UK trade deal; we’ve got the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and are also, of course, making great progress—by all accounts—with India, which is a very, very big deal for us as well.

We do note, within the agreement, there is a lift of threshold for the investment into New Zealand for the United Arab Emirates and investors from there, from $100 million to $200 million. That seems prudent. There is still the national strategic assets test through the Official Information Act as well, so that’s a protection there for New Zealand. That’s something that New Zealand First always looks for in these agreements but, in actuality, this is a really good deal. It’s been brought through fast.

We congratulate Minister McClay again on another high-value, high-quality trade agreement coming in. To Vangelis Vitalis and his team at MFAT, well done. This is a great deal, and New Zealand First supports it.

STEVE ABEL (Green): Thank you, Madam Speaker.

Grant McCallum: Here we go.

Celia Wade-Brown: Now you’ll be enlightened.

STEVE ABEL: Well, perhaps. The Green Party has determined that we won’t be supporting this bill, and we have outlined some reasons in our differing view. One thing that I want to speak to is the concern raised by Ngā Toki Whakarururanga in their submission on the “non-paper” that was presented in the process of expressing what the nature of indigenous principles are in our country through Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and the fact that the Crown provided this to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and it purported to explain Te Tiriti o Waitangi and justified various negotiating proposals, but it seriously misrepresented the meaning of that agreement as the foundation of our country. It failed to acknowledge the nature of the relationship that Māori hold and the rightly held view that Māori possess the right to self-determination, the continued exercise of rangatiratanga, and sovereign authority over whenua, kāinga, and all taonga.

The fundamental lack of clear communication on tino rangatiratanga meant that both chapter 13 and chapter 15 lack genuine accountability and protection for mātauranga Māori and traditional cultural expression. Article 13.35, for example, uses terms such as “endeavour” and “may” that give little confidence that such provisions would be implemented.

We also continue to be concerned with the contribution of the UAE to the Sudanese civil war. When asked, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade could not accurately articulate how this Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement could hold both parties accountable for serious human rights in armed conflicts. It should not surprise us, in the context of that particular question, what we see in the Israel-Gaza conflict, as expressed by this Government, is the implication of there being an equality of position held by the two parties to that conflict, when in fact one is inordinately more powerful than the other and has the ability to cause huge harm. These are things that are important to us in terms of our fundamental values as a country.

I just want to pick up on some of the points that have been made by other speakers. We are a country that depends on exports. We are a country where most of its agricultural production is for the purpose of export and we rely on a principle that that surplus of production that we manufacture—in the case of the dairy industry, 95 percent of what is produced is a surplus to what is needed domestically—is produced for the purpose of exporting and earning money.

Now, we have a fundamental problem with the consequences of that vast surplus in so far as the costs of that surplus on our domestic wellbeing and our domestic natural resources, in particular, is not borne by the industries that impact them. So, for example, the well-documented impact on fresh water, for example, and on the climate, on soil compaction, on groundwater contamination—these are things that are consequences of a surplus that we produce for export to make money for private profit.

Grant McCallum: To pay tax to support the services you need.

STEVE ABEL: Those exporters do pay tax, but that is not their sole purpose. In the case of the dairy industry—[Interruption] Yeah, well, I mean, I’m glad to hear the Government side advocating for more taxes on the dairy industry. If we can have a sensible conversation about this, we need to consider the context in which our only objective is to forever expand the volume of production when I think that if we actually had a serious conversation about it, we would recognise that value is where it’s at.

Hon Mark Patterson: And we can tell you: trade deals.

STEVE ABEL: We won’t be voting for this particular one. Thank you very much.

TIM VAN DE MOLEN (National—Waikato): Well, thank you, Madam Speaker. After that brief diversion to another planet, I’m happy to bring the debate back to reality here in the third reading on the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill.

Now, economic growth is critical for the success of New Zealand. This Government is firmly focused on growing prosperity for our country, because without that we can’t deliver better public services: health, education, law and order—all those things that the other side purport to advocate for. Yet here is a great opportunity to help grow the revenue of this country to deliver for New Zealanders, and they oppose it—that party opposes it, I should say. I do want to acknowledge support from the Labour Party, from other parties in this House, and I am looking forward to this soon passing with near unanimity, because, indeed, it is a great deal.

We’ve heard it’s passed in record time. We’ve heard it will see 98.5 percent of tariffs removed on day one of entry into force, rising to 99 percent after three years. That is a great outcome for New Zealand exporters and that is a great outcome for the United Arab Emirates as well.

We are open for business. We are looking for trade opportunities. This is a fantastic one. It will build the relationship between our countries, help New Zealand become more prosperous, and secure that economic growth that is vital for our success.

VANUSHI WALTERS (Labour): Thank you, Madam Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise in support of the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill. Like colleagues before me, I’d like to congratulate the Minister for Trade and Investment for his very quick work in terms of getting to an agreement, but also to just note the work of my colleague in his role as Minister of Trade, when he began some of these conversations as well. So this really is a piece of legislation that has come about through the fruition of cross-party work, in my view, as often trade relationships and trade agreements should.

I want to comment first on the reference that some in the House have made to the unusual times we’re facing in the world at the moment in relation to trade. In many ways, our exporters have faced a net or a web of tariffs, and tariffs of different kinds. I do worry that that net is growing in many ways, which makes this work extremely important. I want to cover some of the different types of tariffs that do apply to our exporters against many exports that they send around the world. The first is specific. These are tariffs that are not imposed on the basis of value; they’re actually imposed on the basis of units or weight. There are also compound tariffs which are based on the value plus weight or item, so it could include one apple for X amount of tariff. There are ad valorem, or “according to value”, tariffs, and those are imposed purely on the basis of value. You can imagine more high-end goods in this category that may have a low weight amount but do have a high item price. Then there are tariff-rate quotas, which means that there are tariffs up to a certain amount and then no longer any tariffs. So you can see that there’s quite a web of tariffs that exist.

I think my concern is really what we’re seeing in terms of some of the US’s actions, where we’ve now had the introduction of secondary tariffs, or at least the threat of the imposition of secondary tariffs, where the US have said that if Russia doesn’t comply with certain requests from it, then third-party countries, as well as Russia, could be subject to tariffs if those third-party countries do not impose sanctions or restrictions on a country like Russia. We’re moving into quite an unusual space, in my view, in that tariffs are being used more often. They are being used as a tool of sanction, which means that growing our relationships and looking at trade deals, such as this, with other countries becomes extremely important.

I’ve covered, in previous speeches, some of the benefits of this agreement, and certainly others have, in terms of the massive, massive benefit to some of our exporters, including dairy—$707 million, where tariffs will be eliminated on entry into force of this deal—industrial products, horticulture, red meat, all in the multiple millions of dollars. But I referenced in my second reading speech that I was quite impressed with the agreement that was made in relation to wine, which wasn’t large in scale—it’s about $7 million—but, given the current tariff rate is 50 percent and the reduction of that will be 10 percent on entry into force of the agreement, it’s quite a significant change for the industry. The other thing I was impressed with in terms of that part of the negotiation is that the team negotiating managed to futureproof that savings or that benefit to New Zealand. If the United Arab Emirates (UAE) do negotiate a better term with another party, then New Zealand will benefit from a reduction in our tariffs as well, which I thought was quite a novel and futureproofing way to negotiate trade agreements, as well.

I think that a lot of people would assume that the big product coming out of the UAE is oil, but, in fact, now the non-oil sector accounts for almost 75 percent of the UAE’s GDP. We’ve seen a real shift in terms of their economy, from a labour-intensive economy to one that’s driven by knowledge, tech, and skilled labour. Perhaps later, if I have time, I can speak to some of the provisions around digital trade but also copyright protections, which I think are quite interesting in terms of looking to the future of the workforce and the future of trade.

I want to speak about the committee stage of the bill, and I really did appreciate the contributions of the Ministers who were in the chair at various stages, in response to my questions. I do still have questions, and I acknowledge one of the Ministers did say they would get me some responses to those questions. I just want to outline them again briefly.

The first is in relation to the discretion that the Minister holds in terms of setting the threshold for exemption of approval. The question I asked was whether this should be set in statute as opposed to regulation. Currently, it’s set in regulation, but also the Minister can reduce that threshold, should he wish to do so. The Minister’s response was that it would be very rare for the Minister just to reduce that on their own because, essentially, that could put us in breach of the primary agreement, which I absolutely accept. I do then just wonder why we wouldn’t put that provision in primary legislation as opposed to putting it in secondary legislation.

I do also have a question about Land Information New Zealand being able to make a determination about whether multiple payments that put us above the threshold would count as one payment or not. Currently, that’s not specified for in statute or in regulation, so it looks like it’s being treated as a systems issue. Again, just in terms of the confidence of the House, I wonder whether it’s appropriate to at least have that provision in regulation or, if not, in legislation.

I understand that there’s likely to be a review of these provisions and how they’re being monitored and policed, how decision making is occurring. That’s one point where I would be interested in the Minister’s future reckons in terms of whether that’s being managed well or whether that should be moved to—well, whether there’s a risk of abuse in terms of individuals parcelling up payments to get themselves to the 200 threshold and that being treated as 200, as opposed to sitting under.

There were a few definition issues I sought a response from the Minister in regards to. One was the reference to business activity, which, in my view, is actually quite central to how you understand what’s caught by investors or not. I couldn’t locate the definition of that within the primary legislation or the secondary legislation, so I’m looking forward to receiving a response in relation to that as well.

The last one was self-certification category. The provisions for self-certification are quite broad at present. I can very much understand the rationale for that. The intention is to make it as easy as possible for the agreement to be given effect to, rather than clogging up administrative processes. However, the question is, really, how that will be policed, especially with regards to goods that are exported but where we have sourced—or New Zealand companies have sourced—products that are an aggregation of raw materials, if you like, from other countries, and to what extent that will be permissible under the agreement.

I know that we’ve talked a little bit about human rights provisions as well. I share the view of my colleague the Hon Phil Twyford, who spoke really well on this at the second reading, that we cannot restrict who we trade with purely on the basis of human rights issues. I do think this agreement provides us with a doorway to have conversations about things like human rights, as well. The agreement isn’t silent on those provisions; there are chapters which reference women’s engagement, labour rights, environmental protections as well. I do think there’s an obligation on us, as New Zealand, to do service to those provisions and ensure that we’re engaging with conversations and our counterparts about our cultural values here in New Zealand and what those provisions mean to us. So, again, it’s my pleasure to commend this bill, on its third reading, to the House.

DANA KIRKPATRICK (National—East Coast): Thank you, Madam Speaker. Look, it’s wonderful to rise and take a call on this, the final reading of the very well spoken about United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill. This has been through our Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, and I think we’ve done a lot of scrutiny on it, trying to work through all of the issues, which have been well aired. I want to commend the Minister for his work, and the previous Minister, Damien O’Connor, for his initiation of some of the conversations. I feel like it’s a great day for New Zealand. Trade is good. Diversity of trade in the global context is even better. I commend the bill to the House.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): This is a split call.

CUSHLA TANGAERE-MANUEL (Labour—Ikaroa-Rāwhiti): Tēnā koe e te Māngai, otirā tēnā koutou katoa. Kua roa nei te wā nā reira nōku te hōnore ki te tū ki te whakaae i tēnei pire.

[Thank you, Madam Speaker, indeed greetings to you all. It’s been a long time, so it is my honour to stand in support of this bill.]

Today, I rise in support of the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill. Who wouldn’t support such a catchy name? Hoi anō e te whānau, for those who don’t know, I hold the Māori economy portfolio for the Labour Party. As we know, Māori have a long, proud history of trading, so it is with pleasure that I support, in good faith, what we believe will open up free and fair trade for Aotearoa whānui and, of course—speaking with my portfolio hat on—the Māori economy. I also want to acknowledge the Minister and of course my colleague for the work done to get the bill to this place.

Now, we all know that at the moment, the Māori economy has experienced quite astronomical growth and it’s not looking to slow down. This is something I think can provide not only global trade opportunities for Māori businesses but also my true desire is that it’ll filter right down to the papa kāinga, and people beyond the marae will experience wealth. It’s really exciting to acknowledge, you know, that the Māori economy asset base has grown by 83 percent to over $126 billion. We’ve got 46 percent of Māori in high-skilled employment these days, and the entrepreneurial growth is on the rise. This is an opportunity to grow not only individuals—whānau, hapū, and iwi wealth—but of course to support the overall Aotearoa economy.

Joseph Mooney: Good speech.

CUSHLA TANGAERE-MANUEL: Thank you—glad you approve.

Over the years, as we know, more iwi have settled, and Māori are diversifying their portfolios, so I just want to do a quick mihi to some of the iwi holdings that I’ve visited recently, the likes of Tū Mai Rā, Tātou Tātou, Ngāti Pahauwera. There are many, and I look forward to not only, as I said, the bottom-line growth but the exciting innovations that no doubt will come as a result of this opportunity.

I also think this is a great opportunity for us to start thinking about land development. We’re going to have to do some work across the House. I hope we will get support in making it easier to utilise whenua Māori.

On the note of innovation, I must acknowledge Te Pā o Rākaihautū School, who won the 2025 Zayed Sustainability Prize using indigenous biocultural technology to address global challenges like climate change, food insecurity, and land degradation. This bill, I hope, will continue to support innovation not only from iwi, hapū, and whānau but from our rangatahi.

I want to take time to acknowledge Nanaia Mahuta, who was the first wahine to serve as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nanaia was an enduring advocate for indigenous economic development. She understood that the underlying values that drive a Māori economy will only benefit Aotearoa whānui. In recent travels for parliamentary exchanges, to see the behaviour of our members around the world when they hear of the growth of the Māori economy is one of excitement. The world is ready to do business from a kaupapa Māori view. Why? Because it’s about kaitiakitanga and it’s about intergenerational planning. Everyone wants business that’s going to endure for generations, and that’s what I hope this bill will encourage.

Of course, with that comes kia tūpato, or a concern that we must protect, that I think we must commit to protecting as a Parliament, and those are issues around Māori intellectual property and ensuring that the taonga that will be taken to the world and will benefit our economy are protected by us all, so that they’re not abused and so that the concepts maintain their integrity.

He whakakapi, I do believe that Māori and international trade and agreements will be winning factors for New Zealand, for Aotearoa whānui. Once again, I’m really excited for the opportunities this provides for entrepreneurs, for whānau, hapū, iwi, and individuals, and, on behalf of the Labour Party, I commend this bill to the House.

TIM COSTLEY (National—Ōtaki): We are just so focused, on this side of the House, on reducing the cost of living, and our strategy, in part, is all about going for growth. We want to double the value of our exports over this 10-year period, and we’ve seen great progress with the EU free-trade agreement, and now here we are with this record-breaking trade agreement that has been delivered in only around four months. It is a fantastic effort. I want to commend the team from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade—not just those that travel, those that work at home, those that are permanently based over here. It is a remarkable achievement. It will deliver more money into Kiwi households, more money for nurses and doctors and teachers. Higher incomes—that’s what we believe in. I commend it to the House.

REUBEN DAVIDSON (Labour—Christchurch East): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Labour Party to speak in favour of the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill. As a speaker before me commented, it just rolls off the tongue, that one!

Firstly, I do have to give my congratulations to the Minister, the Hon Todd McClay. Good job. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade negotiators, who no doubt worked tirelessly on this, will no doubt be pleased to see their hard work has come to fruition. But I also want to acknowledge, as a number of speakers across the House have also acknowledged this evening, the work that the Hon Damien O’Connor did when he was our trade Minister—Labour’s trade Minister—to build towards this agreement, when he led a trade delegation to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2023.

Now, studious members on the other side of the House will be well aware of all of the work that the previous Labour Government did to progress historic free-trade agreements, like the agreement with the European Union, the UK, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. It’s good to see that the lessons have been learnt and our strong legacy in that space. We cut the path, and that work can be continued.

Now, it’s worth, I think, as one of the last speeches at the third reading of this bill, to just recap in bullet points over some of what this bill does. It eliminates the tariffs on the majority of export goods, gives New Zealand service exporters greater access to the UAE, and facilitates investment between both countries. The New Zealand - United Arab Emirates Bilateral Investment Treaty associated with this bill enters into force when this bill is ratified and will provide a rules-based framework for investors. It will also eliminate tariffs and ensure duty-free status on 98.5 percent of exported goods, rising to 99 percent in three years.

The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) provides sector-specific advantages, particularly for meat, dairy, and horticulture, which have previously faced barriers in the United Arab Emirates. After saying it rolls off the tongue, all of a sudden, it doesn’t! The deal, also worth noting, removes a 5 percent tariff on New Zealand honey. Of course, I’m partial, as a New Zealander, but we do have the best honey in the world.

Now, this is a third reading debate, so it looks like I have at least 10 minutes of content to cover in here. One of the things that I wanted to acknowledge was, unlike some other bills that have passed through the House in this term of Government, this bill was able to enjoy a select committee process, and that’s very important for the good passage of legislative change and new legislation. There were a number of submissions: 25 submissions from groups and individuals, and two submitters gave oral submissions to the select committee. There were a number of concerns that were raised at that select committee around the levels of investment screening, around the threshold shift from $100 million to $200 million; concerns raised about whether there would be public transparency or enough public transparency. A number of submitters also sought out, as is often the case, policy changes that aren’t actually within the scope of the bill that the select committee is considering at the time. The select committee process didn’t recommend any amendments to the bill, and, as would be suggested by the Labour Party’s ongoing support, we did not provide a different view to the bill.

Another thing that I think is very important to mention here, which my colleagues have referred to also, is the place of the Treaty of Waitangi in this agreement, because the CEPA, like New Zealand’s other trade agreements, makes extensive reference to the New Zealand Government’s Treaty of Waitangi obligations and protects the Treaty’s place at the core of our constitution and the place of Māori as tangata whenua in New Zealand. I’m not sure how Todd McClay snuck that one past David Seymour. If I’m honest, I’m sure nothing infuriates him more than the fact that we can be simultaneously a prosperous country, trading with the world, and recognise the unique and important place the Treaty of Waitangi and our indigenous people in our trade agreements, despite his efforts.

Earlier in the speeches this evening, at this third reading, my colleague the Hon Phil Twyford mentioned the Trump tariffs. In an environment where some States are shying away from multilateral free trade, it is really encouraging to see New Zealand continue to negotiate and make gains in new markets. When some States have decided to cut off free trade and raise tariffs, New Zealand is prioritising its trade access and its ability to play a role in a global economy. This agreement eliminates tariffs on 99 percent of goods exported to the United Arab Emirates, which means more money flowing into New Zealand through our outstanding exporters. As a number of speakers have talked about in speeches tonight, one in four people in our workforce are involved in trade. Those jobs are high-value jobs. They are high skilled, and they pay well, and more jobs like that would be good.

Another speaker, my colleague Cushla Tangaere-Manuel, mentioned the Māori economy and the strength of the Māori economy, which has a really proud and long history of trade going back centuries, and a focus needing to be on sustainability, on climate change, and on innovation, and how many leaders we have in our Māori economy working in those spaces. How important it is, with trade agreements like this, and with any work and study that we support in that space, that we protect the taonga and the intellectual property, the IP, that goes into that work and that comes out of it. But also, in protecting that, we make sure that there is a flow back the other way, that the rewards come back to the papa kāinga, back to the people who have done that work, who have led that work in those places.

I want to finish by also particularly highlighting the chapter in the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement relating to digital trade, because New Zealand’s digital and technology sector is a rapidly growing area that produces serious gains for Aotearoa New Zealand. As the Labour spokesperson for our creative economy, what I want to see is that we can make it easier for New Zealand’s digital exporters to access new markets, and agreements like this do make that possible. We know that New Zealand’s meat and dairy industry will benefit significantly from this agreement, but it is worth highlighting also that the benefit will not only be felt there but all the way across our economy.

We know that this agreement will open up billions of dollars in trade for New Zealand, so we like to see increased representation. It would be good, as far as representation and in future trade delegations, to really make sure that that creative economy, that our digital pioneers and innovators, are well represented in those delegations that travel overseas. I know the Prime Minister has got himself into trouble recently over some of the comments he makes about those delegations and those groups, but really a strong focus on our digital economy and on leaders in that space will serve us very well for future trade.

I really want to just finish this speech tonight by acknowledging the Hon Damien O’Connor, our trade Minister, for getting this process started; the current Minister, for his fast work, and in the hope that he might have some tips for Minister Goldsmith, who has promised immediate action but so far—in the media sector and media space—hasn’t been able to deliver anything meaningful. If the Minister for Trade could pass on some tips about how to get things done in four months, that would be greatly appreciated by a media sector that currently has a Minister that is not doing anything for them.

But most of all, I want to thank the staff who carried this agreement through, who saw it come to fruition as quickly as it did. We know the huge amount of work that would have taken. I commend this bill to the House.

CATHERINE WEDD (National—Tukituki): I rise to support the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill, because the United Arab Emirates trade deal is so important for strengthening our economy, creating jobs and opportunity across New Zealand—and especially in my region, Hawke’s Bay, the fruit bowl of New Zealand, where we produce the best fruit in the world. We need markets to send that fruit to, markets where they will pay a premium for our fruit and help us grow our businesses here in New Zealand, and put more confidence back into our horticulture sector, our dairy sector, and our red meat sector. This is good for exporters, it’s good for trade, it’s good for New Zealand. I commend this bill to the House.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the United Arab Emirates Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill be now read a third time.

Ayes 102

New Zealand National 49; New Zealand Labour 34; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 20

Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 5.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read a third time.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): Members, it is now time for us to suspend for the dinner break. We will see you back here at 7.30.

Sitting suspended from 5.58 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.

Bills

Legislation Amendment Bill

First Reading

Debate resumed from 17 July.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): Members, this was an interrupted debate, and we’re on to call No. 2, a Labour Party call.

VANUSHI WALTERS (Labour): Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s my absolute pleasure to speak on the Legislation Amendment Bill, which brings the House together in procedural unity, I believe. I would like to congratulate the Minister in charge of the bill, the Hon Judith Collins. I also think it’s actually quite poetic, because when the Minister was chair of the Regulations Reviews Committee back in February 2023, I sat as a member as well. The committee presented a report entitled Briefing on best practice for publication of secondary legislation to the House of Representatives, which included principles that reflected the rule of law, that law should be publicly accessible, and that most—most—secondary legislation must be published on a website. I think that report made clear the principle of access to legislation. But the important word there is “most”, and I think that this is the bill that takes us even further.

The problem that we’ve faced in the past is that the Parliamentary Counsel Office, who’ve been responsible for drafting most legislation, have also been responsible for publishing it on the New Zealand Legislation website. However, there is a raft of other secondary legislation produced by around 120 agencies. Some are published in the Gazette, some in newspapers, and some not at all. Of course, this creates a number of issues for individuals, but also businesses and other entities who are looking to find out what the law is. It makes it very hard to understand what the law is, it increases cost to individuals and other entities in terms of spending time locating the law, it reduces Parliament’s oversight of secondary legislation, and it also makes it considerably harder for us to meet our international obligations, which more and more are asking us to ensure that all law, including that raft of secondary legislation, is freely available online.

The work in terms of where we are now actually started back in 2016, or actually potentially even before that, when two reports were produced which, in principle, asked for the publication of legislation to be accessible in a single point. In 2016, the Government agreed that that would be what we would implement. It’s extremely significant, because up until the passage of this legislation, essentially, there was some law that was not published at all. The direction to members of the public was that you should find out which entity was responsible for the regulation, write to them or communicate with them, and request a copy, which is really unbelievable in terms of everyday laws that would apply to people. I think the beauty of this legislation, if I could use that word, lies in clause 20, which inserts new section 77 and 77A, which essentially mean that secondary legislation is not law until it is published.

Now, while I do support the legislation wholly, I am glad that it’s proceeding to select committee, because there are a few issues that I will enjoy discussing with members around the table when it comes to select committee. One is around the repeal of section 73. This is about what’s called prospective consolidation, and that’s when members of the public can see what a bill will look like when its provisions come into force. I actually think that’s quite a valuable tool for the public to have. That section’s been repealed.

The second thing I’d like to speak about at the select committee is the repeal of Part 4 of the Legislation Act, which pre-empts the coming into law or the passage into law of the Regulatory Standards Bill. While I can understand the desire to want to minimise administrative difficulties if you believe another law is going to come into place, I do just want to make sure that we’ve thought through the things that that part covers and protects that we may want to continue protecting.

The final thing that I’d like to have a conversation at select committee about is exemptions. I did want to look at the extension of exemptions, but also the rationale in terms of for what reason those extensions will be permitted.

I commend this bill to the House. I’m absolutely delighted that we’ll get a chance to talk more about secondary legislation in due course.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Green Party to speak on the Legislation Amendment Bill. I want to just preface this by saying that—and also kind of thank the Parliamentary Counsel Office, in particular for the work they are currently doing on the legislation website, which is fantastic. We managed to have a preview of what it looks like. I am particularly excited by the way they’re able to draw on amendments and past amendments, and as a way of being able to cross-reference more easily as a result of that. That partly shapes the foundation of what we’re looking at here in terms of this bill.

I think the other really important element is, as we’re seeing with the update to the legislation website, we’re also seeing the need for us to be able to access secondary legislation in a really easy way. A few of the things that are going to take place, hopefully, as a result of this legislation is, number one, the use of a standardised format when we’re looking at the creation of secondary legislation by various agencies and ministries. There is a lot of secondary legislation to keep track of, and, over time, this will be all brought in and cross-referenced within the legislation website that is being maintained by the Parliamentary Counsel Office, or the PCO. With that, it also, again, means that for those to be active, we’re able to use that legislation website to be able to keep checks on these secondary legislations as well, and, over time, that will be brought in as part of that aggregating tool. That’s a substantial portion of this particular omnibus bill.

With that, again, the Green Party is supporting this bill to select committee. It doesn’t mean that we don’t have concerns on certain areas of this bill. Now, there are things—more—that we would like to tease out as part of the select committee—[Interruption] We did say support to select committee. Part of that is to do with in terms of accessibility. What we have seen in terms of Parliament, and this is something that we have spoken on and questioned as part of the Estimates process, is around accessibility to Parliament and, in this case, accessibility to legislation and secondary legislation by the disabled communities, and how that would be able to enhance as a result of this process. If we’re putting in all of this effort into it to be able to make our legislation easier to use and more user-friendly, and particularly in the context of secondary legislation, it will be really important and I will be really interested to know, through the select committee process, what that would potentially look like broadly, in terms of accessibility and inclusivity, when it comes to this particular legislation.

Now, there are additional things that have been mentioned, because it is an omnibus bill, although the update to the legislation website and the changes to the way that we keep track of and also publish secondary legislation is hugely exciting—and the Attorney-General knows how excited I am about that particular component. The other components of this, particularly in terms of supporting—oh, and what I didn’t mention is by having the ability to keep track of secondary legislation, it will also, hopefully, improve the function and improve the work of the Regulations Review Committee here in Parliament as well, which is something that is also incredibly exciting.

In saying that, there are other elements of this bill that deserve attention, particularly in the context of the select committee process, and the previous speaker has already spoken on, in terms of the repeal of Part 4 of the Legislation Act 2019. I think it is a concern that while we are still in the process—and this is something that I haven’t seen that takes place in other bills, where one particular bill anticipates the passing or anticipates the enactment of another bill that is still currently going through the House and is being repealed as a result of that and, therefore, in some ways creates an interesting little limbo where it’s uncertain as to the exact nature of the repealed clause and how that would be assessed as part of the select committee. So that’s just one example.

Overall, the Green Party’s supporting this to select committee, and we would love to hear more about it as part of that process.

TODD STEPHENSON (ACT): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I rise on behalf of ACT to speak on the Legislation Amendment Bill. Obviously, in ACT, we’re not big on more laws and regulations, but this is a very, very sensible bill which actually does ensure that the New Zealand public actually has complete visibility over the laws and regulations that we pass in this place. I think, actually, most people will be quite surprised to know that there isn’t a single repository of secondary legislation where, in this day and age, you can actually just go to look up what might affect you and actually have it at your fingertip.

This is a very sensible bill. It’s actually making a very sensible change. I know it’s taken some time, and I understand the complexities of why it’s taken a while to get to this point. But we’re going to wholeheartedly support this, because it is very important that in our democracy, we actually do have transparency around particularly secondary legislation. I commend it to the House.

ANDY FOSTER (NZ First): Thank you, Mr Speaker. This is about making legislation and regulations more accessible to New Zealanders. That is a great attitude. That is what Government should be all about: trying to help New Zealanders to understand the laws which govern them. It’s common sense, it’s democratic, it’s efficient, and it’s effective. We often say that ignorance of the law is no excuse, but when we hide the law, that makes it very, very difficult for people to understand it. So if we acknowledge that, then that means that it is our responsibility to make that law more accessible, and that is what this is all about. It’s an obligation on lawmakers, if you like, to make sure that the law is available in plain language and with a plain, easy way to get hold of it. This legislation sets clear requirements on the Parliamentary Counsel Office and agencies to deliver on that attitude and those objectives, and I’m delighted to commend the Legislation Amendment Bill to the House.

Hon Dr Duncan Webb: Mr Speaker.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): I think the next speaker is actually supposed to be from the National Party, on my schedule.

TOM RUTHERFORD (National—Bay of Plenty): Have I got the call, Mr Speaker? Thank you very much. It gives me great pleasure to rise on behalf of the National Party and speak in favour of the Legislation Amendment Bill. As has been outlined by previous speakers on this, this is a single broad policy to promote high-quality legislation for New Zealand that’s easy to find, use, and understand, which I can’t believe that, in 2025, we haven’t got. But we’ve got a Minister in charge, in the Hon Judith Collins, who’s sorting it out and getting it fixed. So it gives me great pleasure to commend the bill to the House.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central): Kia orana, Mr Speaker. What an appalling speech that Tom Rutherford barely remembered to stand up for. Here’s the funny thing about this bill—

Hon Scott Simpson: Put your 1970s tie back on.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB: —that no one—I’d rather have a ’70s tie than ’70s values, Mr Simpson. The funny thing about the Legislation Amendment Bill is that it repeals Part 4 of the Legislation Act 2019. I just wanted to talk a little bit about the history of this Act. The Legislation Act is 100 percent about regulatory quality. It is about legislation and secondary legislation and getting it right. It was worked on under the National Party. It’s a bipartisan piece of legislation. It was introduced on 20 June 2017, went to the Justice Committee in June 2018, the committee of the whole House in 2019, and it got Royal assent a few weeks later, in October 2019. So it took a little bit over two years to pass a top-quality piece of legislation in a bipartisan manner that was about legislative quality.

One of the things that this bill does is it repeals Part 4 of the Legislation Act. Do you know what Part 4 is about? It is about accountability to this House for legislative quality. It is being repealed because of the shocking piece of legislation that is being shoved through this House at speed, called the Regulatory Standards Bill. The fact of the matter is that much of what is done in that bill—the good bits of that bill, the bits that actually have some merit—is already in the Legislation Act that we passed around this House with a consensus.

The fact of the matter is that if you look at section 103 of the Act, that is now being repealed by this piece of legislation, “Chief executives must prepare and publish disclosure statements for Government-initiated legislation”. Well, that’s not a million miles from some of the suggestions in the Regulatory Standards Bill. Then, if you go on a bit further, there’s a whole lot of stuff around regulatory disclosure statements, and then “Chief executives must act independently and include statement of responsibility”. That is pretty much exactly clause 23 of the Regulatory Standards Bill, which requires consistency, accountability statements.

A whole lot of stuff that’s going on that David Seymour’s waving his arms about, saying, “We must do this.”—wake up! We’ve done it already. You just want to have a little political win, have your ideological, right-wing, libertarian version of regulatory quality, when what we did over many years in this House—and this bill was considered also and shepherded by the Regulations Review Committee, and I remember working on it there, very carefully, diligently, with fantastic advice from the clerks’ counsel. Yet here we are now, doing away with a system, which also, by the way, had a framework for the responsible Minister—that is to say, the Minister responsible for regulatory stewardship—and the Attorney-General issuing guidance as to what good regulatory quality was. So we’ve got a system here that is well-thought-out and—this is the real point—is politically neutral, isn’t imbued with neoliberal principles, isn’t embarrassing every other party in the House other than the ACT Party, but, because of the coalition agreement, we’re doing away with it.

Now, that’s only one small part of this bill. The fact of the matter is that we know that the coalition parties and the National Party and Christopher Luxon have acceded to the demands of the ACT Party in this, so the Regulatory Standards Bill will pass, and this Part 4 of the Act—a very good part of the Act that, incidentally, hasn’t yet come into force—will become a dead letter, so it’s no use. It’s sitting in this bill after that, but it may well come back, because we intend to repeal the Regulatory Standards Bill.

The rest of this piece of legislation is OK—is OK. It’ll do. It’s a tidy-up. It modernises the legislative framework, and that’s a good thing. But Part 4, there was a solution there already, and now you’re getting rid of it. Kia ora.

Hon MELISSA LEE (National): It is a pleasure to rise and support this Legislation Amendment Bill in the first reading. I think what’s important is that this actually goes back to 2014, based on two inquiries: one is the Regulations Review Committee’s inquiry into the oversight of disallowable instruments that are not legislative instruments, and the Productivity Commission’s report on regulatory institutions and practices. Both of those inquiries recommended improving accessibility of New Zealand’s secondary legislation by establishing a single website or register from which it can be accessed. I completely feel in tune with that comment, because every time that I talk to people, especially ethnic communities, who want to learn more about bills and regulations, they don’t actually have one place that they can go to find all that information.

I think what this bill will achieve is that in time, all of the legislation, secondary legislation, everything related to the changes that we make in Parliament, will be available in that one place, and technology makes it happen. I would like to say, I commend this great bill.

CAMILLA BELICH (Labour): Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s an honour to take a call on—well, I haven’t actually taken a call on a Government bill that we’ve supported in a while, so I’m pleased to be able to do that tonight. I also want to acknowledge the Minister for bringing the bill, and recall our time together on the Regulations Review Committee when she was the chair—so a full-circle moment here, to be in the House when this piece of legislation, the Legislation Amendment Bill, has been brought to the House.

As my colleagues have eloquently said, Labour will be supporting this bill, because it is a practical bill and it does provide greater access to legislation. I think probably, looking through it, the main big change will be the single point of access that it will allow to secondary legislation. Now, I think that secondary legislation is not something that many New Zealanders probably spend a lot of time thinking about, unless it directly affects their lives. But the point of the work that we do is to try and make sure that when either primary legislation or secondary legislation has an impact on people’s lives, they have access to that. It shouldn’t be something which is hidden away and it shouldn’t be something which is difficult to find, and so I think, in addition to the single point of access, the publication requirements that this bill introduces will also be of great use moving forward.

I also wanted to say, at this stage, that this looks very much into the work of the Parliamentary Counsel Office (PCO). We get to work with the Parliamentary Counsel Office every single week in Parliament, and they do an exceptional job. They’re exceptionally talented lawyers, who probably could make a lot more money doing other work but choose to spend their time doing what can sometimes be extremely detailed work—some may consider it tedious, but I’m sure they don’t—making sure that the legislation that we put before this House is of the highest quality. They do an exceptional job of that. They work with parties around the House and select committees, but also, of course, with the Ministers who are in Government, to make sure that the legislation is of very high quality. I want to commend them for the work that they do.

I do echo the concerns that my colleague Duncan Webb made around repealing Part 4 of the Legislation Act and around the almost preparation that the Government is doing for the Regulatory Standards Bill. That is of course legislation that we don’t support and, in fact, purports to do a somewhat similar job to this bill but, actually, as we’ve seen with a lot of those debates, goes a lot further than that. I think, to also agree with what Dr Duncan Webb has said, this particular bill took a long period of time because sometimes legislation does take a long period of time, and especially legislation which is genuinely bipartisan and genuinely seeks to solve a real problem that members across the House can agree exists and that we know that we can do better around moving forward. So I do echo the concerns that Dr Duncan Webb stated around the Regulatory Standards Bill.

But I think, overall, we’re really pleased to see this come to the House. It’s really pleasing to see work that’s gone on, especially with very dedicated committees like the Regulations Review Committee, which probably doesn’t get enough attention in this House. They often meet when the House is sitting, unless those people make complaints, the Regulations Review Committee—who are a small group of people, from my experience. You don’t actually get to see the work that they do, but they do do really important work in this House.

I think that this particular bill will enable the PCO, Regulations Review, and the public to better understand the role of secondary legislation, so it is something that I’m very pleased to support, and, obviously, we’re just keen to see, looking through all of the details of it—and there is a significant amount of information that’s been released today as well, to support that. We will look through this. We will see if there’s any further improvement that can be made, but I want to commend the work that’s been done over successive Governments to get the bill to this particular state. I’m pleased to be able to make a tiny contribution to this and commend this bill to the House.

TIM COSTLEY (National—Ōtaki): When I have been meeting recently with a number of disability groups in our community, the biggest theme I’ve heard from them isn’t about plain language or comprehension; it’s been about ease of access, and this bill, the Legislation Amendment Bill, bringing primary and secondary legislation to one place, improves accessibility. I commend it to the House.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read a first time.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): The question is, That the Legislation Amendment Bill be considered by the Justice Committee.

Motion agreed to.

Bill referred to the Justice Committee.

Instruction to Justice Committee

Hon JUDITH COLLINS (Attorney-General): I move, That the Legislation Amendment Bill be reported to the House by 18 December 2025.

Motion agreed to.

Urgency

Urgency

Hon JUDITH COLLINS (Minister for Space): on behalf of the Leader of the House: I move, That urgency be accorded for the introduction and passing through all stages of the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, and the remaining stages of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill.

The House today is going into urgency for only two bills: the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill is to be passed through all stages to give the Government the ability to manage our national security and other risks to the national interest posed by the misuse of ground-based space infrastructure; and the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill, which has already gone through a thorough select committee process and needs to be passed so it can be ratified. We hope to have near-unanimous approval of both bills in the House today.

A party vote was called for on the question, That urgency be accorded.

Ayes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 54

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 5.

Motion agreed to.

Bills

Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill

Introduction

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): I understand it is the intention of the Government to introduce a bill.

CLERK: Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, introduction.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): That bill is set down for first reading immediately.

First Reading

Hon JUDITH COLLINS (Minister for Space): I move, That the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill be now read a first time.

It is a privilege to introduce this bill to the House. The purpose of the bill is to strengthen New Zealand’s space regulatory framework by establishing a new authorisation regime for ground-based space infrastructure, ensuring that activities involving such infrastructure are subject to appropriate oversight, security, and accountability.

New Zealand’s space sector is growing rapidly, and we are home to innovative companies and research institutions that are pushing the boundaries of satellite technology, space communication, and orbital operations. As the sector evolves, so too must our regulatory settings. Growth in our space sector includes ground-based infrastructure. I’m talking about satellite tracking stations, telemetry systems, and surveillance equipment, which plays a critical role in supporting space activities. These systems can interact directly with satellites and other space objects, and unfortunately that means they can pose risks to national security and other national interests if not properly managed.

Until now, our legislation has focused primarily on space and high-altitude activities in orbit or at high altitude. This bill fills a critical gap by introducing a tailored regime for ground-based space infrastructure, ensuring that operators are authorised, risks are assessed, and enforcement powers are available when needed.

The bill amends the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Act 2017. First, the bill requires anyone operating ground-based space infrastructure for certain activities, such as communicating with satellites or tracking space objects, to hold a ground-based space infrastructure activity authorisation. This ensures we know who is operating the infrastructure and for what purpose.

Second, it sets out a clear application process. Applicants will need to confirm with the regulator that they have appropriate protective security arrangements in place and systems to assess their customers. This is about operators making sure their ground-based space infrastructure operations are secure and they understand who they are providing services to and for what purpose. The bill gives the responsible Minister, which is the Minister for Space, the ability to decline applications in which they are not satisfied that granting their authorisation is in the national interest, including national security. This places ongoing obligations on authorisation holders. They’ll need to report regularly, notify the Minister of any security breaches, and keep their security and due diligence arrangements up to date. The responsible Minister will have the power to vary, suspend, or revoke authorisations where national security and national interest concerns arise. This gives the flexibility to respond to new information or changing circumstances.

Finally, the bill strengthens enforcement. Enforcement officers will be able to inspect facilities, assess security arrangements, and when necessary, in the national interest, the Minister will be able to issue disposal orders requiring a person to divest their interest in ground-based space infrastructure. This could mean they could be ordered to sell the equipment or break a lease with a provider.

To support the smooth transition, the bill includes transitional provisions. From commencement on 29 July 2025—next Tuesday—until no later than 29 July 2026, existing ground-based space infrastructure operators will be deemed to hold a transitional authorisation. Enforcement powers will apply during this period, and the Minister may revoke transitional authorisations on national security grounds. From when regulations come into force, but no later than 29 July 2026, all operators must hold a formal authorisation.

This bill supports the Government’s broader commitment to ensuring that New Zealand’s space sector is safe, secure, and internationally credible. Innovation in New Zealand is accelerating, and the space sector is a standout example. In the five years to 2024 it grew by 53 percent, contributing $2.47 billion to the economy in the last financial year. This underscores the sector’s growing role in our economic strategy and its potential to drive future high-value growth. We’re just scratching the surface as we work to grow our economy by becoming the go-to place for space and advanced aviation activities. By introducing a clear and modern framework for ground-based infrastructure, we are enforcing New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible spacefaring nation. I commend this bill to the House.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING (Labour—Dunedin): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I rise as Labour’s space spokesperson to speak. We are supporting this bill, and why we are supporting this bill is because we do agree that all of New Zealand’s space activity, wherever it is, whether it’s on the ground or in the stratosphere, should be regulated so that it is in the national interest, and that is what this bill appears to be doing.

On the not-so-good side is that this bill is going through all-stages urgency, and so that means that the bill has only just now become available for people to look at. I understand there may have been some prior consultation on aspects of it, but in general nobody has been having any public discussion about this bill, and so there may be parts of it that have inadvertent, unintended consequences. We do want to go through, in the committee stage, and take it seriously so that we all understand the bill as best as we can, and I hope the Minister is of that view.

Because it is going through all-stages urgency—and there may be a reason for that that hasn’t been explained, but maybe the Minister will explain that; I know that she has just indicated that she wants it to be in force by next Tuesday—there should be an opportunity for a post-enactment review of this, because, as I say, we in this House are not all space experts. We do not operate space facilities, ground-based or vertical launch or horizontal launch, even, and we do want to make sure that we’re creating the best laws for this industry that we possibly can.

We agree with the Minister that it is a very important industry to New Zealand, so the point then of being troubled by it coming to us under all-stages urgency is we want to make sure that it’s as robust as it can be and that there are not unintended consequences, because it is not good law-making to do things under all-stages urgency. However, a remedy for all-stages urgency, when there is a proper need to do something in urgency, is to have a post-enactment review. We’d very much like to hear the Minister’s views on that, and we are going to have ample opportunity to, because we’ve got a number of features to do this evening and probably tomorrow morning on this bill.

The bill is talking about ground-based space infrastructure, and, as the Minister said, we already have a lot of regulation that comes from the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Act that governs the launching of various different vessels into space. What that provides is that any payload from those launches has to be signed off by the Minister, and the operation also needs to be signed off—so there is a permit and licensing scheme in the Act that we’re amending today.

What this Act does, and I would welcome the Minister to describe this in one of your speeches, is that this is an authorisation regime—so it’s authorisation rather than licence and permits—and it’s for these ground-based space infrastructure. Ground-based space infrastructure is defined in parts by exception, and so it would also be very useful to hear from the Minister exactly what she considers, and what the drafters of this bill have considered, to be “ground-based infrastructure”.

I am coming here assuming that it is places like SpaceOps down near Bluff and also up in Warkworth, but probably not the horizontal launch that we have in Canterbury, or the vertical launch that Rocket Lab has. But maybe it applies to the Chathams that Rocket Lab has, and maybe it applies to the Wellington Gateway Teleport in Upper Hutt. These are things that I thought would be very useful so we’re all clear on exactly what we’re talking about, what it will apply to, and what it won’t. I look forward to speaking on this further.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Green Party to also support this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. Now, understandably, like the Minister for Space has mentioned in her speech, one of the things that we do have potential safeguards for within that space portfolio is what we’re seeing from outer space, but one of the things that is an existing gap within our current legislative and regulatory framework is around ground-based space infrastructure, or GBSI.

Now, again, understandably, because this is the first time that we are seeing this bill, and this is a bill that’s going through all stages of the readings under urgency, there will be a lot more to unpack, both in terms of the second reading but also in terms of the committee of the whole House. There are definitely things that we would like to ask the Minister about around the introduction of this bill and some of the circumstances that led to the introduction of this bill and, of course, some of the specificity of the bill. In the second reading, I will speak more in terms of the specific sections of this bill and maybe unpack the bill a bit further and raise some of the questions that we’ll be asking the Minister during the committee of the whole House stage.

I think, even at first glance, looking at the departmental disclosure statement, there are a couple of things that we are curious about. One of the things that this does talk about is the fact that although we are seeing this bill be introduced under urgency, the consultation has taken place since 2024, since last year, and there were two sets of consultation that took place, contacting the current 21 operators of GBSI and industry members looking to establish GBSI in the future, and around some of the requirements that we see in this bill. I’m also interested in the fact that while there has been consultation with the GBSI operators, there hasn’t been any consultation with Māori stakeholders as a result of the urgency, despite the fact that there has been consultation since last year. So there are a few additional things, I think, that deserve some unpacking in the committee of the whole House stage in terms of the process that led to this particular legislation.

Now, understandably when we are looking at bills like this one, which is going through all stages under urgency, we won’t have the luxury of going through a select committee stage where we’re able to hear both from the New Zealand public but also, equally importantly, from officials who may have additional insight, and we’re able to ask additional things from officials as part of that process. So we will be very much reliant on the opportunities that we’re given during the committee of the whole House stage for that.

I think one of the other things I want to mention in this first reading, other than the context of this bill—and I’ll mention a little bit more about the context and just highlight one additional thing. As with all bills that we see in Parliament, there will be some form of consistency report with our New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, or potentially a section 7 report if there are any areas that are inconsistent. We still haven’t seen that yet, despite the fact that the departmental disclosure statement states that it will be available once this bill is introduced. So, hopefully, as we progress through this bill, we’ll be able to see something on that and to examine this bill in a more wholesome and full and comprehensive way.

One last thing I wanted to address in terms of this bill—and just, again, raising some of the issues that we’d really like to question the Minister on—is around whether the bill contains any provisions that could result in compulsory acquisition of private property. This is where it says, “The Bill gives Ministers the power to require an operator to dispose of their interest in or right to … GBSI where the Minister is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the [person operates] … or has given … risk to national security.” So we just, again, want to unpack in terms of some of the legal risk components, but also, considering that the departmental disclosure statement specifies that it is within the Minister’s power, we need to look at it from a perspective of regulatory-making power as well as through either secondary legislation or additional aspects.

I’d just say the Green Party is supportive of this bill. It does address a gap. We’ll look forward to further engagement with the Minister on this.

MARK CAMERON (ACT): Thank you, Mr Speaker. And thank you, Minister Collins, for bringing what appears to be a very good piece of legislation, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. I just want to note that satellite technology is now ubiquitous in our modern life. The days of Sputnik—I think we all remember the stories of Sputnik when we were kids.

Hon Scott Simpson: Tom Rutherford does.

MARK CAMERON: Well, there you go. And isn’t science a wonderful subject? This certainly speaks to that. I wrote down a few notes, but apparently I have a limited period of time to talk about the speed of light at 299,000 kilometres a second.

Hasn’t our world changed in the last 50 years? I think also, to add to the obvious, with good actors come bad actors, and that we see our satellite telemetry and ground-based assets potentially being used for nefarious purposes. I think this bill speaks to the importance of protecting that satellite network. Obviously, space vehicles and technology, both hardware and software, are a little bit harder to corrupt, but certainly land-based technology is less so. We see the potentiality for nefarious actors to undo all our good work and our investment.

Certainly, in a world where we’re now immersed in this kind of technology, whether it’s the national grid, whether it’s communication capabilities, and certainly our ability to data share, anyone or any group that might compromise that kind of technology and our sovereignty in New Zealand should be protected against.

So this is good bill. I thank again the Minister for introducing it to the House, and I certainly look forward to more dialogue on this very subject.

ANDY FOSTER (NZ First): The final frontier is exciting. I thought we’d start off with a reference to at least one famous genre. I think we all bask in the reflected pride, if you like, in the innovation and the growth of the space sector in New Zealand, something I think we’re all very proud of. But it also holds perils, and that’s really what this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, is about. The regulatory impact statement (RIS) talks very eloquently about the potential for malicious interests. We know not everyone is benign in this world. There are people who would misuse that final frontier, and so the RIS talks about that, and this bill is about protecting our national security—our national security. That is a very, very important thing.

I think it is also something that’s about our reputation with our friends and our neighbours, because it’s also about their national security as well. If we’ve got a lot of payload which is launched from New Zealand, it is not just affecting New Zealand but affecting potentially globally, but certainly around our neighbourhood in the South Pacific.

Often in this Government we don’t like adding regulation, but this is about allowing the regulation of what would otherwise be an unregulated sector—and making sure that what goes into space from New Zealand’s sovereign territory is not carrying malicious payloads for nefarious purposes which would affect our national security and the national security of other nations around us.

Also, when you think about things that could be launched—the surveillance, for example—we want to make sure, as much as we can, that if there are things which are taking photographs or coverage of New Zealand, it is not going to cause adverse effects to New Zealand. Without this bill, there would be, as I understand it, no powers to regulate the payload which is launched from New Zealand soil, and this is what this bill allows to be done.

Somewhat predictably, from the Opposition we’ve heard, “Yep, we support it, but we’re concerned about urgency.” I guess I would encourage the Minister in further speeches to actually say, “Look, why is it important to get this thing through now?” I think you can see the way in which it’s been put on the table, why it’s been put on the table, the way it’s been done, and the way it’s been pushed quickly is because it is seen as an imminent concern which we need to deal with straight away, to cut any problems off at the pass. The RIS also, I think, very helpfully sets out that this is also about our reputation and it’s about the reputation of our operators here out of New Zealand. That’s a very, very good thing for them to have that good reputation. I commend this bill to the House.

TIM VAN DE MOLEN (National—Waikato): Thank you, Mr Speaker. Look, happy to take a call on this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. It’s an important bill, and, I think, reflects the growing technological advances we’re seeing here in New Zealand. There’s a lot of opportunity for us in space and in advanced technologies, but with opportunity comes risk. We can see that when we look around the world. There is growing uncertainty. So it is appropriate that we take precautions and sensible steps to ensure that we are managing these technological advances appropriately and setting the framework. This bill will establish a new authorisation regime for the ground-based space infrastructure, which aims to deter foreign interference and protect our national interests. That’s an important consideration for us to look at as we go forward as a trusted, responsible, space-faring nation. So I commend this bill to the House.

Hon PRIYANCA RADHAKRISHNAN (Labour): Thank you, Mr Speaker. As other speakers before me have alluded to or mentioned, this is a bill that aims to protect New Zealand’s national interest and New Zealand’s national security. It aims to discourage foreign interference in the country’s infrastructure when it comes to tracking and controlling of spacecraft, space surveillance, and the transfer of data to and from spacecraft. It’s also one that aims to send a clear message that New Zealand considers its national security a very serious matter and will take action if it suspects that it’s under threat. As Labour spokesperson for the national security agencies, that is, of course, an aspiration of the legislation that I support.

Just in terms of the why of this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, I do want to point to the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service’s (NZSIS) New Zealand’s Security Threat Environment. That was the assessment that the NZSIS did, or published, last year in 2024 where they talk about some of the malicious activity that targets the private sector here in New Zealand, and that’s particularly companies focused on tech and innovation. They do lay out all of this. This is in the public domain, so I don’t think there’s anything particularly to not touch on in terms of what they’ve laid out here, but they do state that big data applications, space-related technologies, and advanced manufacturing processes have all reached a stage where the line sometimes between what is ordinarily commercial and what is military or intelligence use can become blurred.

They do also lay out a case study where they outline that in the past few years, in recent times, New Zealand organisations have been approached by specific entities that seek to then develop space infrastructure here in our territory, who then claim that that infrastructure will be used for civilian research purposes, but it was then later found that in each of those cases what was proposed by them could have assisted in foreign military activity that would have then harmed New Zealand’s sovereignty, New Zealand’s national security, and our interests more broadly.

The full capabilities and, specifically, some of the affiliations of those entities were deliberately withheld or deliberately hidden, and therein lies an issue. If those projects had gone ahead, we would have inadvertently allowed another country to install equipment here in New Zealand with a plausible military or intelligence function, without even having really known the extent of that. That would have, as I said previously, risked our sovereignty. By deliberately hiding their affiliations, the foreign entities then undermine our ability to be able to make informed decisions about our own national security and our national interests.

What this bill does is it puts in place a regulatory framework. There is a lot of detail in the regulations, and I will come back to that in a minute, but basically what it does is it requires operators of that specific type of infrastructure to obtain a ground-based space infrastructure activity authorisation from the Minister. It also then empowers the Minister to be able to assess whether proposed activities meet the national interest test, and that includes considerations of economic benefit, national security, and international relations.

We do think that the national interest test is a bit vague, and we would want more transparency around balancing the national security test. I do have a question for the Minister, probably when we come to committee stage. I get that the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment will be the regulator of this framework that’s proposed, but I do want to know what the interactions will be with national security agencies and the Minister responsible for national security when it comes to that national interest test. But as my colleagues have laid out, we do support this because of its focus on national security.

We do have some questions. We do have a question around the need for urgency for all stages and what sort of consultation will happen when it comes to the regulations within this bill, and have proposed, as Rachel Brooking mentioned, that a review be built into this, just because it is being passed through all stages under urgency. Thank you.

TIM COSTLEY (National—Ōtaki): Sir, this evening I and others—the Hon Chris Penk, Tim van de Molen, and Vanessa Weenink—joined veterans who served in East Timor in 1999 to commemorate and acknowledge their service. The world is a different place. Technology has evolved markedly since that time, and while to some it might feel a bit far-fetched to say that we are facing space wars or something similar in the future, actually, the space domain is already critical to security operations around the world, and indeed in New Zealand.

Isn’t it good that here we have a Government, and a Minister in the Hon Judith Collins KC, who is doing something about that for our country? I commend the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill to the House.

Hon PHIL TWYFORD (Labour—Te Atatū): As colleagues have said, this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, puts in place an authorisation framework to regulate ground-based space infrastructure. It’s worth noting for the folks at home that ground-based space infrastructure includes any earth-based facilities that support space operations, including satellite ground stations, tracking and monitoring systems, data reception and processing centres, launch support facilities and mission control centres, and cyber-physical systems used to interfere with orbiting spacecraft.

The risk, I think, that this bill is seeking to address is espionage and foreign interference by foreign powers. The sort of ground-based space infrastructure that we’re talking about here can be exploited to intercept satellite communications, monitor payloads and launch schedules, and map New Zealand’s scientific and military capabilities. They’re also vulnerable to cyber-attacks and intrusions. There are a number of examples internationally, global precedents where foreign actors have successfully hacked into satellite ground stations in Norway, in India, and in the US.

A number of like-minded countries who have space sectors have, in recent times, introduced regulatory safeguards to manage the risks of foreign interference and national interest risks associated with ground-based space infrastructure. In 2020, the Norwegian Government tightened the security rules for foreign access to satellite ground stations in the Arctic. They brought in restrictions on data sharing, requiring greater transparency and compliance with security clearances. Canada in 2019: a Chinese-controlled company was blocked from acquiring Canadian satellite imaging firm Norsat, and Canada mandates that operators of satellite ground stations and space data systems comply with their defence and intelligence vetting. Sweden has done similarly with their Space Activities Act. Australia: the Office of National Intelligence and Defence Space Command now advise on all proposed space activities involving international collaboration.

I want to use the remaining time to really ask the question about whether the concern for national sovereignty and the protection of the national interest in relation to ground-based space infrastructure begs the question of whether we’re doing all we can to protect our national sovereignty in relation to the rest of the New Zealand - based space programme, including the launches at Māhia Peninsula. The threat there, of course, is not espionage, foreign actors who might wish to interfere or disrupt; it’s foreign actors who may be the paying customers of the launch programme. Why do I say this? Because what began as a launch industry taking advantage of our uncluttered skies and ocean with exciting economic development potential has grown with a very heavy reliance on launching payloads for US military agencies and private sector firms who supply the US military.

The salient example is BlackSky’s technology. A geospatial intelligence firm have had satellites launched for them by Rocket Lab over a number of years. Now BlackSky supplies the high temporal frequency images and analysis to the Israel Defense Forces. Israel’s artificial intelligence systems use geospatial data to select their strike targets in their military operation in Gaza, where they are routinely bombing civilian targets and breaching international law on a daily basis. The question is: are Rocket Lab payloads supporting a genocidal war on the people of Gaza? Well, we don’t know.

The Minister is required, when they sign off a payload, to ensure that it meets the national interest test and a set of principles which include the payloads with the intended end use of supporting or enabling specific defence, security, or intelligence operations that are contrary to Government policy must not be allowed. But there’s no transparency. We have to take the Minister’s word for it. That is the question.

This bill seeks to strengthen the regulatory framework to protect the national interest in relation to ground-based space infrastructure. But are we applying the same level of care to the rest of the space programme, particularly the payload launches at Māhia Peninsula for military clients and the private sector firms that serve them?

Grant McCallum: Madam Speaker?

DEPUTY SPEAKER: I’m sorry there’s no more speech—[Interruption] Is there one more? Oh, one more National—sorry. Apologies. I see an arrow that’s been drawn here. I call Grant McCallum. Thank you.

GRANT McCALLUM (National—Northland): Thank you, Madam Speaker.

Hon Matt Doocey: Oh, you could have saved us, Madam Speaker!

GRANT McCALLUM: Ha, ha! The support is overwhelming—it’s overwhelming!

It’s a real pleasure to rise to take the final call on the first reading of this very important bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. The space industry—who would have thought many years ago that once upon a time New Zealand would be one of the key leaders in the space industry in the world. It’s a very proud moment to be able to rise to speak on this. I acknowledge the work of the Hon Judith Collins KC that she’s doing in this “space”, you might say—boom, boom.

For that, I’d just like to say I look forward to moving through the rest of the bill, and I commend it to the House.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read a first time.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: This bill is set down for second reading immediately.

Second Reading

Hon JUDITH COLLINS (Minister for Space): I move, That the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill be now read a second time.

I want to thank members from across the House for their contributions during the first reading debate. I appreciate the thoughtful engagement with the bill’s intent and provisions. As I outlined in my first reading speech, this bill introduces a new authorisation regime for ground-based space infrastructure. These are facilities and systems located in New Zealand that interact with satellites and other space objects such as tracking stations, telemetry systems, and surveillance equipment. Until now, these activities have not been subject to a dedicated regulatory framework. This bill addresses this gap.

The bill requires operators of infrastructure to have a ground-based space infrastructure activity authorisation before conducting regulated activities. Operators of this infrastructure must notify the regulator that they have protective security and partner due-diligence arrangements to obtain an authorisation. The responsible Minister, the Minister for Space, may decline an authorisation if they are not satisfied that the application is in the national interest.

Importantly, it also provides enforcement powers, including the ability to issue disposal orders, where risks cannot be adequately managed. I want to be clear that the bill excludes activities such as astronomy, emergency services operations, and personal or household use. The regime is targeted at ground-based space infrastructure that poses a risk, or a potential risk, to national interest.

From 29 July 2025—next week—all in-scope operators will be treated as having a transitional authorisation. Enforcement powers will apply from that date, and the Minister will have the ability to revoke authorisations on national security grounds, a subcomponent of the broader national interest.

A formal transition period will run until the commencement of regulations, with a backstop date of 29 July 2026, giving operators time to meet the new requirements. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment will provide guidance and support throughout this period. From the commencement of regulations, the Minister will have the ability to revoke authorisations on broader national interest grounds. This bill responds, by the way, to an immediate need to safeguard New Zealand’s national security. Ground-based space infrastructure is increasingly being used to support satellite operations, and without a regulatory framework in place, we are exposed to risk, including foreign interference, that cannot be adequately managed under current legislation.

During the past five years, there have been several deceptive efforts by foreign actors to establish and/or use ground-based space infrastructure in New Zealand to harm our national security. They have deliberately disguised their affiliations to foreign militaries and misrepresented their intentions. To date, these risks have been managed through non-regulatory measures, including relying on the goodwill of ground-based space infrastructure operators. These measures are no longer enough. By progressing this bill under urgency, we are ensuring that enforcement powers are available from the moment the legislation comes into force on 29 July, which is next Tuesday.

This is critical to maintain oversight of in-scope infrastructure and to enable swift actions if national security concerns arise. This bill is not about restricting innovation; it’s about ensuring that New Zealand’s space sector continues to grow in a way that is secure, responsible, and aligned to our national interests. It complements our broader work on space activities, regulation, international partnerships, and space security.

I thank members again for their contributions and look forward to detailed consideration of the bill’s provisions during the committee of the whole House. I commend this bill to the House.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING (Labour—Dunedin): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I thank the Minister for Space for two comments that she made just then. One was that we’ll have some detailed consideration in the committee stage, and that is very important. The other one was that the Minister has said there is an immediate need, for national security reasons, regarding potential foreign interference that can’t be managed by the current regulatory framework. That is her case for it coming to us under urgency, and I will accept the need for it to be under urgency at the Minister’s word. She knows much more about these things, given the many different hats that she wears in this field.

But I do still say, and I will continue to say—and I’m interested in the Minister’s answer—why can’t there be some sort of post-enactment review of this legislation that we will pass either tonight or tomorrow morning? That point remains, but I thank the Minister for confirming that there is a reason for the urgency and that we will have a detailed discussion in the committee stage.

Now, I just want to touch on a couple of things, because in between doing my first reading and my second reading speeches, I have been down to the Table and have found there now, just as the urgency motion was moved, the departmental disclosure statement and the regulatory impact statement (RIS). A couple of the matters that I referred to in my first reading speech not that long ago are relevant here as well.

I mentioned in the first reading speech that it would be good to know exactly what the operations are that we’re considering. Is it what we have down in Awarua and up in Warkworth? How many more of these ground-based space infrastructures (GBSI) are there around the country? I note then in the departmental disclosure statement, on page 9, it talks about the external consultation that happened with this bill and notes that 21 operators of GBSI and industry members looking to establish GBSI in the future were contacted for some sort of consultation. Then it says, “We met with 10 operators during the initial consultation and three operators responded in writing in the second round of consultation.” It says that the consultation was positive. Then it goes on to say that “We conducted consultation with two GBSI experts on the bill.” It looks to be that there could be 21 operators of this infrastructure around the country, given the comment in here. It would be very useful to hear from the Minister at some point during the committee stage about what those operators are and what is in and out of ground-based space infrastructure.

Then I also note that the Minister made some comment there in her second reading speech that the current regulatory framework is not good enough to safeguard us from this national security risk, and she mentioned that in the past there have been some regulations and some goodwill—the goodwill of the current operators has meant that the system has been, hopefully, working OK.

Now, on page 8 of the RIS, there is some discussion about some of the different regulatory frameworks that are already in place. I think this is important, because it talks about the Radiocommunications Act, and that does provide some regulation at the moment for telemetry tracking and control that’s radio frequency - based, hence it is the Radiocommunications Act, but that there is no coverage for the optical. So that is a useful table that shows the gaps in the regulation that I presume this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, is trying to fill. That is why we are speaking in support of it but want some more discussion on it.

I also note from the RIS that it will take two additional fulltime-equivalent people—that’s an estimation—at the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the ministry in charge of the bill. Those are important items to understand as we progress through the second reading and go into the committee stage soon.

Of course, normally, in a second reading we are talking about what we have heard from the select committee and what those that were consulted have said. That hasn’t happened in this case. I take the Minister at her word that the urgency is required, but it does mean that we do need to spend some time on the bill in the committee stage.

We’ve heard from my colleagues who were talking about the national interest test. In this test, from my look at the bill and also the primary legislation that’s being amended by the bill, the national interest test is the same. It’s the same for consideration by the Minister when considering the existing launch approvals—which have different names from approvals: licences and permits—and then for these authorisations for the space infrastructure.

We see it in new section 49C, inserted by clause 7, that the Minister may have regard to economic or other benefits to New Zealand of the proposed activity—so financial focus; any risks to national security, public safety, international relations or other national interests; the extent to which the risk can be mitigated by authorisation conditions; and any other matters that the Minister considers relevant.

So, obviously, new section 49D, inserted by clause 7, is quite wide, and I do acknowledge that this is the same test that is in the legislation already, but we’ve heard from some of the speakers, and we heard from the Greens before about, well, where do mana whenua fit in with this? Is there any consideration for any particular concerns that they might have either in the national interest test or somewhere else? Through my quick look through the RIS—I couldn’t see anything in there, but that may be because I skipped the page. We would like to know more about that.

Then we will also be asking questions about requirements to consult the security Ministers. I acknowledge, at the current point in time, that that is all one person, which is interesting, but we will have some questions about that, and also how these apply to people who might be scientists or universities that aren’t the private person that the Minister talked about and who are clearly exempt. What about those other agencies that might not actually have a big bunch of kit like you do in Awarua but might have a small amount of—some of the items that are listed, when they’re operated by certain people, they become infrastructure, but when they’re operated by a private person, they’re not covered; they are exempt. So there’s an interesting balance there of how that decision will be made of where the line goes. That, again, is something that we will be wanting to address in the committee stage. I’ll leave it there for now.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Greens in this second reading speech to talk about the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. For those that are just tuning in right now, what this bill proposes to do is establish a regulatory regime for ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) activities, and it imposes an authorisation regime on people who operate what we call GBSI to carry out those activities. The activities include telemetry, tracking, and control, including of activities that could disrupt satellite operations of space objects, space surveillance and identification of space objects, satellite data reception, and other activities of concern.

What we have heard so far in this debate is that this bill is coming to the House because there’s a gap. There’s a gap in the regulatory regime, and it is a gap that needs to be filled. As the Minister was saying earlier, there have been incidents of concern where people have disguised their actual intent in terms of their set-up, and so making sure that you have eyes over things, I think, is really important, right? If you’ve got something being built in your backyard, it makes sense that you know what is being built in that backyard, and it makes sense that there is some sort of regulatory regime that is in place to make sure that it does what we think it does. That’s important. That’s the reason—with that particular aspect—that the Greens are supporting this bill, because we recognise that there needs to be something which deals with ground-based space infrastructure activities.

I do agree with the point, though, that this is coming through the House under urgency, and we have heard concerns that it needs to be done quickly because there are possibly incidents afloat. But the suggestion that we could actually take a look at it a bit afterwards—having a post-legislation review on it—I think, is a good idea, because this is an incredibly important space but also a way for us to make sure that we’ve done the job properly. The issue is that if you take things for urgency too quickly—you know, you’ve got to be able to road-test the tyres, and so on and so forth. We don’t want any of the wheels falling off. So I do support that suggestion.

I think it was the Hon Phil Twyford who talked about his concerns around the national interest. Yes, it’s important for there to be eyes over it and to have a regulatory regime so there is some sort of form of law to be able to make sure that everything is happening in a way that makes sense, and that’s important. But we also need to understand that all of this stuff hooks on to what we call the “national interest”. I guess, for me, the national interest can always change. I note, within the regulatory impact statement here, that ground-based infrastructure refers to GBSI but also that this legislation is focused on foreign actors that do not share New Zealand’s values. I think that’s an important point, because values change over time, right? What are New Zealand’s values? As we become, hopefully, more enlightened as a society, our values change; they evolve.

I think the question that I have—which is linked to this bill but is perhaps a wider discussion, I think, that needs to happen in the context of the Act itself—is actually: have we got it right in terms of how we determine what the national interest is? There are a couple of examples of things, that I’m aware of, that are against the national interest. For example, if you launch something into outer space and you hit someone else’s satellite, well, you’re creating damage to someone else’s property, so that’s against the national interest. We’ve got, proudly, a nuclear-free status, so we can’t—shouldn’t—be launching things into outer space which contravene our nuclear-free legislation, and so that would be seen to be against the national interest. There is another debate there around dual use: if you fire something up which could be agnostic in terms of its usage, what says that afterwards someone might actually use it for nuclear purposes? How do you actually monitor that? Those two things would be considered to be against the national interest.

I think the legislation needs to be a lot more nimble to be able to accommodate the changing world that we live in. We are living in a world that is incredibly fractious. Things change very, very rapidly. Is that particular part fit for purpose? I don’t think it is. The need to actually have the regulatory regime to make sure that we know what we’re doing and that there’s eyes on the ground-based space infrastructure stuff—point made: that’s really important. But it actually hinges on what the national interest is.

We did hear concerns—that I have—around what’s being launched over in Māhia, as well. I note that BlackSky itself, which is a third-party provider who is providing geospatial data to countries like Israel—literally, with Israel. They’ve got a $150 million contract with Israel, and that’s incredibly problematic, because we had a debate today and this whole House is concerned about what’s happening there, as well. The question that I have is: is this now in line with our national interest? Well, I would argue that it isn’t. I would argue that what is happening over there is incredibly problematic and that we must do everything that we can to actually stop what is happening there, or to at least not be part of that. That hinges around that question of national interests.

Just coming back to the bill, I do acknowledge that there have been assessments made by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, and I’ve got a quote here from their assessment, which says, “The full capabilities, and some of the affiliations of these entities, were deliberately hidden”. That’s not good. “If these projects had gone ahead, we would have inadvertently allowed another country to install equipment in New Zealand with a plausible military or intelligence function. To have done so would have risked New Zealand’s sovereignty. By hiding their affiliations, the foreign entities undermined New Zealand’s ability to make informed decisions based on our national security and national interest.” For me, that’s at the heart of why you do need to have a regulatory regime and, in this case, to make sure that GBSI—ground-based space infrastructure activities—do have eyes over them and are regulated. That’s incredibly important.

The other part that I have heard made by some other commentators—which I do support, as well—is concerns from mana whenua. The time that I did go out to Māhia to meet with Māori communities, they were really concerned about what activities were happening there, and what they told me was they were told one thing—these launches weren’t going to be military payloads or surveillance payloads—and then something else happened completely. I think there is another part there. Yes, it’s incredibly important and urgent to deal with issues that are right in front of us, and if there are companies either knowingly or unknowingly being used by nefarious actors, well, then of course we need some legislation to actually be able to deal with that. But we also need to be able to deal with local communities, right? Some of these ground-based institutions—for example, in the case of Māhia—have connections. You have mana whenua who have really legitimate concerns about environmental impacts, for example. Having that weaved through, I think, would be important. I see that as a missing part and component which would actually strengthen, I think, this bill that’s going through, as well.

We do support this. We do need to have eyes on ground-based space infrastructure. Everybody needs to know what’s happening in their own backyard. But I would ask the House to really think about what New Zealand values mean. For me, it means we’re, of course, looking after ourselves but we’re also thinking about our neighbours as well. We live in the Pacific, and we’re a family of Pacific nations, so doing what is the best not just for us but also for the Pacific—in everything that we do—I think, is incredibly important, while also noting that in the fast-changing world that we’re living in, we do need to have legislation that is accommodating, legislation that can actually deal with the fluctuations with what’s happening, not just in the Middle East but also all around the world as well so that if our values change or differ, the legislation matches the evolution of those values—the evolution of those values, I think, that will, hopefully, be a step in the right direction. On that, Madam Speaker, thank you.

Dr PARMJEET PARMAR (ACT): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m taking this call on behalf of ACT to support this bill. I want to thank the Minister for bringing this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, before the House, and it’s justified, in our view, that it goes through under urgency, because the risk has been already identified. Despite identifying the risk, if nothing is done, then it would be really irresponsible, and that is not what we do in Government.

That’s why it’s good to see that this bill is going through under urgency, because at the moment, the non-regulatory approaches that are available for any actors, those who come here into New Zealand and set up any ground-based space infrastructure, basically, don’t have any teeth. It’s about education. It’s about outreach. We are relying on their goodwill, and, at this stage, even if we find something that is malicious, we cannot go and stop them, so having this regulatory regime will actually send a really good message—a strong message—to anybody who is wanting to come here. At the moment, if somebody will see how relaxed our approach is, they will see New Zealand as a very easy place to go and set up these kinds of infrastructures and do, kind of, malicious activities that we don’t want happening here in New Zealand.

It’s good that, from next week, all authorisations will become transitional authorisations, and then, on a case-by-case basis, they will be changed to fully authorised activities, based on what their activity is, and also giving the opportunity for us to be sure that none of those activities are compromising our national security. It’s a great bill, and I support this bill, and commend this bill to the House. Thank you.

ANDY FOSTER (NZ First): This bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, is going through a very rapid passage and, for most of us, the first time we saw anything of it was when the Minister introduced it and we saw the papers put down on the Table in front of us. So I think we’re all getting to have a greater understanding of what the bill is about.

I just wanted to pick up on one thing, because my understanding is that the Hon Phil Twyford talked about a lot of things related to payload—things which are actually being launched into space—which I understand has actually been covered by other legislation for some period of time, I think since 2017. So what it’s more about is the things which are on the ground, surveilling space. If you look at the list—and it was Teanau Tuiono who very helpfully read those out—it’s telemetry, tracking, and control of space objects; space surveillance and identification of space objects; and satellite data reception.

I really want you to think about the place of New Zealand in the world, because we are an island nation. We’re quite a long way away from anywhere else that anybody can do that kind of tracking, in a location which, as I understand it, a lot of satellites will be going over—the South Pole area—so we are going to be strategically important. If somebody wants to surveil those—to interfere with them, potentially, if they’re a malicious operator—we are quite a handy location to do that from.

It’s quite important that we do that, not just for us but also for our friends and our neighbours. If I might say to the Green Party there—you talked about our values. Looking after our friends and neighbours is a really good part of our value system.

I’ll just finish off with saying that we’ve had two separate comments from the Opposition. One is to say that this idea of national interest is vague, and then the other is to say that we want the idea of the national interest to be flexible, to be able to respond to different situations. Can’t really have it both ways.

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan: Yes, you can.

ANDY FOSTER: Well, it is really about allowing for a judgment call to be made for the Government of the day as to what is in the national interest. I commend this bill to the House.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: This call is a split call.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m here to speak on the second reading of this particular bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. I mentioned in the first reading speech that in the second reading I’d be diving a little bit deeper into the bill itself and some of the questions we have for the Minister for Space in the upcoming committee stage, and, also, this gives me a chance to go into some of the specificities around the regulatory impact statement as well.

I think, to start with, in terms of the different clauses of this bill, one of the things we heard from the Minister was in terms of the reason for urgency. But one of the things we do see in this particular bill is around the transitional arrangement, whereby there’s a transitional authorisation for all persons operating ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) from the date of commencement until one year—so 29 July 2026. Again, if there is already a transitional arrangement in place which opens the opportunities for the Minister to be able to review the authorisation, it raises the question of why we are then needing to introduce this urgency where, currently, no operators’ authorisation is secure. That’s one of the questions that we’ll be hoping to tease out.

The other one that is really important, and, I think, quite a few people have mentioned this—and, again, this is something for us to highlight during the committee stage—is the fact that there is immense power embedded in the Minister. The Minister, in this case, has a lot of discretion and regulatory-making power in terms of the ability to authorise such GBSI operators, with—from what I can see within legislation—not a lot of checks and balances. This is, again, something that we would like to tease out. One of the things I have learnt on the Regulations Review Committee is this immediate nervousness around when there are unchecked regulatory-making powers by the executive.

Also, I mentioned this in the first reading and I would just like to reiterate that we are now at the second reading, and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act report is still not available on the Ministry of Justice’s website, which makes our job incredibly difficult in terms of analysing and scrutinising any legislation in the House.

On to the regulatory impact statement: one of the things that we have seen is the fact that this particular bill had a number of options. We can talk more about what is considered to be the national interest and what are considered to be New Zealand values, and we’re going to tease some of that out as part of the committee stage. In accordance with the regulatory impact statement, one of the things that we have seen is that this particular concern—and we have addressed that there is a gap in this particular area and the coverage between what is currently the regulatory environment and the non-regulatory environment that has been used to sort of jigsaw together the current status quo doesn’t cover certain areas. Particularly, if we’re looking at the regulatory impact statement, the current environment doesn’t cover telemetry, it doesn’t even cover space objects surveillance identification, or SOSI, and it doesn’t cover data reception, and also particularly around passive radiofrequency or optical—those two are the most frequent ways for us to be able to track some of these space objects, so to speak. There are certain areas where the current regulatory and non-regulatory environment doesn’t cover, so it is important for there to be an altered measure.

Now, four options have been given. One of the things I’m more interested in is that there is a third option, which is offering authorisation for this particular regime, and the next option is actually offering a licence. Based on the regulatory impact statement, there is a difference, but there isn’t a lot of information within that that suggests one is better than the other. So, again, the idea of authorisation versus licence is something that we would like to have a conversation with the Minister around during the committee stage.

I think, finally, when we are looking at this—and this is also important to tease out and this is something that is currently covered under the regulatory impact statement—a large amount of that current guidance is largely based on the Government’s existing published guidance in these areas, through areas such as the Government Communications Security Bureau, but also in terms of New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. So there will be more conversations around those, because, as we’re seeing with some of the other legislation, that has been a sticking point. We look forward to the committee stage.

TIM VAN DE MOLEN (National—Waikato): Well, we’ve heard already that ground-based space infrastructure plays a vital role in supporting global satellite operations and space activities. That’s why we’re bringing this regulatory regime in, because, of course, there is a risk that there may be foreign entities that don’t share our values or interests looking to engage with this ground-based space infrastructure.

I do just want to give some confidence to those hobbyists that they will not be captured by this law. The intent is that for members of the public looking at satellites as a hobby, for example, they are excluded. So I just wanted to note that piece—because it hasn’t come up so far in debate—before we get into the committee stage. But I do commend the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill to the House.

Hon PRIYANCA RADHAKRISHNAN (Labour): Thank you, Madam Speaker. We know that space is increasingly contested and competitive. That leads to, often, an increasing view of space as a geopolitical domain. We know that countries seek to use space technology to further their own military and security ambitions. We have seen, as I previously mentioned or laid out in my contribution to the first reading of this bill, that the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) themselves have laid out in their threat assessment for 2024 how this has happened in recent years, the fact that there are malicious actors, and the lack of a stringent regulatory framework—because there is some regulation—and that the gaps in that mean that we could have opened ourselves inadvertently to be used in a way that goes against our own national security. So here we are.

We also know from the work that has been done to date on this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, that New Zealand is increasingly an attractive location to host ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI), and so the two together mean that we need to take some action, and that’s what this bill is about. That’s why we are supporting it: because we do recognise that there’s the potential for increased activity in this space—excuse the pun.

We also know that GBSI is dual use: it could be used for military purposes; it could be used for civilian research purposes, for example. I acknowledge that this bill aims to narrow the scope so that it captures, within the scope, some of those more problematic aspects of GBSI use but doesn’t capture, as the previous speaker said, some other things around hobby and astronomy and so on and so forth. We would like to tease that out a little bit at the committee stage to make sure that that is indeed what the outcome will be.

In terms of the regulatory gap that this piece of legislation aims to fill, to date a lot of it has been around non-regulatory measures—so engagement between officials and known GBSI activities, I suppose, or providers, and education there. It’s been recognised that that’s not enough. There needs to be better tools or better levers to be able to manage the risk herein.

I do want to raise, within the regulatory impact statement (RIS)—and I accept the Minister for Space has said that there is a security risk, and that’s why all stages of this bill are being considered under urgency. However, I will still say that we do still feel that a post-enactment review clause should be included in this bill, because it is potentially a significant bill, and there has been limited consultation. It’s that point that I want to make. I’ll just find the particular section of the RIS that talks about some of the consultation that’s happened to date. I understand it’s on the policy intent of the bill, not the bill itself—that it was the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment approaching 21 known GBSI operators to provide them with the opportunity to give some feedback on what the scope of the policy intent of this bill, and the design of the regulatory regime itself, would look like.

I see from the RIS that only three of those operators actually responded to the call—the consultation document—and that made it quite difficult to then get a consensus around, I guess, the scope of this regime, what it should capture, and what it should exclude intentionally. In fact, of the three, only two of them responded supporting an authorisation regime, while, apparently, one operator felt that choice was not consequential because they offer GBSI services to foreign third parties and would expect a high level of scrutiny, so I’m not too sure what to make of that feedback. It does also say earlier on in the RIS that there was broad support for this regime. We, of course, haven’t seen the consultation document, it being a targeted form of consultation, but it would be useful to know what some of that feedback was in a little bit more detail, I guess.

The other part of the RIS that had me a little bit nervous was the part that says that there’s currently no funding identified to support the implementation of the regime. From reading the bill, there are a number of parts to it, but a large component of it would be the compliance and the penalty regime, I would have thought, because that is the lever that is being sought to address the national security, national interest side of the risk of this whole activity. Not having any funding to implement the regime and no information around where that would sit or how that would happen is, for me, problematic. Perhaps that’s also in the regulations, but there is a lot of detail in the regulations of this bill, and so I do think some questions around that, to the Minister, would be prudent at the committee stage.

The final point that I wanted to make—given that, as I mentioned previously, there is a section of the NZSIS threat assessment from last year that lays out a case study around the risk involved here. There is also a section of the RIS that talks about how managing GBSI risks aligns with New Zealand’s National Security Strategy. I know when we were in Government there was a comprehensive piece of work around countering foreign interference. That has continued as well. Foreign interference and espionage, alongside space security, are included as core issues for this Government to focus on through the security agencies, and I will once again raise the point that I see no interaction or requirement, through this legislation, for the national security agencies to be consulted when it comes to the national interest test. I will put to the Minister that I will be asking a few more questions at the committee stage around that.

Given that the whole point of this legislative fix is to improve national security, I find it slightly bizarre that there’s no requirement around that consultation either of the Minister. In this case, it’s not too much of an issue, but in future cases, if it’s not the same Minister for Space and security agencies but also overarching intelligence and security, I feel there probably should be a requirement to consult in that space. Thank you.

DANA KIRKPATRICK (National—East Coast): Thank you, Madam Speaker. Look, I’d just like to rise and take this call on the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. Please could I just take one minute to acknowledge the Star Trekkers from Gisborne in the gallery tonight, here for a night of fun in the House.

I think the purpose of the bill, being to strengthen New Zealand’s space regulatory framework, is one that is well needed and it’s a good piece of work. I commend the Minister for her hard work and I commend the bill to the House.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: This is a split call.

INGRID LEARY (Labour—Taieri): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I would like to use the time that I have to really encourage and urge the Government members and the Minister for Space in particular to look at the post-enactment review that has been called for by my colleague the Hon Rachel Brooking. I accept, as my colleagues do, that there is an important reason why we’re going through urgency and why everything needs to be done in a hurry, but I am really concerned about a number of issues and the context in which this has been created—that the national interest that we are serving is New Zealand’s national interest and that it cannot be hijacked by any of our friends in the global terrain.

I say that as the MP who has the privilege of having Awarua, which has been mentioned a few times in the House, in the electorate that I look after as what we call a buddy MP in Invercargill. The reason Awarua is such a great site is that we have clear skies down there near Invercargill but also really fantastic launch angles. The Hon Rachel Brooking and myself were lucky enough to go down and see what almost felt like something out of a Dr. Seuss book, with these strange contraptions that would lie dormant and then very occasionally suddenly wake up, turn, and provide vital information. I do want to acknowledge Robin McNeill and his team for the incredible innovation and what they have created for the sector with what has become SpaceOps.

My concern, really, is that there have been issues raised in terms of the use of urgency, in terms of the caveated and the very high levels of trust element that we have regarding the imminent threat to Aotearoa New Zealand—the fact that the Government Communications Security Bureau, as the Hon Priyanca Radhakrishnan has said, is not required to be consulted. I think about the context of Rocket Lab and also about the dual use of these facilities, and I think it’s really important that we accept and trust there are good reasons to do this but that we understand what agendas are at play here. The post-enactment review will provide full transparency and full scrutiny so that we can be clear this is really about New Zealand’s national interest and nobody else’s.

I also look at the powers of the Minister, which are undefined considerations of economic benefit, national security, and international relations. They are not prescriptive, and that means they are potentially subject to the political whims of the day, regardless of who is in power. I also note that there are some who fear that New Zealand’s space sector would become a proxy for foreign defence interests. It’s really important that, for those sceptics out there, we can provide a comprehensive and full disclosure, full transparency, and rationale for enacting this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, and for doing it with so much urgency. When I look at the national interest, it has a heavy tilt towards economic benefit, and economic benefit and national security can be mutually exclusive. It’s really important that we distinguish, again, the agendas that are at play here and that we appease people who think this is maybe not about New Zealand’s national interests but about others’ in the geopolitics that we are seeing play out in our region. I’m thinking here about the Pacific region but also Antarctica and that triangle of geography that is so important to our national security and also to global peace and security.

Finally, I am concerned that the operational detail of the regime will be only introduced in maybe 2025 or 2026. There is a transitional period where actors are deemed to be compliant. Again, they may well be fine, but in the interests of transparency, which is the best way of garnering public support and confidence in this, I think it’s really important that we have a post-enactment review that can ventilate and shine a light on all of these concerns so that people in New Zealand really know that the excellent work done by Robin McNeill’s team in Awarua and also up in the Far North is in New Zealand’s national interests, without agendas from partners, without pressure from any foreign partners, and that we are really doing the right thing by our country. Let’s get that post-enactment review in place, and then everybody can sleep well. Thank you.

Dr VANESSA WEENINK (National—Banks Peninsula): Thank you, Madam Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise in support of the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. This bill brings into place a regulatory framework to help with the ground-based space infrastructure that we know is in place, and it enables us to protect our national interests. I commend the bill to the House.

VANUSHI WALTERS (Labour): Thank you, Madam Speaker. Like my colleagues, I rise in support of the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, which, in my view, does send a clear message that the country considers its national security a serious matter and that we can take action and have an appropriate regulatory framework in place to address threats. I do support the bill and, of course, have trust in the Minister, the Hon Judith Collins, given her knowledge in the sector, in terms of the need for urgency. However, like my colleagues, I would support a post-urgency scrutiny process.

Just as a bit of a sidestep on the urgency, I note going into the Standing Orders review that this is an issue that comes up fairly frequently and that the Clerk has proposed changes in this respect as well. Post-legislative scrutiny is a good way of ensuring that where legislation does need to proceed through the House urgently, we can still examine it after the fact. However, unfortunately, the Standing Orders Committee has yet to act on those recommendations. It’s not an unusual procedure to have in a House and, just having done some looking into this, I understand that in the United Kingdom they have had a post-legislative review process in place for all legislation, including fast-track legislation, since 2008. With their process, it actually allows a departmental review—it’s a different process—within three to five years of the Act entering the statute book. However, the UK House of Commons also engages in a post-legislative scrutiny process as well, where there are select committees that examine legislation, and sessional committees specifically put together to go through whether there have been legislative flaws, which often happens as well, or whether there are policy issues that ought to be examined.

There are other countries still, like Denmark, who adopt other ways of regulating or managing legislation that needs to go through the House under urgency. Again, I’m completely accepting that there will be times when this does need to happen. For example, Denmark in 2022 announced that they would provide for fast-track legislative proposals to come with a sunset clause of six months. The aim there was that they would then go into a period of immediately reviewing the legislation and allowing for public submissions. That’s, of course, not what we’re asking in this case. I think we’re asking for something that’s extremely reasonable in terms of a post-legislative framework to examine the rationale behind the bill. I’m just wanting to emphasise that I do think it’s extremely important, not only because we’re going through an urgency process but because of the nature of the legislation as well, which I’ll speak to part of in a moment.

I did want to just refer back to comments made in the House earlier this evening by the Hon Phil Twyford and Lawrence Xu-Nan. They referenced the national interest test and the fact that while this regulates a particular a gap in our regulatory system in terms of infrastructure on the ground, we do always also need to consider how the launching of payloads affects our national security as well. I think it’s part and parcel of the same considerations in terms of national security. I would just note that there was a call earlier this year from a group of eminent lawyers asking for an Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security review of our intelligence sharing and whether that posed a risk in terms of our obligations under the Genocide Convention. This is an important area of the law, and I do think that we need to be actively considering what we believe to be national interest. For me, it includes our commitment to international law and the rule of law and making sure that we comply with that as well.

I did now want to go to a few issues that, had this gone to select committee, I would have raised, and perhaps there will be time to discuss during the committee stage. The first is whether certain provisions are most appropriately placed within primary or secondary legislation. This is actually an issue I raised in regards to the Legislation Amendment Bill earlier today. In terms of this bill, clause 24 amends section 88, which concerns the power to make regulations for various purposes related to the principal Act. I just wanted to point out the difference in some of those powers. There are some powers that prescribe the requirements for protective security arrangements and partner due diligence, some that prescribe conditions for authorisation—in my view, that’s very appropriate to be done in secondary legislation—some that prescribe the form of authorisations and the information that they must contain, and some that prescribe requirements for authorisation holders to provide information to the Minister. In my view, this very appropriately sits within secondary legislation.

Then there are some other provisions that create powers to amend the definition of “ground-based space infrastructure” by prescribing things that are or that are not within the meaning of that term. There’s another one that allows amending the definition of “operate” by prescribing acts that are or that are not within the meaning of that term, and another one that allows a power to amend the definition of a regulated activity by prescribing activities that are or aren’t within the meaning of that term. There’s difference in terms of the powers created here—some of them are very technical, while others appear to touch on very substantive policy decisions. The question I would have asked is whether it would be more appropriate for those terms—those substantive terms—to be outlined within primary legislation. This is a point that has been made before by the Regulations Reviews Committee, and certainly many academics as well, who have critiqued the making of very broad legislative powers and the fact that it then becomes very difficult to monitor how those powers are used.

Now, some might suggest that we don’t need to be overly concerned about this because there are executive checks on the system in terms of creating those secondary powers. Certainly, as regulations are created, there is an obligation on the Parliamentary Counsel Office to notify the Attorney-General if there is a sense that the regulations are being drafted outside the scope of primary legislation. The issue here is that when you draft primary legislation so broadly, it is very difficult to hold back those regulation-making powers. Likewise, if you wanted to challenge the regulation in the courts, it probably wouldn’t be deemed ultra vires—outside of the power or scope of the primary legislation—however, it might be deemed unusual.

I do think, as I mentioned earlier this evening, we have to be cautious of legislative decision-making that takes us on a slide towards framework legislation as the acceptable model all the time. I think we need to be especially cautious of a model where we’re dealing with security and intelligence - related substantive policy. The reason for that is that that’s the very type of secondary legislation that I could see as being the type that might be exempt from publication, that might be less subject to review, and so we must really be very, very careful of that.

There’s another point on, I think, new section 49B, which speaks to the application, in terms of being authorised. There’s an obligation on the applicant to establish reasonable measures to manage the risks that are present in terms of producing their application. It’s another example of a place within the legislation where I would ask: should we specify what those risks are rather than leaving them fairly broad? Hopefully, Madam Speaker, we will have time at the committee stage for some of these questions to be answered by the Minister for Space, but, at this stage, I will support the bill through to the committee stage.

TIM COSTLEY (National—Ōtaki): Can I just say I always admire as we sit here in urgency the House staff and the security staff that serve us so faithfully, and it’s appropriate that we would be here in urgency passing this legislation.

I did hear the call from the Greens, the question about, “Well, what about the Pacific?” It’s an interesting one. Of course, New Zealand has not just security interests in the Pacific but we’re a Pacific nation and we’re a good friend and a good partner. Of course we’re interested in that, but first we need to sort out our interests at home. We need to get our own house in order.

That’s what this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, is about, and how appropriate that the world’s first Minister for Space would be the one to bring it to the House. I commend this bill. We should all vote Aye.

SUZE REDMAYNE (National—Rangitīkei): It is my pleasure and honour and privilege to commend our Minister for Space, the Hon Judith Collins, for putting this bill, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill, to the House. I commend the bill to the House.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): This bill is set down for committee stage immediately. I declare the House in committee for consideration of the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill.

In Committee

Part 1 Amendments to Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Act 2017

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): Members, the House is in committee on the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. We come first to the debate on Part 1. Part 1 is the debate on clauses 3 to 25, “Amendments to Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Act 2017”, and the Schedule. The question is that Part 1 stand part.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING (Labour—Dunedin): I would like to start with clause 5, which is the amendment of the interpretation section. I have three different points to make on this for some clarity. The first one is about “authorisation holder”, and I mentioned in my first reading speech—and I got a nod from the Minister for Space, but I think, and I would like her to confirm this—that the term “authorisation” is used throughout this bill to be a point of difference from licences and permits, which are already existing for launch activities in the primary legislation. That’s one question.

The second question is around ground-based infrastructure, and I’ve asked now in a couple of the speeches what it is that the Minister imagines will be included in that ground-based infrastructure. We saw in the regulatory impact statement that there were 21 different groups consulted. Again, is the Awarua, the SpaceOps, that we heard Ingrid Leary talk about in Awarua in the South and also in the North in Warkworth—is that something that’s included? Tāwhaki—is that something that would be included, or it’s the runway, so it doesn’t count? The Rocket Lab—if the Minister could go through some examples of what she considers in and out, I think that would be very useful.

Then the third question is just, really, I think, a point of clarification, and that is: at “ground-based space infrastructure”, the definition, says “(b) does not include either of the following:”. One of either of the following is “any infrastructure or other equipment … of a type that is made or supplied primarily for personal, domestic, or household use:”. Now, before I ask my question of clarification, I note that Tim van de Molen, before, referred to clause 7 and new section 49A(2)(b)(ii)—that “an activity carried out as a recreational pursuit or hobby:” is not included. I’ll come back to this later, but my question is whether or not this exclusion in clause 5 will not include amateur radio, known as ham radio operators, who communicate with amateur satellites. I think it would be very useful to have clarification of that point on the Hansard if the exclusion excludes those ham radio operators with the amateur satellites.

Also, if she could give some examples of the well-known ground-based space infrastructure that she considers will be covered by these regulations, and if she can confirm that the definition around authorisation as a point of differentiation between what already exists for the launch infrastructure being licensing and permitting.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Madam Chair. I too have a number of questions for the Minister for Space, but I think we will kind of go through this systematically, starting from, in this case, clause 5, amending section 4, which is around interpretation. One of the things that has been highlighted in the regulatory impact statement that was considered something that the Overseas Investment (OIA) does not capture is around—for example, in paragraph 21C of the regulatory impact statement, it says the OIA will not cover services provided to foreign customers or collaborators by New Zealand - owned operated ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI), or when there is a sharing of some of the roles when it comes to GBSI. I’m noticing that in terms of the authorisation holder here, the authorisation holder means the person who is the sole holder of GBSI activities. I just want to check with the Minister for Space: in those kind of situations, how does work that is considered collaborative considered? You know, you would consider—who is the sole holder in that particular instance, particularly when we’re looking at international collaboration between New Zealand and, let’s say, another country? On that and also, I guess, a follow-up of the question—if that isn’t something that’s captured here and is still considered captured within the OIA, that is also something that I would like to hear from the Minister that that’s something to consider as well.

Following on from the interpretation, one of the other things that I would like to ask the Minister around is the idea—I wrote it down somewhere. When we’re looking at ground-based space infrastructure, you know, particularly GBSI—and this is going to be quite a, I guess, basic question for the Minister: is the GBSI that we’re seeing separate from the space object that is being tracked? For example, do we have a situation where GBSI can be operated by the authorisation holder, and that authorisation allows that particular GBSI to track or to monitor all space objects, or a space object that is particularly within that jurisdiction of that GBSI? While they’re applying for the authorisation, would that GBSI applying for that authorisation be required—because I’m not seeing it later on in terms of the application process—to give a list of everything that they are particularly tracking, whether they have control or whether they’re managing that particular space object or not?

So I’m going to start with those two particular questions on the definition of “authorisation holder” and the definition of “GBSI”.

Hon PHIL TWYFORD (Labour—Te Atatū): Madam Chair, the question I want to pose is whether or not the national interest test, which is set out in clause 7, new section 49C(4), of the bill, is precise enough and whether or not it would benefit from the support of a set of principles like those that apply to the national interest test for payloads. Just to remind folks, those principles prohibit payloads that would contribute to nuclear weapons programmes or capabilities; payloads with the intended use of harming, interfering with, or destroying other spacecraft or systems on Earth—so war fighting in space; and payloads with the intended end use of supporting or enabling specific defence, security, or intelligence operations that are contrary to Government policy—so payloads that might assist the fighting of some foreign war that it’s not New Zealand’s policy to support. I wonder whether or not there needs to be more work on the definition of the national interest when it comes to authorising and regulating ground-based space infrastructure.

It’s self-evident, I think, that New Zealand does not want foreign interests hacking and intercepting or disrupting ground-based space infrastructure or using ground-based space infrastructure to do the hacking and disrupting. But, surely, it wouldn’t be in our national interest either if ground-based space infrastructure was being deployed in New Zealand in ways that were not in our national interest. Imagine, for example, if there was a satellite communications interception station, ground-based space infrastructure, that engaged in mass surveillance of neighbouring and friendly countries and operated without any real parliamentary or public oversight. Imagine if that happened. I am of course talking about Waihopai, which ran from 1989 to 2021 and did exactly that without any real parliamentary or public oversight. It engaged in mass surveillance of our neighbouring and friendly countries. It was run by the Government Communications Security Bureau, and it was ground-based space infrastructure.

The question, I think, and the lesson, really, from all that was that ground-based space infrastructure on New Zealand’s soil can be used for foreign surveillance purposes without our full awareness or consent. I think that right now, in the current environment with private firms with defence clients building space infrastructure, we risk repeating the same mistake in a new era. I think it’s too simple to think that it’s just about regulating to protect New Zealand - based operations from bad actors who might want to engage in espionage or foreign interference or disruption. If we don’t regulate with a rigorous and precise national interest test, we run the risk of those private firms in our territory that could be, for example, supporting foreign wars that it’s not our New Zealand’s policy to be part of or prosecuting or mass surveillance that’s not consistent with our foreign policy or our national interest.

I think that is precisely the current problem with the launch programme, which has a better, more rigorous, and precise national interest test but no transparency to ensure that the public can be reassured. I’m interested to hear from the Minister for Space whether or not she thinks that the current national interest test in the primary legislation would benefit from the kind of principles that she currently employs in considering the national interest test in relation to payloads and whether this ground-based space infrastructure regulatory framework would be strengthened by that.

Hon JUDITH COLLINS (Minister for Space): Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, members, for your questions. I realise that members haven’t been able to see the bill, in most cases, until this evening, so don’t take anything I say as a criticism or anything. I know you’re coping with the fact that it was only on the Table today. We have been able to be in a position to brief some members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, because this is a very important issue that we’re dealing with.

I will, of course, refer to some of the points: that this is an amendment bill, that it goes into the primary legislation, so issues like the national interest tests are clearly within the primary legislation. I will point everyone to new section 49C of the amendment bill, inserted by clause 7, which deals with the considerations that need to be taken into account when seeking authorisation or the Minister for Space giving authorisation. I’m sorry to talk about myself as a third party, but I know that in the future, at some stage, after a decade or so, there may be another Minister in that role.

One of the issues that we have is that we have had instances of people—companies, supposedly research organisations—using or seeking to use ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) in New Zealand, with unwitting and innocent owners of the land or operators of the infrastructure being, essentially, fooled into thinking they were dealing with people who said that they weren’t who they are. When we look at this, it is very important to realise, too, that this is nothing about payloads. It’s got nothing to do with it—nothing to do with this amendment bill. It’s in the primary Act that’s been in place since 2017. This is all to do with people using the ground-based space infrastructure to access other people’s communications, possibly to use some form of shifting—possibly satellites, of course, if they could do that. It is quite a serious issue, given that so much of our communications and even our banking is done through satellite activity, including—might I say, for some people, even more importantly—their rugby games. So it is really important.

I thought I’d take some of the issues that were raised. The use of the term “authorisation” is signalling a different approach to licensing for launch, because it’s not licensing for launch or payloads—because it’s not about payloads. But what could be included—and there’s a question from Hon Rachel Brooking about that, if I can just give her some assurance what that means: it’s activities carried out by companies like, for instance, Space Operations New Zealand at Awarua. It will cover radio and optical GBSI, which is the ground-based space infrastructure. It will cover commercial operators and research institutes that are undertaking regulated activity, but it won’t be including hobby activities including ham radio lobbyists—hobbyists, I should say, rather than lobbyists. And lobbyists too, by the way. It will also exclude things like cell phones and television satellite dishes, which is a great bonus to us all.

It is important that there is a holder of an authorisation who is the person who controls the GBSI, because that has clearly become a problem—that not everybody who says that they are this person are actually really that person. They often could be representing, particularly, a foreign-based actor who may not want to go through the sorts of security clearances that we expect.

GBSI is different from space objects. Yes, they’re all very different, but GBSI operators could track spacecraft they own or operate, or they could track spacecraft owned or operated by someone else, including for surveillance. I think, on the national interest front—it’s been raised tonight by members about how do I define whether or not it’s the national interest. Well, if we go to section 56 of the primary Act, it’s very clearly there—certificates given by the security agencies to the Minister or the security Minister, or the Prime Minister. It’s also, if you look at new section 49C, inserted by clause 7, having to look at all these other issues. It’s about national security, public safety, international relations, or other national interests—and that’s in 49C(4)(a) to (d). Those, I think, are some of the issues that were raised by the Hon Phil Twyford, so they’re in there.

In addition to that, don’t forget that we have regulations that will be coming with this. While the regulations and the full force of this law will not take effect until, basically, one year away, in the meantime, the Minister will be able to actually use national security as a way of cancelling the use of these particular bases. So it’s very important this is done quite quickly.

I would also take the opportunity to say to members that over the last little while—over the last few years—we have, as a nation, had to help other Pacific nations around this issue, where certain foreign actors may have, at times, sought to use other countries to put in ground-based space infrastructure without telling those countries what they’re actually doing. We have been able to tell these other nations, which means that they can take some action. All we’ve been able to do in this country is to ask people on whose land it is to please cooperate. That is no longer something we can take for granted, and so it is very important that we get this sorted.

The other point—I think it was made from the Green member around other Pacific nations, as well, and what help we could give them. Well, this is quite an edgy piece of legislation in terms of not everyone else has got it yet. What is really clear: we get this through, we get our regulations done—I think it’s very important that we make this available to other Pacific neighbours who might well want to take advantage of this themselves and slot it into their law. I think that one of the obligations but also the duties we have as a Pacific country is, where we can, to help our neighbours, because they’re often up against people with significant resources and significant pressure and levers. This would help them as well.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Thank you, Madam Chair. I just wanted to get some clarification from the Minister for Space in terms of some of the questions that were asked. I think the Minister was talking around it, but just to be more specific, would Waihopai, for example, fall under this legislation? It was ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) when it was fully operational, and they would monitor satellites and so on and so forth. So would that fall under this as well? I also would assume—and I do want to check with the Minister as to whether this is accurate or not—that Rocket Lab in Māhia would fall under this legislation as well, given that if you’re going launch something up in space, you’ve got to be able to monitor it at some particular point in time, so it’s a question around coverage in terms of what’s happening there already. I’d like to get an answer on that as well.

There was also an interesting point made around the authorisation and the collaborations to make with authorisations as well. I think the committee understands that somebody could be setting up a GBSI and they’re working with someone, but they might not know that this other group or company is being influenced by nefarious actors or by foreign actors and they haven’t been upfront with it. How does that work? How does the legislation enable that person, that group, that might not know that they’re being used and what are the steps for that clarity to be reached?

So there are two questions there. One of them is around: is it going to cover Waihopai and Rocket Lab? Also, there’s that question around the authorisation, because I think it would be important to get that clarity for people out there. I note that you reached out to 21 operators as well, so maybe there are some specific examples that the ministry might be able to use to actually illustrate the different points or the answers that I’m seeking. Thank you.

Hon JUDITH COLLINS (Minister for Space): Thank you, Madam Chair. There is an exemption for operations from New Zealand Defence Force and also for our security agencies. So when you’re talking about various activities that we take in order to keep our country and our neighbours safe, those will be exempt. But in terms of all other commercial activities, they’re of course covered by it.

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): Ryan Hamilton—I’m always hesitant to call you.

RYAN HAMILTON (National—Hamilton East): I move, That debate on this question now close.

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): No. We’re in urgency. We’re not ready for that yet.

Hon PRIYANCA RADHAKRISHNAN (Labour): Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank the Minister for Space for acknowledging that some of us have only seen the bill this evening and have not had a briefing around this either. Thank you for taking the questions that we’ve asked.

I do want to just tease out that bit—I did read, obviously, new section 49C(4) and (5) that the Minister mentioned, and I do get that the national interest test here does include risks to national security, public safety, and so on. It’s really (5) that I was referring to in my contribution, where it says, “Before granting a GBSI activity authorisation, the Minister may consult the intelligence and security agencies about—(a) … risks … and (b) the extent to which the risks can be mitigated by authorisation conditions.” It’s that bit around “may”, where it seems optional to me rather than a requirement, and that’s the point that I was trying to make and the clarification that I was seeking and continue to seek.

The other bit that I spoke about, Minister, is around clause 10, “Section 53 amended”, down to subclause (7), so “Replace section 53(4)(a) with:”, and there’s a whole list of—“in the case of a launch licence”. The Minister outlined the difference between the launch and the permits relating to payload, if I understood correctly, versus the authorisation, which refers to the activity which is being regulated here. But there is, in (7)(a), “in the case of a launch licence, payload permit, overseas launch licence,”—and so on and so forth—“or high-altitude licence, must consult the security Ministers in accordance with section 55; and [then] (aa) in the case of a GBSI activity authorisation, may consult the intelligence and security agencies about—(i) [the] risks … and [again] (ii) the extent to which the risks can be mitigated”. That’s my second question around the difference there and whether the Minister could give us an explanation as to the difference in requirement there to consult with security Ministers between the launch licence, etc., and the activity authorisation.

That’s one part of the questions that I’d raised in both my contributions to the first and second readings. I did also have a question around clause 5, going back. Of course, that is around the definition of “GBSI” in that clause and also “regulated activity” that’s defined.

My question is really around the options that are laid out in the regulatory impact statement (RIS). I’ve had a quick read of them this evening in the sense that I get outside of the counterfactual, which I’m not considering for the reasons that everyone’s traversed in this Chamber—clearly there is a need for this. Outside of that, the other two options that didn’t make the cut—so the introduction of the notification and call-in regime—I’m assuming were too lax perhaps and wouldn’t necessarily lead to the national security risk mitigation that we’re looking for in this legislation. The analysis of option two in the RIS—it says, “as the least stringent of the options considered, it was the least regulatory cost to both.” It was a light-touch regulatory option. My question to the Minister is: was there a consideration of starting with that and then escalating to a tighter system, perhaps? Obviously, that was not the option that Cabinet has settled on, but I’m keen to get a sense of the Minister’s thinking around those options that were laid out and some of the costs and benefits of those.

CHAIRPERSON (Barbara Kuriger): Members, the time has come for me to leave the Chair. The House is suspended until 9.a.m.

Debate interrupted.

Sitting suspended from 9.56 p.m. to 9 a.m. (Wednesday)

TUESDAY, 22 JULY 2025

(continued on Wednesday, 23 July 2025)

Bills

Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill

In Committee

Debate resumed.

Part 1 Amendments to Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Act 2017 (continued)

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Good morning, members. The committee is resumed on the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. When we suspended last night, we were debating Part 1. Once again, the question is that Part 1 stand part.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING (Labour—Dunedin): Thank you, Madam Chair. As you noted last night, we were on Part 1—near the start of Part 1—and the Minister had engaged with a range of questions, which was very helpful to us because, of course, we’re in all-stages urgency and this is the only chance for us to ask questions and to get things on the Hansard, as well, which I think is helpful.

One of the questions that she answered yesterday—I was asking if she could name some of the places that have this space infrastructure, and she confirmed that SpaceOps NZ, which is in Awarua near Bluff and also in Warkworth, would definitely be covered. But I didn’t hear her say about the organisations that do both the launching—sorry, at Māhia Rocket Lab—but also the horizontal launching at Tāwhaki; if they would be covered or not. So it would just be useful to know the answer to those two questions—those two places specifically—and if there’s any longer list of the places that are already existing, not an exhaustive list, but if there are other places that would be captured by this. That’s just helpful to know.

Also confirming: I think she mentioned that universities and scientists would be covered, so they’re not exempt. We were talking about ham radio operators being exempt—so just to confirm that around new section 49A, which is clause 7. Then I’ll go through a bit further. We’ve also, to the Minister in the chair, a number of us have asked questions about the role of mana whenua in this. I don’t think that was commented on. If I go through now, I’ve got a couple of things I just want to touch on that the Minister might be able to answer quite quickly.

At clause 7 and new section 49D—maybe on page 8 of the bill—there’s mention of a “specified person or class of [person]”, and I was wondering if the Minister—

Tim Costley: Achoo!

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: Bless you. That was quite the interjection. I hope the member is well. The question there is just if there is any example of a specified person; that’s referred to at (1)(b). I’m just going through my bill. Another thing where it might be useful to have examples is at clause 21 and new section 83B, which is the direction to stop providing electricity or internet services to the space infrastructure—if there are any examples of that sort of thing happening anywhere else in the world, where that idea to stop providing electricity or internet services came from, and if that covers everything or not?

Then, it would be also good—and other speakers might ask for specific questions on this—but we are amending the principal Act, which obviously will say how regulations are made. It would be useful for the Minister to discuss how the regulations will be made that are set out in clause 24—the new regulations; what sort of consultation there will be with people, given that this is all in urgency.

I also want to bring the Minister’s attention to an amendment, in my name, that is to enable a post-enactment review, because this is going through all stages in urgency. We accept the Minister has said that it needs to go through urgency and that there is a real need for this legislation to be in place. So, whilst we accept that, it would be useful to have a post-enactment review in case there are mistakes or somebody is going to be impacted in a way that we haven’t thought of during our time here.

This amendment in my name suggests going to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. However, I’m very happy, if the Minister is interested in this amendment, for that select committee to be the Intelligence and Security Committee, maybe, or the Regulations Review Committee might be another one. Then I’ve also said, in this amendment, that that select committee should report back to the House no later than 25 November 2025. So, again, that date is entirely arbitrary and one that I picked based on Tuesdays, because this Act is going to come into effect on a Tuesday.

Very happy for the Minister to suggest amendments to that and table other amendments or for the Minister to do that. But the point of this is that that committee would scrutinise the legislation that’s already operative, so the timing issue isn’t an issue, but properly look at the legislation and engage with those people who know about space infrastructure and then report back. Then, if the House agrees to those recommendations, then amendments suggested by that committee are treated as an amendment bill with the bill proceeding without all of the stages that we would have in a normal amendment.

That is the suggestion. I’d be very keen to hear the Minister’s views on that. As I say, the time frames and the select committees or if there are any changes—we are very pleased to discuss those. But the point is we’re going through all-stages urgency. We accept that there’s a reason for all-stages urgency, but there is no opportunity for us to have good engagement with people who know about the subject matter, and this would provide an opportunity for that to happen without inhibiting the bill from commencing.

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence): Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and good morning to all members of the committee. A couple of interesting contributions already, one by the Hon Rachel Brooking and one by another member—I didn’t see who sneezed, but I hope she’s recovering. Ladies and gentlemen, a number of issues have been raised, both reiterating comments and discussions from last night by the honourable member, and I have the benefit of some of the analysis that flowed from those questions asked last night and now this morning, too. So please indulge me, members of the committee, if I run through those as best I’m able in terms of understanding the discussion that’s taken place so far.

The first is around the point about the coverage of the Acts, as compared with those different locations, versus those that the members asked as to whether they’d be covered by the ambit of the regime—up in Warkworth, which is an area within my patch, was referred to, as well as down South, where the member herself hails from. But in terms of vertical or horizontal launches, these would be covered, I understand, if they operate ground-based space infrastructure—that’s within the scope of the regime. So there’s no attempt to exclude or include more explicitly than that. But I should point out, for the sake of completeness, that activities that are already covered by the principal Act and are not being brought in or out of the regime by the amendment can be understood to be captured or otherwise already, in those terms.

As for “a specified person”, that will be a person specified in regulation. And I’m sorry, that sounds quite circular and possibly unhelpful at this point—except to say, of course, the regulation-making power, as the members referred to, will contain a certain amount of the necessary detail. That will be able to be updated as time goes on, in the way that regulations are more readily updated, of course, than primary legislation. So I’d point out that, in terms of the member’s thoughtful suggestion that a post-enactment review be mandated by the legislation, a certain amount of the detail will be under constant review by way of that regulatory process, including any regulatory review, but also, there’s a constant review—with a small “r”—that takes place, of course, in terms of the operation of any legislation. This being an amendment bill, the amending provisions would be reviewed constantly for effectiveness and also the extent to which they interact with other rights and responsibilities of New Zealanders, particularly. The Minister for Space feels—and I, in her place, am happy to relay but also support the notion—that we don’t need to specify a mandated review mechanism, be it in front of the Intelligence and Security Committee or, indeed, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, as per the original proposal.

In terms of turning off electricity as being a particular action that might be taken, the intent there, or the enabling of that action, is to prevent the remote operation of such infrastructure while a disposal order is carried out. So it buys a bit of time, in that sense, pending the disposal, and that’s where it’s deemed to be necessary on national interest grounds. And, just referring to the wording of the legislation, conditions imposed by the Minister are said to be those “which may include, without limitation,”—you know, those that are specified in the bill. So it’s deliberately not excluding the range of conditions or actions that might be taken—noting, of course, that in this highly technical realm and with developing technology, it might well be the case that there are conditions or actions that might be necessary in the future that we’re not able to contemplate now and would be inappropriate to calcify in primary legislation, as compared with responding on an ongoing basis through enactment of regulation.

As for urgency, of course, the member is rightly diligent to note that we need to examine, as carefully as we can within the context, the bill, and, of course, the committee of the whole House stage is at least one way of doing that. But I think it’s also worth reiterating a point that was probably made last night—in fact, I’m certain that it was—that this is an urgent proposition and the attention of the House, including its committee today, is important to deal with the issue as expeditiously as possible so that we can have the benefit of, effectively, these defensive measures in the case of those who would do harm to New Zealand and its national interest.

I’ll leave my contribution there; I see my five minutes is nearly up. But I will acknowledge the point made around consultation and say, again, there’s nothing to preclude that on an ongoing basis in terms of the way that the Act is operating.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Thank you, Madam Chair. Just to pick up on some of the answers that the Minister just gave us, I think the point with the post-enactment review is that, yeah, everyone around the committee understood what the Minister was saying: a gap needed to be plugged, and there is broader acceptance of that around the committee. I think the point is that you have to actually be sure that the wheels are going to stay on the wagon—are all the nuts and bolts actually screwed on properly? So a post-enactment review would enable us to actually have a more thorough look at it to make sure that it does what it says that it does.

Another question around the turning off the electricity part of it: I was wondering, well, what does that mean for people that are on solar, what does it mean if they’re on battery—how will the regulator know that? They might think that, actually, this ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) is not doing what they said it was going to do so they’re going to turn off the electricity, and they think that’s all going to be fine. But, actually, there are lots of different ways around it, so I guess it’d be good to understand practical ways of how the regulator would deal with that particular issue.

I also have another question around the application process. I guess the question is: if someone gets the permit to be able to run a GBSI, and it’s a company, but then it on-sells that to somebody else and they on-sell it again and then, next thing you know, it’s in the hands of a nefarious, possibly foreign actor that is counter to our national interest, how does that work—how does the oversight happen on that, because, often, as we know, there are different kinds of arrangements that happen? So that is a question there around that possible scenario, which officials behind you might have already thought of—possibly already have—but I think it would be useful for the committee to understand that particular perspective.

Just coming back to the questions that have emerged about where exactly this applies, my hearing of it last night was that a situation like Waihopai wouldn’t apply, because they’ve got the Defence Force exemption, but that Māhia would apply, because they don’t have that exemption. But if I was wrong in terms of how I heard that, getting some clarification from the Minister about exactly what is being covered here, I think, would be really important. So those are my questions.

VANUSHI WALTERS (Labour): Thank you, Madam Chair. I do have some questions for the Minister, but I just wanted to start by speaking in favour of my colleague the Hon Rachel Brooking’s amendment. I think the response from the Minister was that there would be review of the relevant regulations, so there’s not cause for concern in that regard. However, I do think that yesterday, when the Minister spoke in the chair, she spoke about the regulations coming into force after a year and that she would be exercising powers in the meantime. So there are aspects that aren’t attached to the technical content of the regulations that, in my view, ought to be examined, ordinarily by a select committee. In this case, we don’t have that opportunity and so, in my view, the proposal is a valid one because there are very unique powers, in my view, that are being exercised within the national security space which otherwise wouldn’t be examined.

The other issue that potentially wouldn’t be examined in the ordinary process of creating the regulations is something that is unique to the House itself, which is whether the substantive content of the regulations is best suited to primary legislation or to regulation. Certainly, that happens through some Parliamentary Counsel Office advice to the Attorney-General, but my view is that that’s a legislative function, and, again, ordinarily that would happen within select committee processes. So in terms of those two aspects in particular, it doesn’t feel to me that there is post-legislation scrutiny on them. So, again, I’m just speaking in favour of that amendment.

There are some other specific questions just resulting from the discussion yesterday. The definition of “protective security arrangements” in regulation 3(1) lists not an exhaustive list but things that the applicant, if you like, would need to include. There has been a lot of discussion about nefarious actors and third-party actors, and I did wonder whether there was consideration of being more explicit in that provision, so speaking explicitly about corruption, explicitly about bribery, and what requirements, what investigations would need to be made of third-party actors.

I’m also looking at clause 6, “Section 6 amended (Act binds the Crown)”, which is the exemptions section that a few others have touched on. I was curious as to the meaning of new section (2)(b)(i). That’s the exemption for the New Zealand Defence Force, but it’s also an exemption for “a person assisting or providing services to, or working jointly with, the New Zealand Defence Force;”. I wonder if the Minister could give us an understanding of the scope of that and whether that could include foreign actors who we act in partnership with, as well, and what the intended scope of that inclusion is.

The other exclusion is new section 6(2)(b)(iii), which lists “an intelligence and security agency;”. My question there is whether the intention is for that to read “New Zealand intelligence and security agency”. The reason I ask the question is because in new paragraph (iv), just under it, it specifies “the New Zealand Police”. So just considering whether there’s a need for an amendment there, or whether there’s a definition that I haven’t spotted that makes it clear that we’re speaking here about the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence): Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I’m seeking to take a call to respond to the thoughtful questioning from both members who have contributed, in the hope of staying on top of the issues that have been raised.

The wheels on wagon metaphor raised by Teanau Tuiono—of course, he’s right to say that we need to identify if the wheels might fall off a regime, but there are ways of doing that other than by specifying in statute that a particular type of review must take place at a particular time. To extend the metaphor, if the wheels are wobbly or the vehicle is otherwise not proceeding as it should in the right direction and in a smooth fashion, then it’s incumbent upon the Government of the day—including the Government agencies for which there is regulatory stewardship responsibility—to investigate that. It seems to me that this is a matter that is sufficiently high stakes that the appropriate degree of scrutiny as to the ongoing operation of the regime would be considered and watched carefully, such that any such shortfalls or mechanical difficulties would be identified in a timely fashion.

As for turning off electricity as a particular mechanism, I take the member’s point that solar and other ways of operating electricity exist beyond the traditional way. If not a switch to be flicked on or off, I assume that there are ways that power could be disabled in the way that’s contemplated by the legislation in respect of GBSI, or ground-based space infrastructure. I was remiss in not having spelt that out earlier at least once, but the acronym from there on is probably—hopefully—acceptable.

As for clarification in terms of whether the likes of Māhia Peninsula activities are caught by the regime, I don’t wish to be definitive in a way that would be unhelpful were I to seek to tender what would, effectively, be legal advice and be wrong. So I won’t venture an opinion on that except to, again, just reiterate the point that to the extent that activities and locations are already captured by the primary legislation as to be amended, we’re not necessarily displacing that by the addition of the measures in this amendment bill.

As to the points made by Vanushi Walters, I do take on board her point about regulations only being reviewable in that typical way, and also the time gap. If I may say, that seems to me a worthwhile point to make. Nevertheless, it happens all the time that the House will make a determination on that which is appropriate for the subject of primary legislation—as opposed to secondary or tertiary—at the point that the legislation is made, and then a determination of the content to fit within the regulations is made after. Of course, that’s the nature of a regulation-making power, as my fellow alumni of the Regulations Review Committee will appreciate, so I’m not sure that I can take that point much further except to acknowledge her having raised it. There’s always a tension between the detail that one includes in primary legislation versus the expansive ability to add, over time, technical detail in regulations that may be amended in a much more timely and flexible manner later.

As for third-party actors, I suspect it would be unhelpful to be more specific about the types of nefarious activity that we might want to include, even in the way that we might say that there might be other types contemplated. It’s probably typical within the realm of national security that we wouldn’t want to bind our hands in a way that we would find unhelpful—albeit, again, I acknowledge the tension between certainty and that going to the rule of law diktat, ordinarily, that the law must be knowable. I’m hopeful that the measures in the bill would be applied in an appropriate and proportionate way, and I know that the Minister for Space would understand and take seriously those responsibilities—not least of all because she’s the Attorney-General and, of course, understands that balance of rights approach that’s always appropriate, and no less in such occasions as this.

As for section 6 exemptions, I don’t myself yet know if those working with the New Zealand Defence Force might include non-New Zealand agencies or entities. If I receive some advice on that in time to be helpful to the member, then I’ll certainly look forward to relaying that.

Hon PHIL TWYFORD (Labour—Te Atatū): Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to just direct attention to new section 3A of Part 3, inserted by clause 21: the provisions in 83A around disposal orders; 83B, giving the Minister the opportunity to unplug the electricity system; and 83C, forfeiture orders. These are, I think, by any measure quite Draconian provisions that give the Minister the power, if certain criteria are met, to order the disposal of private property and, ultimately, to put in place a forfeiture order. It’s easy to imagine a scenario where that would result in very significant economic harm to the owner of that ground-based space infrastructure.

I wonder, given how keen this Government is on enshrining the principle in law of compensation to the owners of assets that are affected by regulation, with the current passage through the legislative process of the Regulatory Standards Bill—the Government is obviously very keen on that principle. I just wonder whether or not the Minister for Space has considered the possibility of, let’s say, the Russians operating a bit of ground-based space infrastructure that we deem to be a threat to the national interest, or they’ve somehow inveigled their way into some other private sector operator providing a service and yet, the data is ending up in the hands of the Russians—just for argument’s sake—and the Government chooses to close that down, causing significant loss either to the Russians or their erstwhile partners. Would the Government consider compensation consistent with its adherence to the principle in the Regulatory Standards Bill?

I’d be keen to hear the Minister in the chair’s view on that but, also, I wonder whether, in fact, the Government has considered that there are embassies and diplomatic missions in New Zealand who operate ground-based space infrastructure. They operate satellite technology that I’m pretty certain would meet the definition of ground-based space infrastructure. If a diplomatic mission is conducting the interception of signals and so on from its properties here in the capital, and it was deemed to be doing so contrary to the national interest, would those diplomatic missions be covered by this bill?

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence): Thank you very much. I look forward to responding to those points made by Mr Twyford. To come back, however, first to the question that was posed by Ms Walters: there isn’t a need to specify New Zealand in terms of security intelligence agencies because those terms are defined already in the principal Act, I understand. In terms of whether non - New Zealand actors could be said to be working with the New Zealand Defence Force such as to qualify for the exclusion, I’m advised that they could be caught by such an exclusion. This may or may not help to assuage the fears of Mr Twyford, or at least to answer the question that he has raised in terms of non - New Zealand actors, be they embassies or high commissions acting in this country. I suspect that there would be important conversations at a diplomatic level if there was any need for activity of that nature. That would be well above my pay grade, I hasten to add.

I also hear his concern about Draconian powers to switch off. Yes, these are important and serious powers, but they’re being legislated for a reason. By the way, I do acknowledge and thank the members opposite, so to speak, who have engaged with the principle of the legislation being important and, of course, asking questions to ascertain the detail. As far as those Draconian powers, and the segue into the Regulatory Standards Bill, I do wonder if Mr Twyford is signalling his intent to support that legislation, because he’s obviously very concerned about the right to compensation. I would be very surprised if the disablement of Russian ground-based infrastructure were to enable Vladimir Putin to get a red cent—and I use the phrase advisedly—as a result of this regime. I think he can feel as assured as possible on that point.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a number of questions for the Associate Minister of Defence, because we’re still on clauses 6 and 7, largely, and there are still a number of areas that should be covered.

Thank you to the Minister for his excellent, as always, response to our questions. I think to start with, in terms of the review clause, I want to draw the Minister’s attention to the regulatory impact statement (RIS), paragraph 145, which is around the fact that the principal Act includes the provision—in fact, in section 86 of the principal Act it actually includes a three-year review provision. The recommendation here is that we propose a similar provision to be included for review of the operation and effectiveness of the ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) regulation regime two years after the commencement. However, that is not present in this bill, despite that being the recommendation in the regulatory impact statement. I just also want to support the tabled amendment by the Hon Rachel Brooking on this because, again, it is something that we see stated in the RIS but not reflected in the bill.

I just also want to pick up on what the Minister mentioned before and what the Hon Phil Twyford questioned in terms of what happens if we have this one-year transition period and, after, that the Minister is able to authorise the permit—yes, in some ways the permit—for the operations of GBSI. I want to pick up on what it says on page 10 of the departmental disclosure statement. I want to just check in terms of the reading here because it does say in 4.1 that the Minister has the power to require an operator to dispose of their interest. But right at the end, it says—you know, this could potentially go to a District Court—“the constable to dispose of the interest or right and pay any proceeds of the disposal to the recipient of the disposal order.” Would those proceeds also include, then—if the Minister wouldn’t mind elaborating—the cost of the interest in its entirety, or at least the market value of the cost of that particular interest, as part of that court order?

I’m just going to pick up on some of the conversations that we’ve had, and I just want to go into a little bit more detail around there. Picking up on something the Minister for Space mentioned last night—this is a question that I signalled in my second reading—which is, in the regulatory impact statement, there were four options given to how we could look at managing some of the gaps that we have in the current legislation around GBSI. The most persuasive options were options three and four; option three is authorisation regime, option four is licensing. The Minister mentioned about licensing yesterday so I wanted to check with the Minister in the chair today on whether the Minister wouldn’t mind elaborating on the decision between, why in the end, we decided to go with option three, the authorisation regime, and not option four in terms of licensing—because they seem to be, according to the RIS, of equal footing.

One of the other questions I had, which hasn’t been responded to, is around the definition of “authorisation holder”. In section 4, amended by clause 5(1), it talks about the person who is the sole holder of a GBSI, whereas I mentioned yesterday that in the Overseas Investment Act it talks about the possibility of a collaborator. So how would a collaborator be considered under this legislation when the authorisation holder is a sole holder? Without the sole holder it naturally encompasses collaboration, because in the example that is on page 4, it talks about person A and person B, and if person B, for lack of a better term, sublets that particular control from person A, the sole holder is still person A and not person B. But it still doesn’t go into any elaboration on collaboration, and it doesn’t specify—in this case, I’m assuming the accountability, and anything that person A has to answer to, falls on person A and not person B? So if the Minister wouldn’t mind clarifying that.

My final question, noticing that I’m very short on time, but I do have another question if I may, Madam Chair? My final question is around clause 7—Madam Chair?

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Lawrence Xu-Nan.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN: Thank you. My final question is around new section 49A, inserted by clause 7, subclause 2A(i), and that is around communicating with a space object. Again, it kind of goes back to what I wanted to ask about accountability. When we are looking at communicating with a space object and also anything that’s relating to a GBSI, you’re also in the process of collecting data. I want to check with the Minister, from a data-protection and also data-sovereignty perspective, as part of the requirement for authorisation, whether the Minister would consider requiring the operator of GBSI to give a copy or all copies of data collected as a result of operation or be made available as a requirement of national interest.

Now, the regulatory impact statement was very clear that the reason we have something like this is mainly for our national interest and security, and particularly how it could be used for military purposes. I think it might be quite an important element for us to be able to at least readily view or require the operator to make the data they collect readily available by the relevant Minister in order for them to have the authorisation.

Those are a couple of my questions. If the Minister would elaborate on why has the bill gone against the advice of the regulatory impact statement for a two-year review, in paragraph 145; questions around the collaborator and the definition of sole holder; accountability measures; the difference between authorisation regime and licensing; and, finally, in terms of the requirement for the availability to review data that’s been collected by the GBSI as a requirement for authorisation.

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence): Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I’m grateful to Lawrence Xu-Nan for a typically thoughtful contribution from him—and he’s flattered me into giving as helpful a reply as I’m able.

At the risk of going round in circles on the point about a mandatory review versus a non-mandatory one, it seems, to me, clear that the Government decision has been around retaining flexibility in terms of the time frame and manner of such a review—notwithstanding that there is advice that there could, or rather should, be a review specified in the primary legislation, with the rationale being that, as already canvassed with various colleagues, it will be helpful to monitor the ongoing operation and effectiveness of the Act. There are other ways to skin that cat, frankly, so the Government’s view is that it’s not necessary to specify that in primary legislation. I appreciate, in relation to the particular proposal put forward by the Hon Rachel Brooking and other comments made in the House, that that may be unsatisfying to some members of the committee, but I feel at this point I can’t take that point much further.

In terms of the property rights argument, as expressed by the Hon Phil Twyford, but also with a link to the data sovereignty element raised by Dr Xu-Nan, I think it’s worth exploring—but briefly—the mechanics of what would happen in the event of the measures being triggered within the Act, namely that there is a disposal order that would allow the person issued with it to dispose of their right or interest in an agreed manner. It might be that the switch be flicked at an agreed time or in an agreed way, and it could include selling those rights or interests—and data, of course, could be conceived as being within the ambit of the rights and interests associated with the physical infrastructure. Where there is a forfeiture order, on the other hand—as opposed to a disposal order—the Act allows for sale proceeds to be returned to the person. So, unlikely as it might seem in the case of hostile foreign actors, for those of a less aggressive or unsavoury element, it might be that it’s a matter of negotiation for the New Zealand Government to engage in a conversation about the way that the confiscation, effectively, of property rights not take place but instead an agreed and mutually beneficial outcome take place—that the evil is avoided without undue impingement on the investment of those who might, for non-nefarious reasons, invest in ground-based infrastructure.

In terms of collaboration, and therefore accountability, I’m not certain that there’s much I can say about its interaction with the Overseas Investment Act regime, but I would say that the intent of the legislation is to appropriately capture the activities of those who are effectively, as opposed to nominally, undertaking them. It’s my understanding from reading the legislation that there would be nothing to preclude as a nation—“us” being New Zealand and the Government through its various agencies—from acting in a manner that would reflect the intent of the legislation. Notwithstanding that it might—if you’ll excuse the legal language, and I know you will, sir—pierce the corporate veil in terms of the ownership and other structures around that.

As for licensing versus authorisation: yes, both are possible regimes. The member rightly points out that these are both contemplated as possibilities within the regulatory impact statement. It seems to me that the Minister chose the authorisation route as best reflecting the balance that we wish to have in terms of being empowering but also enabling flexibility and, of course, balancing those considerations on which we have already touched.

Finally, in terms of the data sovereignty point, I should also add that the power under the Act is to seek necessary information, and to ask operators to provide all data wouldn’t necessarily be practicable in the circumstances when that arose, whereas particular data could be stored if it’s needed. Again, the effort is to provide as much prescriptive enablement of the functions that we all, I think, wish to see provided in legislation but without constraining ourselves in the manner that that might take place.

Hon PRIYANCA RADHAKRISHNAN (Labour): I do have a few questions that I would be keen to put to the Minister. But just before I get into that—and I acknowledge the Associate Minister of Defence has said he’s not going to move on the post-enactment review amendment; I take that point—but I do want to register my emphatic support for my colleague the Hon Rachel Brooking’s amendment, for the reasons outlined by her and by Vanushi Walters. It is disappointing that is not going any further, given the circumstances under which we are passing this bill.

To my questions: I do want to put to the Minister a question that I put to the Minister for Space last night. I did see her nodding, but the House rose before I could get a response, so I will just lay that out again, and that is with regards to new section 49C(4)(b)—

Tim Costley: Repetition!

Hon PRIYANCA RADHAKRISHNAN: Well, I didn’t get an answer, Mr Doocey, so I have—

Hon Matt Doocey: I didn’t say anything.

Hon PRIYANCA RADHAKRISHNAN: Oh well, whoever said that; Tim, somebody. Anyway, what I want to know is, with regards to the national interests test and the regard that the Minister needs to pay to national security, specifically, it does say in new section 49C(5) that “Before granting a GBSI activity authorisation, the Minister may consult the intelligence and security agencies about—”, and it goes on to lay out the risks to national security and then the extent to which the risks can be mitigated through the authorisation conditions.

My question to the Minister was why it seemed to be written in a way that it was optional rather than a requirement. Given the emphasis on national security for this piece of legislation, why is it not a requirement to consult with the relevant Minister and the relevant agencies, there? Related to that, in clause 7, “Replace section 53(4)(a) with … in the case of a launch licence”—and it goes on to list a whole bunch of licences, and it says: “must consult the security Ministers in accordance with section 55; and … in the case of a GBSI”—this is (aa)—“activity authorisation, may consult the intelligence and security agencies about—” those two points: the risk and the mitigation to the risk. So just keen for some clarification why that consultation is not a requirement.

The other question I had was around what I understand is already happening, which is—and I get that this legislation aims to capture operators and not the host of the GBSI—but I understand that there are scenarios where the host is in New Zealand but the operator is offshore in a different country. Therefore, my question is whether this legislative regime would capture them in that scenario, as well.

My final question that I want to raise is to tease out a little bit the options versus the funding model that is laid out or touched upon within the regulatory impact statement (RIS). There’s a fair bit of detail and analysis around the different options considered, the four options considered. Totally take the point that’s made in the RIS why option one—which is the counterfactual—was not the way to go, and option four was probably too heavy-handed given the cost requirements there. So I take that point and it seems to be between two and three, and the Minister and the Government has landed on option three.

However, when it comes to the funding of the implementation, I would have thought that the concerns around effectiveness would have been both in the design of the scheme but also in the implementation of this regulatory framework. There is a fair bit of ongoing monitoring that is involved, as well, and yet it does say in the RIS somewhere that there isn’t specific funding for the implementation of this. In another bit, it says that the anticipated estimated cost is of two fulltime-equivalents at the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. It then goes on to say that the intelligence community may require further resources depending on the number of authorisations, but that they will need to assess as they go. So why wasn’t it then, perhaps, a decision to land on option two, then to move to three? Was that considered? Just keen to get a sense of how this is going to be funded, because that leads to the effectiveness of the framework, as well.

TOM RUTHERFORD (National—Bay of Plenty): I move, That debate on this question now close.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): I call the Hon Rachel Brooking, but before you begin your call, there is a lot of repetition that is now starting to come back. It doesn’t matter how differently the questions are phrased; we keep a close track of what they’re referring to.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING (Labour—Dunedin): Well, Madam Chair, we’re all going through this, and, as you know, we are in all-stages urgency—

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): I do understand.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: —and we’re trying to work our way through this. I have some questions based on some of the Associate Minister of Defence’s responses so far. I was asking about Māhia and Tāwhaki and he said he didn’t want to get it wrong—to get the answer wrong; I don’t mean to be rude there at all. Can he clarify, then, the point is: if you already require, under the principal Act, a licence or permit for launching, but if you also have space infrastructure that will require the space infrastructure authorisation as well as whatever the launch ones are—so that’s one question.

Then, we’ve been talking a bit about the disposal orders—so that’s at new section 83A, inserted by clause 21. The Minister just went through that process, and I note that a disposal order may “specify any reasonable steps that must be taken in order to comply with the disposal order”. So if the Minister can confirm: some of this equipment is very large and I imagine—but can the Minister confirm my imagination—that it’s his expectation that any order would go through, in some detail, how it is that this large equipment would be disposed of.

Then, I note that the Minister has talked about, at 83A(4), “The Minister must have regard to New Zealand’s international obligations when acting under this section.” Are those international obligations the compensation that he’s referred to or is it something more than compensation, as well? Is it different trade agreements? Is it different treaties? What does he imagine that section to mean?

Then, wanting to just link all of that back into these questions about the host and the operator. So there’s: “An authorisation holder must—(a) comply with” and give a whole lot of information when applying for the authorisation. So that’s at new section 49D, inserted by clause 7. I’m particularly interested in 49D(e) which is: “if the authorisation holder operates, or proposes to operate, [the infrastructure] to carry out regulated activities on behalf, or for the benefit, of another person, ensure that the authorisation holder has in place partner due diligence arrangements that meet the requirements”, etc.

I know, I’ve visited space ops, just the one in the south, not the one in your electorate, Minister; this is big infrastructure and some of those—my colleague Ingrid Leary described them as a Dr Seuss - type thing whereby the antenna come up and move around—will be controlled offshore. Is it the idea that—so in this case, the person on the ground, which happens to be a council-controlled organisation, would have to show the relationships that they have with those operators offshore to get the authorisation and then the regulator would have to be satisfied that there is the right security arrangements in place, or not satisfied, and therefore, they wouldn’t be able to operate? That’s of particular, very real economic importance to those operators, and I’ve no doubt that they all want to do the best, I’m not saying that—but they will be interested in how these aspects are going to work in practice.

If you’ve got comments on that, and on what thought has gone into those relationships that the hosts—they seem to be the hosts, to me, because they are the people who have the land, and the big bits of equipment are on their land, but the antennae, the tracking that they’re doing on the satellites might be operated from offshore; how is that going to be regulated?

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence): Thank you, Madam Chair. I love a good Dr Seuss reference and I feel like there’s something about Oh, the Places You’ll Go! in there. I feel like we’re in that waiting room on page 7 of the book—no, just kidding; I don’t know the page number, but it’s very familiar.

In response to the points made by the Hon Rachel Brooking in terms of the disposal of the large physical infrastructure, I think it’s a question that I might have anticipated from a member of Parliament concerned with environmental considerations, and rightly so. I would think, however, that there’d be nothing that would necessarily preclude the disposal of such infrastructure in a way that would be consistent with the usual manner of disposing of waste, as it would be by that point. The member will be more familiar with those legislative and regulatory frameworks than me, but it seems to me that it would need to be disposed of thoughtfully, but I don’t think that’s a matter to specify in this legislation in relation to, effectively, the data and space-related aspects of how the infrastructure is used.

In terms of international obligations, whether that goes beyond mere compensation, instinctively I would expect that it might, and we can all use our imagination about different international instruments to which New Zealand is a signatory that might become relevant, but, again, I think it’s appropriate in terms of the background documentation and the legislation itself not to attempt an exhaustive list of what those obligations might be for fear of missing out some, or unduly emphasising the importance of others, in a way that’s general, given the particular circumstances might dictate what is appropriate or not. And, of course, our international obligations do change over time as we enter into, and theoretically could withdraw from, international obligations of a bilateral or multilateral nature. So it seems sensible to me that we’re not more specific about that, but I can’t see a reason, personally, that it would be limited only to matters of compensation as to those obligations.

As to the authorisation process and what would be necessary to demonstrate security and other relationships with non - New Zealand actors, I can imagine well that a thorough process of determining such factors and investigating them will be necessary for authorisation to be passed, but, again, it’s not something that I can comment on in terms of the content of the law that’s in front of us as to how those discussions might play out in any particular case.

Passing to the points made by the Hon Priyanca Radhakrishnan, to respond to that point that she’s raised regarding whether the Minister for Space should be required, on a mandatory basis, to consult the security Minister; she’s rightly pointed out that the Minister for Space “may” but we’re not saying “must”. That’s because, in practice, consultation will take place between the regulator—which is the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, of course—and security agencies for every authorisation application, as agreed from time to time by Cabinet. So that’s, we think, a more efficient approach requiring consultation that would actually lead to the same outcome than necessarily requiring that particular formal element whereby consultation must take place in a way that’s understood by that term. So we think that, overall, the regime will provide for appropriate advice to the decision-making Minister; and, of course, the Minister herself, or himself, potentially in the future, would make decisions on behalf of the Government, in any case.

The other points made by Priyanca Radhakrishnan seem to me to be around costs and funding, and we think that the effectiveness of the design and implementation is appropriately set, but, again, all these matters are not set in stone and can be reviewed and should be reviewed in terms of practice as well as the policy over time. Then she’s again made the point about the regulatory review proposal, and I’d hate to repeat my own answer on that and thereby risk the committee of the whole House stage being shut down by the Chair—because we wouldn’t want that to happen, would we now?—but if I were to dwell on it for one more moment, she said she wants to express her view on that. Of course, parties will be able to do that through a vote in due course, at some point, on the proposal as encapsulated by Ms Brooking’s tabled amendment.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): I think there is still room for new material.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Madam Chair. I actually just have quite a small question on an area that we haven’t covered yet. This is clause 7, new section 49E, “Minister may vary, revoke, or suspend GBSI activity authorisation”. I actually just have a very small question on this. Understandably, the Minister may vary or potentially may revoke and suspend a particular authorisation, but can I just check if the Minister would consider—if there’s the scope, for example, to give a prior warning first, to say, “Look, you are operating out of the scope of the particular thing.” Is there going to be some sort of criteria that the Minister for Space is going to be looking at when there is a suspension of a particular authorisation?

That’s actually, essentially, my question, which is around whether there might be a notification period to say, “Hey, we’ve noticed something that you’re not supposed to be doing. Please correct yourself before further actions might be taken.”, or maybe it depends on severity—that’s it, you know, you violated it, you get your authorisation revoked. If the Minister wouldn’t mind elaborating how that revocation would work.

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence): I feel as though the mechanisms already have a degree of flexibility in the fact that there would be a discussion, or could be a discussion—could be a discussion—and the disposal of data in an agreed manner could contemplate the opportunity to respond, if the Minister, acting on behalf of the Government for the people of New Zealand, were to determine that was appropriate. So it seems to me there’s nothing that precludes that, but, at the same time, we don’t want to be so prescriptive in law, as in the other factors that have been raised, in a way that would be unhelpful in the future.

VANUSHI WALTERS (Labour): Thank you, Madam Chair. I just wanted to respond to the Minister’s response on a question relating to exemptions. This is actually more to do with the Minister’s lack of power in terms of granting an exemption or preventing an exemption, on the basis of the Minister’s response. I asked a question earlier about new section 6(2)(b)(i), in terms of who that exemption would apply to. The response was that it could apply to a foreign actor as well, potentially. My colleague the Hon Phil Twyford asked questions about embassies in New Zealand. Putting those two together, it feels to me like partners such as our Five Eyes partners could potentially fit into that space.

Now there may, of course, be times when it is appropriate that an exemption would be granted. However, on New Zealand territory, it would seem to me that that ought to be a decision of the Minister, in terms of the scope of an exemption. I’m not ordinarily one to argue for an increase to discretionary powers, but it just feels to me, in light of the way that clause is drafted, that either ministerial discretion should apply or the clause should be drafted more closely. Another example of how the clause could be drafted more closely is that there’s also an exemption for a person who’s “providing services to … the New Zealand Defence Force”. That’s it. It’s not couched by more limiting language. I wonder whether the Minister would be open to limiting that, for example, by including the words “security or intelligence service” to the New Zealand Defence Force.

I’m just wondering whether there is either an appetite for more closely drafted language to ensure that New Zealand is still retaining its autonomy in terms of potential third-party actors or whether, appropriately, the Minister should have discretion to prevent an exemption from being granted in certain circumstances—and, if so, whether that should be drafted into the legislation.

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence): Thank you, Madam Chair. I think I understand the point made by Vanushi Walters, but I also think that the discretion could be applied—or would be applied in practice—at the stage that the New Zealand Defence Force would choose to work with the other partners, be they other Government agencies of New Zealand, including the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service or the Government Communications Security Bureau, potentially, or overseas players. I think there’d be enough flexibility in the system such that they could choose with whom they work. Therefore, to give the Minister either more power or discretion, on the one hand, or to more tightly constrain her or him, on the other hand, isn’t necessary.

Dr VANESSA WEENINK (National—Banks Peninsula): I move, That debate on this question now close.

A party vote was called for on the question, That debate on this question now close.

Ayes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 54

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 5.

Motion agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The Hon Rachel Brooking’s tabled amendment to Part 1, providing for post-enactment review of the bill by a select committee, is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

A party vote was called for on the question, That Part 1 be agreed to.

Ayes 117

New Zealand National 49; New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 5

Te Pāti Māori 5.

Motion agreed to.

Part 1 agreed to.

Part 2 Amendment to Outer Space and High-altitude Activities (Licences and Permits) Regulations 2017

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Members, we come now to Part 2. This is the debate on clauses 26 and 27, “Amendment to Outer Space and High-altitude Activities (Licences and Permits) Regulations 2017”. The question is that Part 2 stand part.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all, I just want to point out again that one of the things the Minister said yesterday as part of the first reading was that the consistency report against the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (BORA) will be available on the Ministry of Justice website. I want to, first of all, raise the point that that BORA report is still not available on the Ministry of Justice website—so if the Minister wouldn’t mind looking into it.

My question is around clause 27, “Regulation 3 amended”. I understand that when we’re looking at the licence and permits, the revocation of the definition of “protective security arrangements”, as expressed earlier, is due to the introduction of the authorisation regime, particularly when we’re looking at the activities under permits and licences, which are replaced by the definition of “protective security arrangements” being inserted into section 4 of the principal Act by clause 5. That is also a covered activity under “GBSI activity authorisation”, and, again, just going back to the regulatory impact statement, when we’re looking at table 1 on page 8, which covers what the existing regulatory environment and non-regulatory environment is, versus what the authorisation regime will be doing, my question to the Minister is this. By revoking—sorry, just another piece is that we already see there’s still a degree of overlap between, for example, the new authorisation regime and other legislative environments, such as the Overseas Investment Act, around collaboration with overseas parties.

Can I just check with the Minister as a reassurance that the revocation of the protective security arrangements in the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities (Licences and Permits) Regulations isn’t going to create a gap in the regulatory environment that the authorisation regime doesn’t cover. Is there any possibility that we have inadvertently created a separate gap?

Hon RACHEL BROOKING (Labour—Dunedin): Thank you, Madam Chair. This is a very simple question for the Associate Minister of Defence because, as he will be aware, Part 2 of this bill is very, very short. What clause 27 does is amend an interpretation in the regulations, and—just to make sure we’re all talking about the same thing—that regulation has a definition of “protective security arrangements”. It seems that the definition in the regulation is very, very similar to the new definition that is coming in through this amendment bill and the only difference is that it now refers to an authorisation. So my question is: am I right—is the point of this clause in Part 2 simply to delete the secondary instrument’s definition because it’s now going to be in the primary instrument?

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence): Thank you, Madam Chair. Just to respond to the question posed by the Hon Rachel Brooking: that’s my understanding—yes—that that’s the intent of what lawyers call a switcheroo, of course, whereby revoking the definition at the same time as creating the new definition within primary legislation will be so as not to create a gap. So I think we’re on the same page with that, and it’s a fair point, of course, to seek clarification.

A fair point, as well, Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan has raised is around coverage, or the possibility of a gap between this legislation and the Overseas Investment Act. That’s a piece of legislation in which I take a certain degree of interest as the Minister for Land Information, wearing another hat. I’m currently moonlighting for the Minister for Space. Some might unkindly call me a space cadet, but I’m sure that wouldn’t be a phrase everyone else would agree with in any other context. As land information Minister, I’m naturally interested in the operation of the Overseas Investment Act, and it seems to me if the passage of this legislation were to result in any kind of mismatch or undesirable duplicate of coverage or—more importantly—a gap, then that would be a matter that we can and should review. So I’ll take that as a helpful point from the member.

In terms of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act vet, it’s unfortunate if the member doesn’t have access to that by way of it being uploaded to the Ministry of Justice website. This is something I’ve encountered myself before, and it’s not a particularly helpful situation. But, for what it’s worth, I can relate to the member at least that my understanding is that the vet passed, which is to say that there is nothing in this Act that was considered to be inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.

CUSHLA TANGAERE-MANUEL (Labour—Ikaroa-Rāwhiti): Tēnā koe e te Māngai. Tuatahi tēnei te mihi atu ki a koe e te Minita.

[Thank you, Madam Speaker. First, I would like to acknowledge you, Minister.]

Who called you a space cadet? How unkind! Anyway—

Hon Member: He did.

CUSHLA TANGAERE-MANUEL: Oh, you called yourself a space cadet? OK.

No doubt there will be continued discussions about the role of kaitiakitanga of space. Hoi anō rā [However], we are talking about ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI), te whenua, tae noa mai ki te mana whenua [the land, and also the authority over the land].

I want to acknowledge Rocket Lab, obviously, which is a shining star in part of my electorate, in the beautiful Te Māhia, and one of the things as to why they stand out is that they support around 12,000 jobs, which is always a great thing, but we’ve also learnt some excellent lessons from Rocket Lab in terms of working with mana whenua. While neighbours such as Tawapata station happily coexist, throughout the establishment there were concerns around cultural impacts, environmental impacts, access to moana, consultation concerns—you know, some people felt as if the process was rushed—and genuine engagement.

So, as we look at the Schedule to the bill and at clause 9 in the new Part 2 to be inserted in Schedule 1 of the Act, it says that they “must be granted a GBSI activity authorisation for the operation of GBSI for the activity.”, my question to the Associate Minister of Defence is: knowing what we know from the establishment of Rocket Lab, how will Māori land owners, or mana whenua, be involved throughout the process—not just in consultation about establishment of the GBSIs but the ongoing monitoring of the licences? Indeed, it is any neighbouring landowners, not just mana whenua, because I think that’s a concern for anyone who is a neighbour of such establishments, especially when space is still the final frontier for a lot of people, and so this might just seem a bit out outlandish for the landowners and neighbours.

Also, there is the consideration of wāhi tapu, or sacred land, and how that’s going to be taken into consideration—if at all—and, as I said, there are environmental concerns. Koirā aku pātai mō tēnei wā. [Those are my questions at this time.]

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence): Thank you, Madam Chair. Just to acknowledge the points made by the member, it’s positive to hear that there’ve been constructive relationships locally with the operation of Rocket Lab, whom she has rightly acknowledged as a significant employer but also a major player in terms of the activity within that part of the world. The engagement with local iwi sounds as though that has been very constructive.

Broadening out the conversation in terms of new ground-based space infrastructure, it seems to me that our resource management laws and requirements and regime, more generally, and decision making outside the remit of this legislation will continue to govern that. I take the member’s point that this is important, not only because there is a land-based element, or the ground-based or whenua aspect of what is included within the remit of the bill, but also the cultural aspects and the access to the moana, etc. I just acknowledge those points, but I say that I don’t think that it’s necessary for this legislation to contemplate some sort of new way of understanding what should be approved in the first place or the ongoing interaction, because that’s covered elsewhere within our statutory frameworks.

A party vote was called for on the question, That Part 2 be agreed to.

Ayes 117

New Zealand National 49; New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 5

Te Pāti Māori 5.

Part 2 agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the Schedule be agreed to.

Ayes 117

New Zealand National 49; New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 5

Te Pāti Māori 5.

Schedule agreed to.

Clauses 1 and 2

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Members, we now come to the final debate. This is clauses 1 and 2, which is the title and commencement.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING (Labour—Dunedin): Thank you, Madam Chair. Again, this is a very short part, and I have one question on clause 1 and one on clause 2.

The first one is about the title, which is the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Act. I ask whether the Minister for Space would consider any amendments or changes to put in some brackets there like “(Regulating Ground-based Space Infrastructure)” after “Activities” and before “Amendment” just so that when people are looking for the amendment, they might be able to find it more easily, because it does seem that all of our discussion has been about that ground-based space infrastructure with its quite odd-to-say acronym.

Then, on the commencement date, my question is around the fact that it comes into force on 29 July 2025—so that is next Tuesday. That late July date—not necessarily Tuesday, 29 July, but late July—has been bandied around by the Minister for some time now as being the time that she wants this legislation to be enacted and enforced. So my question is: why is it that we only saw the legislation yesterday and that it’s being progressed under all stages in urgency when it has been in train and in progress for some time?

We accept that this legislation is needed and we’re supporting it, but it could have been in the House last week and been with the select committee over the weekend and back in the House this week, for instance. We know that there are not a huge number of people in the country who know about ground-based space infrastructure, but there are some, and it would have been useful to get their views on this and to make sure that we were asking the good questions about it. So that is my question about the commencement date, and also about the title.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Madam Chair. I too have a very quick question for the Associate Minister of Defence on clause 2, “Commencement”, but from a different approach than that of the Hon Rachel Brooking. I agree with the Hon Rachel Brooking that the question that she asked around the commencement date is an important one, particularly in light of the fact that we do see that the consultation with the operators has been done since 2024, and so this is something that’s been in train.

However, my question is around the fact that this bill has been brought into the House under urgency—all stages under urgency—with the Government citing that this issue is something that potentially will create security risks and this bill is in our national interest, and yet the commencement date isn’t the day after Royal assent, but, instead, it is next week. I just wanted to check if there’s any potential—like what could happen now that people know about this, because, again, the House didn’t know about this bill until it was placed on the Table during the first reading. There was no heads-up and no way for anyone to know—including the New Zealand public—because of the national security risk, and yet we are now left with five days of people knowing that this is something that’s happening. So what is the potential risk from now until 29 July, and why was the commencement date not the day after Royal assent?

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence): Thank you, Madam Chair. To address the two time-based elements, I take the point made by both members, actually, in terms of the time frame. But it’s probably helpful to note for the record, by way of background, that consultation with existing ground-based space infrastructure holders did take place in the formulation of the policy—and perhaps even in terms of the drafted outcome for that policy—and, likewise, with a couple of experts in this space. So I take Ms Brooking’s point that there are some others in New Zealand, albeit a limited number, who would have expertise to speak in this space, and, no doubt, again, without rehearsing old ground too much in terms of the ongoing nature of review of the operation and effectiveness of the Act, I’m sure that we’ll welcome hearing any well-informed opinions about the extent to which that is working well and as intended.

As for the time frame element that Dr Xu-Nan identified, I suppose that whenever there is a gap between the passage of the law and it becoming effective in the real world, there is a possibility of actions being taken in contemplation. The fact that it’s a relatively short time frame I think mitigates as best as possible the risk that particular activities ramp up in the meantime, but, of course, that’s at the same time an argument against having a long lead time for the legislation to be coming into effect. We don’t want people to take contemplation of this in a way that takes advantage of a gap that’s now, arguably, highlighted by the fact that we’re now discussing and identifying potential vulnerability in our arrangements.

Finally, as to the name of the bill, I suppose one can always be more explicit about the contents of a bill within its title. The length of it already is considerable and, hopefully, it will be reasonably obvious to those reading the bill, and for anyone who’s minded to be even more diligent and read the Hansard of this discussion—they’ll get a pretty good idea, I think, of what’s in it.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Thank you, Madam Chair. Just a quick question around—and I was listening carefully to the Associate Minister of Defence—those time frames. We had that consultation process with around 21 of the entities that are ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI), and now we’re at this particular point here. Just for clarification for the committee: did something happen between awareness from those discussions with these different entities, and is that why we are in this situation of moving through urgency? I think that will help to alleviate some of the questions that we’re having around the committee in terms of that gap between that consultation process that happened, and the fact that we are moving through urgency at this particular time and are looking at 29 July as the commencement date. So a quick question there.

The other thing is that I support what the Hon Rachel Brooking was saying around making it easier for people to be able to find this amendment. You might want to not use the entire sentence, because I get what you’re saying—it’s a paragraph, and we don’t want that. But you could have “GBSI”, or whatever it is as the acronym, to make it easier to find things. That’s just a helpful suggestion for the Minister.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING (Labour—Dunedin): Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to the Associate Minister of Defence for answering my questions before. I just want to put it to the Minister: does he agree that there is a difference between consultation on policy versus the drafting of the full and final bill—do words matter?

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence): I’m happy to confirm for the committee of the whole House that words do matter. As for the period of time between the consultation taking place, the substance of the consultation, and the time frame of the effectiveness of the legislation, there’s no particular insight I have in terms of what was consulted upon that led to that time frame being specified as 29 July 2025.

TIM COSTLEY (National—Ōtaki): I move, That debate on this question now close.

A party vote was called for on the question, That debate on this question now close.

Ayes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 54

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 5.

Motion agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That clause 1 be agreed to.

Ayes 117

New Zealand National 49; New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 5

Te Pāti Māori 5.

Clause 1 agreed to.

Clause 2 agreed to.

Bill to be reported without amendment.

House resumed.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Madam Speaker, the committee has considered the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill and reports it without amendment. I move, That the report be adopted.

Motion agreed to.

Report adopted.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: This bill is set down for third reading immediately.

Third Reading

Hon CHRIS PENK (Associate Minister of Defence) on behalf of the Minister for Space: I move, That the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill be now read a third time.

Thank you to all members for their contributions during the first and second readings and also for the thoughtful debate that we’ve just experienced during the committee of the whole House stage.

This bill represents a significant step forward in strengthening New Zealand’s space regulatory framework. As our space sector continues to grow, so too does the need to ensure that the ground-based infrastructure, such as satellite tracking systems and telemetry systems, are subject to appropriate oversight and standards. Ground-based space infrastructure plays a vital role in supporting satellite operations and space activities, but without regulation it can pose risks to national security and other national interests. This bill ensures the operators of such infrastructure are authorised, accountable, and operating in a way that protects New Zealand’s interests.

It’s been done because it is needed, quite simply. During the past five years, there have been several deceptive efforts to establish and/or use ground-based infrastructure in New Zealand to harm our national security by foreign actors. They’ve deliberately disguised their affiliation to foreign militaries and misrepresented their intentions. To date, these risks have been managed through non-regulatory measures, including relying on the goodwill of ground-based space infrastructure operators. These measures are no longer enough. Passing this bill establishes an authorisation regime for ground-based space infrastructure, backed by enforcement powers to safeguard the national interest. It also provides for a transition period, allowing operators to meet the new requirements, while ensuring that the responsible Minister, being our colleague and friend the Hon Judith Collins the Minister for Space, can act immediately if risks arise.

The bill will therefore help maintain New Zealand’s reputation as a trusted and capable spacefaring nation, one that takes its responsibility seriously and is prepared to manage the risks and opportunities of space activity here on Earth.

I’d like to thank the teams at the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment and the Parliamentary Counsel Office for their work in supporting the passage of the bill. I also acknowledge the contribution of stakeholders, who helped to shape the policy and ensure that the regime is practical and effective. Thanks to the MPs across the House who have supported the bill and, again, to those who engaged thoughtfully in the debate of the committee of the whole House. I commend this bill to the House.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING (Labour—Dunedin): Thank you, Madam Speaker. As the Associate Minister of Defence just noted, this is a bill that Labour has been supporting because we do agree that space activity should always be in the national interest and that it’s an important part of our economy. I guess a lot of people will think about space and the first thing you think of is the rockets launching off and then you might think about what it is that they are taking into space. But we don’t probably spend as much time talking about this ground-based space infrastructure that does the tracking of those satellites that are deployed in space by the launch that is regulated when it comes from New Zealand. So now this ground-based space infrastructure will also be regulated, and that is a sensible thing.

I do want to briefly comment on an amendment that I put up during the committee stage that was ruled out of order, and that was about a post-enactment review. It doesn’t matter as to the form of it. It is the general idea that whilst Labour accepts that there is a need for urgency in this case, and to go through all-stages urgency because of what is best for our national interest and our security interests—we accept that—we can have both things, though. We can have both something going through urgency and getting the benefit of the national security that it will bring by it being passed and commencing next week, on 25 July; but we can also spend a bit more time on the bill with a post-enactment review. The Government had an opportunity to not use all-stages urgency in a cynical, negative way—which I say this Government often does. They had the opportunity to say, “We’re actually using urgency for a good reason this time, but we do acknowledge that it is not a great way to make laws. And so to fix that not great lawmaking aspect of it, we will have a post-enactment review.”

But the Government has chosen not to do that. I implore them, anybody who’s listening, that there is still an opportunity to put this to a select committee, in some form or other, to make sure that it does have the proper scrutiny. We heard from the Minister, and we saw in the regulatory impact statement (RIS), which we only saw once the all-stages debate on this bill started, that some groups of people have been consulted, and they were consulted on the policy, and the Minister in the chair just before alluded to the fact that some of them might have seen some drafting as well. It is unlikely, and I do not know, but I am assuming that they have not seen the full bill as drafted for comment before they saw it as it was introduced last night. That is a shame, because words matter and we don’t want to get them wrong.

I still didn’t have a clear answer from the Minister in the chair about the relationship of the people who own the site and own the land to other operators that might be coming in and contracting with them. I understand that it looks to be that when the land holder—the person who has the ground space—is applying for their authorisation, they have to demonstrate that they have done the correct due diligence for national security for anybody who might be using some of their equipment from time to time. I think what happens, then, is that if the operator of that equipment is largely offshore or a different entity, that different entity will have to get their own authorisation as well. But, again, this is something that could have been worked through.

Unfortunately, the National Party backbench MPs kept jumping up to call for a closure motion in the committee stage. That is very disappointing when this is all-stages urgency and we we’re trying to make sure that we all understood this bill. So I say to them, shame on them. That just really shows a terrible understanding of how unusual it has been in previous parliaments to do all-stages urgency of a bill. But, of course, this is a term—[Interruption]

DEPUTY SPEAKER: All right. That’s a barrage, not an interjection.

Hon Matt Doocey: Fake news.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: I’m hearing it’s fake news. I’ve got a lot of statistics on this and all-stages urgency has been used by this Government time and time again, and this is the one time that I’ve come across where it makes some sense, and we are agreeing to the all-stages urgency. Yet members opposite still jump up and try and close down these very civil, thoughtful debates. What does that say about their attitude to lawmaking? It is just arrogant. That is all it is: arrogant and not wanting good lawmaking.

Hon Member: Where was that view in the last Government?

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: I’m asked now, when was that view in the last Government? Well, the last Government didn’t do all of this all-stages urgency. I can provide the member those numbers—

Tim van de Molen: Point of order.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: I think we can have this debate—oh, sorry. We have a point of order from Tim van de Molen.

Tim van de Molen: Yes. Madam Speaker—

DEPUTY SPEAKER: I was halfway through making a statement, so if it’s relevant to this—

Tim van de Molen: Yes, I was just pointing out that that was a factually incorrect statement and I suggest the member might want to withdraw it from the House.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Well, look, I think the member’s stated a view; she hasn’t put any numbers on it. She’s just made the observation that the closure motions have been called, and she’s expressed a view. She hasn’t made any statements about the frequency in the number form. But what I was about to say is that this is away from the actual bill itself, the debate that was going on across the House. So we’ll give the member a chance to finish her third reading speech.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: Thank you, Madam Speaker. My point remains, and I’m happy to give information to the members across the House, that there is a lot of legislation that has come through this Parliament in all-stages urgency, and it does not lead to good lawmaking, and they should take that seriously.

Joseph Mooney: Just like the last Government did—or didn’t.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: No, very much unlike the last Government, Mr Mooney.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: OK, we’re not having that debate. The member’s made a point; now we’ll come back to the third reading. Thank you.

Hon RACHEL BROOKING: Very different—sorry. I’ve noted some of the issues that I don’t think were well traversed in the committee stage, and that is a shame. But I’ve also noted that the space industry is important to New Zealand, as is our national security. So that is why Labour has been in support of this bill, if any of the members opposite had been listening. I will end my contribution there. Thank you.

TEANAU TUIONO (Green): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise on behalf of the Greens on this third reading of the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. For those just tuning in today, this is a piece of legislation that establishes a regime for ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) and imposes an authorisation regime on persons who operate GBSI, which is what we’re calling it these days, to carry out activities. The activities include telemetry, tracking, and control, including activities that could disrupt satellite operations of space objects; space surveillance and identification of space objects; satellite data reception; and other activities of concern if prescribed in regulations.

This bill is passing through all stages under urgency, and we began talking about this last night. We had an interesting discussion with the Minister in the committee of the whole House, and what the Minister told us and what we have accepted is that the bill has been introduced in response to the assessment by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service of the security threat environment that found that New Zealand organisations had been approached by entities seeking to develop space infrastructure. These entities claim the infrastructure would be used for civilian research purposes but it was subsequently found that the proposed activities could have assisted foreign military activity with potential risks to New Zealand’s interests.

That assessment also said, and I quote, “The full capabilities and some of the affiliations of these entities were deliberately hidden. If these projects had gone ahead we would have inadvertently allowed another country to install equipment in New Zealand for plausible military or intelligence functions. To have done so would have risked New Zealand’s sovereignty. By hiding their affiliations, the foreign entities undermine New Zealand’s ability to make informed decisions based on our national security and national interest.” So there’s an obvious gap there and the Greens support that—if you’re going to build something in someone’s backyard, it’s important that we have eyes over that. There was a regulatory gap, so making sure there were some regulations in place is incredibly important.

There were also some very good questions posed. For example, I know a number of people will want to know when this threat became known. As through our discussions and the departmental disclosure statement, we did find out that there had been discussions with 21 GBSI operators, and that began in 2024. So there have been ongoing discussions, and 21 is not a small number. That’s a few people that are doing this. I’m guessing that through those discussions something emerged, which, of course, is why we find ourselves in urgency at this particular time. So I accept that premise from that side of the Chamber while we’re here in urgency.

I do support what was said, I think, very well, by the Hon Rachel Brooking about having a post-enactment review of some kind. The issue is that when we go through urgency like this, we do want to make sure that all the nuts and bolts are holding the wheels to the wagon, so that we can have the best, most robust legislation that we can. And that’s whether you support the legislation or don’t support the legislation—if we put something into the legislative system, we want it to be the best it can be.

We also had some really interesting discussion around the authorisation regime. There were four options, and we heard the various reasons why this particular regime was the one that was picked. I guess there were some interesting discussions there and some questions that I continue to have around exactly happens—because we’re in a very fast-moving world where somebody might be a GBSI operator and that’s what they’re doing, and then they onsell to another group, and then that group onsells to another group. What are the actual parts in place to ensure that there is proper oversight over that? Also, if there are nefarious foreign actors, if I can put it that way, who are influencing some of these GBSI operators, we need to make sure there is oversight over that as well.

There was also, I think—and this is where I have some unease on this; an unease that is out of the scope of this amendment bill but it is definitely connected to it, and I think the Hon Phil Twyford mentioned this a number of times around the national interest element of it. Of course we don’t want people building stuff in New Zealand which is against the national interest and could be harmful to Aotearoa. So making sure we have a regime that is in place to deal with that is important. But it gets difficult when we have different interpretations of what the national interest is. In the regulatory impact statement, it talks about how we need to be careful of foreign actors that do not share New Zealand’s values. Well, the question I have is: what are New Zealand values? Those things develop over time and they evolve, and we do, I think, as parliamentarians, want those values to be the best kind of values. Many of us often make the point that we’re in the Pacific. We are a Pacific nation and part of a family of Pacific nations, so making sure we do everything we can do to take care of our neighbourhood is an important thing to do.

Outside of the Pacific, things are changing incredibly rapidly. We had a ministerial statement yesterday about the situation in Gaza, and a number of countries that would typically align themselves with the US have spoken out on what’s happening in Israel. Does that show that our New Zealand values are changing? Are they developing? I hope so. I think evolving values in a way that puts people at the heart of them is incredibly important.

There was an argument around having more specificity in terms of what the national interest is. There is part of that in this amendment bill—I think there are three or four aspects. But the argument was made that you could be more specific. So, for example, with the launching of payloads, you can’t launch things that would contravene our nuclear-free legislation. That makes sense. You can’t do other things that would cause environmental impact on other satellites in outer space. That also makes sense. I think you can be prescriptive, but I also think we need to have some space to allow for our values to develop in a good way. That’s a good thing as well. So that, although outside the scope of this amendment bill, is foundational to the entire Act as well. I hope that the Minister takes on board those points of clarification, which I think would make this a stronger piece of legislation.

The other thing that was not answered at all, I felt, was the part around the role of tangata whenua. A few years back, I did go up to Māhia to talk with the whānau up there who are unhappy with what Rocket Lab was doing. They said it was one thing, and the next thing you know, other things were happening and it was impacting the wider community. Yes, they might be funding this, that, and the other, but the intention around making sure you take care of the environment and don’t launch military payloads on behalf of foreign actors—the US—is an important point that has been made to me repeatedly when I visited them.

The other thing that the Minister also talked about and that we talked about for some time was around the exemptions. The New Zealand Defence Force gets an exemption. My understanding of it is if you’ve got a Waihopai-type situation, that exemption applies, but if you’ve got a Māhia Rocket Lab situation, that falls under the Act. I didn’t get a lot of clarity from the Minister as to whether that distinction was correct or not, so if people on that side of the House could clear that up, that would be really good for people who are watching this at home. On that note, I commend this bill to the House.

Dr PARMJEET PARMAR (ACT): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I’m taking this call on behalf of ACT to support this bill. We just had the committee of the whole House before this reading, and it was really good to see that the Minister answered questions that came from various members. I can fully understand, as this bill is going through urgency, members had lots of questions, and those questions were addressed in the committee of the whole House.

It is totally justified that this bill is going through urgency, given that we know there are risks, and these risks are real risks, because through the ground-based space infrastructure, we know that some entities, while they are using this infrastructure, this technology, for everybody’s benefit—this technology can also be used to strengthen their own space capability while degrading others’ capabilities. That’s the big risk that we have. We cannot let anybody compromise or undermine our national security.

This bill is about ensuring we are protecting our national security, protecting our reputation, because when we talk about national security, it’s not just our country; it’s the entire region as well. It also puts everybody on notice because, from next week, all the authorisations will become a transitional authorisation—so, basically, they will be on notice, and they will have to prove that their activities align with our national interest. It’s a great bill, and I support this bill and commend this bill to the House. Thank you.

ANDY FOSTER (NZ First): Madam Speaker, thank you. I’m delighted to rise on behalf of New Zealand First to speak in support of this bill in the third reading. Look, it’s very, very clear that space is a rapidly evolving environment, and what we’ve heard in terms of that rapid evolution goes to a need for speed in terms of this legislation. Also, what we’ve heard from the Minister for Space—in fact, both Ministers who’ve supported this bill—is that there have already been malicious operators seeking to take advantage of what is a gap in our legislation as it is at the moment.

It’s been great also to hear the stories about, and to see the numbers about, how important the space industry is now to New Zealand, across several parts of our country. We’ve got a fantastic range of entrepreneurs and, typical to New Zealand, we have innovation, and space is no exception. In the five years to 2024, we read that the space sector grew by 53 percent, and at 2024, it was a $2.5 billion contribution to our economy, and that is only going to rise. But that means it’s really, really important that that sector is regarded as trusted and is regarded as reliable, and so this legislation itself, in a sense, also helps not only our national security but also our national economy.

I’ve heard comments made about Rocket Lab in particular. Having visited them a few months ago, what I did see in here is the importance that they place both on employment but also on training and development of local people. I thought that was absolutely fantastic to see around the Māhia Peninsula.

This is an amendment bill. The 2017 Act, which it seeks to amend, is very, very focused on the things that we send into space, the payloads that we send into space. I think what this bill is doing is it’s identified that there is a sizeable gap about the space-related infrastructure which actually sits on the ground and communicates, if you like, with the satellites that are sent into space. Satellites are now an essential part of so much of what we do—whether it’s communications, navigation, weather forecasting, scientific research, being able to watch sport, all of those things. Satellites make a huge difference.

What are some of those things there? We’ve got relaying signals; broadband internet if you’re not on cables; secure financial transactions—that’s very, very important—global positioning system, GPS; real-time tracking of vehicles, deliveries, and all of those sort of things; aviation and maritime safety, surveillance, search and rescue; and environmental monitoring. There are a huge number of things which satellites are part of, but they’re also used for less productive, more malicious, more nefarious, and more aggressive purposes. That’s what this bill is about, trying to make sure we have a means of dealing with this.

I think that we all now understand that New Zealand is in a strategically important location for space. We are an island in the middle of the Pacific, which means there’s not a lot of other places for you to base this kind of ground-based infrastructure on. Australia’s a long way one way, and South America is a very long way the other way, so we are an important location also in relation to the South Pole. I think we also accept that there are now increasingly malicious operators who would like to disrupt things and would like to launch things from our sovereign soil, and this bill is about making sure that that does not happen. We want to ensure that our national interests are protected, as well as those of our friends and neighbours, and to ensure that we as a nation remain a reliable, trusted partner which upholds the law, and that is also good for the businesses which operate out of New Zealand. I commend this bill to the House.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: The next call is a split call.

TĀKUTA FERRIS (Te Pāti Māori—Te Tai Tonga): Tēnā koe e te Pīka. Māku ngā kōrero mā Te Pāti Māori, otirā te iwi Māori mō te anga o tēnei pire. Nō reira kaua koe e māharahara mō taku hāte. Tēnā tātou.

[Thank you, Madam Speaker. The statements on behalf of Te Pāti Māori, indeed the Māori people regarding the direction of this bill, is up to me. So don’t you worry about my shirt. Greetings to us all.]

We do not support the bill, and it’s for a fairly straightforward principle. It’s a principle of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. The bill, not its predecessor nor the amended bill, mentions anything about Te Tiriti o Waitangi—about the partnership that Te Tiriti o Waitangi created, or the place of Māori in it.

Whilst we might be here talking about space and an emerging field of technology and an emerging economic opportunity, this lesson has been learnt, has been tracked, time and time and time again by this Parliament. We arrive at a new technology and then the Parliament takes the view, “Oh, Māori don’t have anything to do with that technology—don’t have anything to do with that.” This was the same thing that happened when the spectrum case came up in the early 2000s—the spectrum case—and the somewhat arrogant view of the Government at the time was that Māori didn’t have any use or history in the use or utilisation of the spectrum. This would ultimately be disproven, right?

Joseph Mooney: Start a business. Give it a go—have a go at starting a business.

TĀKUTA FERRIS: This would be disproven. So here we are again—

Joseph Mooney: Encourage people to start a business.

TĀKUTA FERRIS: Here we go. Here we go. We’ve got the 1840 guy over here. What were the ancestors of the Brits doing in 1840? Not a lot in space. The principle is the same. The principle is the same.

Andy Foster: Who developed the technology?

TĀKUTA FERRIS: I hear the supporters of the myth of technology idea over here on my left—astounding, astounding. A new resource is available, there’s some regulation wanted for it, being proposed for it, and Māori are being regulated out of it. It’s worth billions of dollars into the future.

Andy Foster: Ngāi Tahu are doing very well out of it

TĀKUTA FERRIS: Oh, Ngāi Tahu did very well out of it? We’re sticking to the root facts here. Māori have a long cosmological history. They have deep knowledge. We’ve been navigating the biggest ocean in the world for 10,000 years using the stars. We’ve managed to name every planet, every constellation. Māori—

Andy Foster: So has everyone else.

TĀKUTA FERRIS: “So has everyone else.”—the attitude of this House, when it comes to this type of discussion, is deplorable. It’s deplorable. It’s a joke. It’s an utter joke, the attitude of this Government. The House isn’t built to facilitate the Te Tiriti o Waitangi conversation. I can say that to the Speaker, absolutely 100 percent knowing that: this House isn’t built to facilitate the Te Tiriti o Waitangi conversation. This Government isn’t interested in the Te Tiriti o Waitangi conversation. They keep spewing out stupid views that I’d love to take a little bit more time to rip to bits, but we don’t have it right now.

Anyway, a great mentor of mine, an uncle, Moana Jackson, spoke about colonial myths a lot. One of them was the myth of technology, Andy—the myth of technology—and that the colonial settlers and the successive Governments and power structures of this country built colonial myths into our history. One of them is the idea that all Māori development halted in 1840, and that’s where we should stay. You should go and look up the myth of technology, e hoa mā—go and look it up.

Dr Vanessa Weenink: Go look up Tāwhaki.

TĀKUTA FERRIS: I know about Tāwhaki. I know about Māhia-mai-tawhiti. We know about all of those things. I also know about Ihirangaranga. I also know about Mātairangi. I also know about things like Matariki. Everyone knows about Matariki now—

Tim van de Molen: At least read the title of the bill.

Joseph Mooney: He doesn’t even know about Tāwhaki.

TĀKUTA FERRIS: Oh, here we go, here we go—no decent debate from this side of the House, just slanging stuff. Slanging stuff, eh? [Interruption] I’ll just give it a minute to simmer down. I hope everyone’s listening. Although you can’t hear at home, I hope everyone’s at least getting a feel of the attitude here when I’m raising quite a simple point—a simple principle—and it’s the principle of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. This House has passed laws that protect these rights that Māori possess. You’ve passed laws, and here you are just riding roughshod straight over the top of them. Nō reira, kia kaha koutou. We do not support the bill at all.

STUART SMITH (Senior Whip—National): Point of order, Madam Speaker. I’m not going to raise a point about the member Tākuta Ferris not addressing the bill, but I am going to raise a point of order in regard to wearing a political slogan on the previous speaker’s shirt, which has a logo, as well. If that’s the ruling, I’d just like some clarification—you don’t need to give it to us now—because we could all wear T-shirts in the House with party logos and slogans on them, but I just want to know what that ruling is. So I’ll leave that with you.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: I can’t see a party logo from here, but I can see that the member has a T-shirt with something on it. But it’s not visible from the Chair, and I don’t know if it’s visible on the TV screens.

Tākuta Ferris: Speaking to the point of order.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: If the member wishes to speak to the point of order, I’m happy to take that.

TĀKUTA FERRIS (Te Pāti Māori —Te Tai Tonga): Yeah, speaking to the point of order, I’m not sure who the sovereign party is, but I do know that the Deputy Prime Minister has been pulled up in this House about three or four times for wearing his ACT pin. So if you want to come and clear that up, you’re welcome to it.

Cameron Luxton: Speaking to the point of order.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Look, as long as it’s constructive, I’m happy to follow up. But there is no visible party branding on the member who was just speaking that I can see from here.

CAMERON LUXTON (ACT): Sure. The member is using a tactic that’s well-known in bullying circles, which is to raise a different issue when there’s an issue on the table, and—[Interruption] Points of order are heard in silence, and I think—

DEPUTY SPEAKER: No, look, I’ll tell you, the member has been attempting to make a speech and has had a lot of barrage and interjection from the Government’s side of the House, which—I think it’s been coming from both sides, and I’m not prepared to accept that that particular member has been directing what he’s been saying at this, other than to react to interjections.

CAMERON LUXTON: Thank you, Madam Speaker, and a related point of order—

Tākuta Ferris: Speaking to the point of order.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Just a moment, we’ve got a member on his feet.

CAMERON LUXTON: As the Deputy Speaker has acknowledged, it’s hard to read what is written on the shirt of the member. The member did actually just refer to what was written on the shirt, so it would behove the House to look at Standing Order 119 in regard to what the member has just said, as to whether that is an affront to that Standing Order.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: I’ll follow that one up. Thank you.

TĀKUTA FERRIS (Te Pāti Māori—Te Tai Tonga): Speaking to the point of order, with regard to the first part of the member’s point of order, deeming the relevance of Te Tiriti o Waitangi to a debate in this House as some sort of act of bullying and not being relevant to this bill is one of the stupidest things I’ve heard to date.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: Look, that actually wasn’t a point of order. I’m going to shut this down now. I accept that there has been some to and fro going from both sides and, as I say, when the member was actually making his speech, there were a lot of interjections coming at him, which made it hard to speak. I’m closing down the points of order now. I can’t see what’s on the member’s T-shirt and I’m accepting that I cannot see any political logo, and we’re going to move on. Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan.

Cameron Luxton: Speaking to the point of order, Madam Speaker.

DEPUTY SPEAKER: No, I’ve ruled—I’ve ruled and I’m moving on, and I’ve called Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan to make his participation.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Madam Speaker. Who knew that this bill, which was introduced under urgency, could be so contentious?

I rise on behalf of the Green Party to speak on the third reading of this bill. I want to start by pointing out that the Green Party does support this bill from the perspective that it does address a gap within the current regulatory and non-regulatory environment—that would be beneficial from the perspective of our security, but also from a so-called national interest perspective. So it is important in that regard. I just want to point out a few things that we have discussed during the committee stage. It doesn’t mean that there aren’t concerns that we have regarding this bill and particularly around the regulatory-making power of this bill.

Firstly, regarding the urgency that we see for this bill, we did ask the Minister that if there was consultation on this bill—and since 2024 they have consulted with 21 operators, according to the departmental disclosure statement—why was this bill introduced under urgency? There is the idea that, yes, there’s a security risk, but then we also pressed to ask why, if they had the time to consult with 21 operators since 2024, there were no Māori hapū iwi collectives consulted as a requirement of this bill. That was not fully clear as a part of that committee stage. So that’s the first thing that we wanted to address.

The other thing that we’re asking about in the context of GBSI or ground-based space infrastructure is that this does give the Minister a lot of powers in terms of approving those authorisations. One of the clearest things, and this is from the perspective of regulatory-making power and also from the Regulations Review Committee, is it will cause some nervousness. And then there’s the fact that the Minister, in the end, despite the fact that they talk about flexibility and all of that, did not take on the departmental recommendation in clause 154 of the regulatory impact statement to put in a review period.

Now, the regulatory impact statement was very clear. They recommended a two-year review period because something like this is very new internationally, and that will also be in line with the principal Act, specifically section 86 of the principal Act, around the review period, which was three years in the principal Act. So there will be things that people are going to be picking up, as a result of this.

Now, the third point I want to address is that we do constantly go back to the idea of our national interest, and we do acknowledge Aotearoa New Zealand’s strategic geographical location globally as someone who has this relatively rare and quite expansive Southern Hemisphere GBSI coverage. There are two issues with this. Number one: we go back to the issue of the role of Te Tiriti and the role of Māori within this space, and how that relationship will be rebuilt, will be made stronger despite the lack of consultation. I think that is something we have yet to see the Minister making a commitment on, and we would like to see further work being done in that space.

The second area is around what is considered “national interest”. Now, I want to be very clear. The Green Party has always talked about the need for an independent foreign affairs policy here in Aotearoa New Zealand. We are concerned with the fact that we have seen Five Eyes expanding beyond what is an information-sharing agency to potentially interfering with even something like this around GBSI. Because the bill does say that the Minister may seek advice from the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) and, as we know, the NZSIS has a singular target and a singular country that they are targeting as a result of this. So in this case, is this national interest or is this Five Eyes interest? I think we need to be very clear on that.

So, yes, the Green Party does support this bill, but I think there’s a lot more work to be done around this area.

TIM VAN DE MOLEN (National—Waikato): Thank you, Madam Speaker. Now, I want to pick up, firstly, on the blatantly untrue statement made by Ms Brooking before, in her contribution, that the previous Government had not used urgency to pass any bills through all stages. That was, verbatim, what she said—incredible. A short Google search shows 24 bills were passed through all stages under the last Government, 17 of those were outside the Budget process, and, indeed, that included changes to the electoral law of this country—a totally unjustified use of urgency.

This case is a particular case for a particular purpose that has been well traversed for sensitive issues. So I commend the bill to the House.

Hon PRIYANCA RADHAKRISHNAN (Labour): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I just want to set the record straight, given that the member that just resumed his seat has claimed that the Hon Rachel Brooking said that our Government never passed any legislation under urgency. That’s not what she said; what she said was that we didn’t do it as much as this Government is doing it, and we didn’t do it for reasons that seem completely unjustified for significant bills, as this Government has done repeatedly, time and again. However, she also acknowledged that this bill is not an example of that. So it would pay for the member who made those claims to actually listen in future, and that would go for members opposite who have been unnecessarily nasty during this debate, given that members on this side are actually supporting this bill.

The purpose of this bill, of course, is to manage national security and other risks to New Zealand’s national interests that are posed specifically by GBSI, or ground-based space infrastructure, and it does that through the enactment of a regulatory regime. We all know from the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) threat assessments—the most recent one in 2024—that companies that are focused on technology and innovation are particularly vulnerable, and we’re seeing that; we’ve seen that in recent years. They are particularly vulnerable to being used by foreign States to advance their own military and intelligence goals. Often this has happened in instances where we’ve then found out that, initially, those malicious activities or that malicious intent was not actually even realised by companies here in New Zealand.

Entities have approached New Zealand organisations specifically to develop space infrastructure in New Zealand territory. They have claimed that the purpose of that infrastructure was for civilian research, but it was then later found out in each one of those cases that that was not true; that the infrastructure was designed to assist foreign military activity and the affiliations between those foreign entities and the entities that approached New Zealand companies were deliberately hidden. So none of us disputes the need for this legislation, which is to plug the gap in our regulatory frameworks or regulations legislation that we currently have.

We know that the ways in which this was addressed to date has been through non-regulatory measures. We know that space is increasingly contested and competitive, that technologies change rapidly and therefore legislative fixes are required to continue to ensure our national security, and that is why Labour is supporting this bill. However, there were a few concerns that I raised, questions that I asked during the committee of the whole House stage that we’ve had. I will also make the point that this is being considered under all-stages urgency. We accept the Minister for Space’s point that this is being done for national security purposes, and we don’t question that; that is fine.

However, I want to emphasise the point that my colleagues have made, both the Hon Rachel Brooking and Vanushi Walters, in their contributions at the committee stage, and also the amendment by Rachel Brooking which was for the Government to include a post-enactment review clause. This legislation is being considered through all stages under urgency; we accept that—but there is a mitigating factor given so much detail is in regulations, given that consultation has been minimal. The consultation document was put out to 21 operators that are known to the regulator. However, only two have substantively responded to that consultation. That was on the policy intent of the bill. The actual bill itself, as far as we’re aware, has not been consulted on.

So the suggestion from this side was a review clause so that we can mitigate potential loopholes created by the quick enactment of this bill and also mitigate the lack of consultation on this legislation. It is disappointing that the Minister has chosen not to take that any further and I do want to put that on the record.

The other point that I raised was the lack of requirement within the legislation, within the amendment bill, for the Minister for Space to consult directly with Ministers relevant to intelligence and security and the security agencies. The Minister has clarified in the committee stage that there is a requirement for the regulator to consult with the security agencies, and I accept that. However, I don’t see it necessarily written into legislation.

Finally, the point that I made in committee that I felt was not addressed adequately was the fact that this particular option—there were four options laid out—option three, which the Government has decided to proceed with, is what has led to this bill. I get that it’s a balance between the effectiveness of the design and the implementation regime versus it being cost-effective; I take that point. However, I have questioned the lack of resource that has been put in to ensuring the effectiveness of the implementation. The Minister has said it’s basically a movable feast. However, I don’t necessarily think that gives this side of the House a huge amount of comfort that it’s being resourced enough to be effective and protect our national security in that sense.

Those are the main issues that we have traversed and ultimately, though, on balance, given this is a bill that aims to protect our national security interests, I commend the bill to the House.

TIM COSTLEY (National—Ōtaki): I quote Rachel Brooking: “I’m asked … when was that … in the last Government? Well, the last Government didn’t do all of this all-stages urgency.” That is the direct quote. Let’s just get that right—

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): As it relates to this bill.

TIM COSTLEY: That’s not what she said, Madam Speaker, and I don’t think—

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): No, I’m saying to you—

TIM COSTLEY: Well, this relates to this bill because that was her—

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): I know. It’s been well—

TIM COSTLEY: —direct quote from this reading on this bill and that is what the debate has centred on. What I would like to centre it on—

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): Order! Mr Costley, what I’m saying to you is please relate your debate to this bill.

TIM COSTLEY: Yes, Madam Speaker—absolutely. This is a debate on this bill. My debating point is to counter two speakers in a row now, who have stood up and said that that quote was never made. It is in the Hansard. It would be outrageous if we couldn’t reference that.

Madam Speaker, this bill is actually something that we started out yesterday evening agreeing on, that there is a need here, for our national security, to act. We’ve got a Minister for Space that is acting quickly. We should move on, and I commend this bill to the House.

CUSHLA TANGAERE-MANUEL (Labour—Ikaroa-Rāwhiti): E te Māngai, ka tū atu awau ki te tautoko i tēnei pire mā te Pāti Reipa, arā te pire, Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill.

[Madam Speaker, I stand in support of this bill on behalf of the Labour Party—that is, the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill.]

I just want to commend that side of the House for having the wisdom to quote this side of the House—very smart. Hoi anō rā [However], in the committee stage, I raised a few points that had been reinforced—

Hon James Meager: What did “Chippy” say?

CUSHLA TANGAERE-MANUEL: You can just wait and listen, then you can quote me—you can quote me for some words of wisdom.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): I assure the member that I am listening.

CUSHLA TANGAERE-MANUEL: While we support this bill, some of the things that I raised during the committee stage must remain pertinent.

At a time when people are telling us that they need jobs, better healthcare, and homes, I know that it can be tempting to support initiatives for their economic development, but we must make sure that this remains about national security, which, in these trying times, is actually at the forefront of a lot of people’s minds who it may not have typically been.

While reference to Te Tiriti o Waitangi has been badgered this morning, it actually is very relevant. While I’ve said that we have learnt lessons from the establishment of Rocket Lab, the relationship with Rongomaiwahine, and while, of course, it’s pleasing to hear not only the educational support but the employment support that comes from such projects, we have to make sure that Te Tiriti is honoured and mana whenua are honoured, because while we’re talking about space—and, like I said, that debate will continue about kaitiakitanga and space—we are talking about ground-based science infrastructure. At the end of the day, whenua is for ever and kaitiakitanga is for ever. So these conversations must go beyond consultation.

In the committee stage, I also raised the fact that while there was consultation, it felt rushed. Even when consultation is done well, the relationship with landowners, iwi, hapū, and mana whenua must not end with consultation, otherwise it’s mere lip-service and it’s a mere tick-box exercise. This relationship must go beyond that to include the monitoring and the review of this bill.

At the moment, you’ve got to get authorisation from the Minister for Space, and this bill empowers the Minister to assess whether proposed activities meet the national interest. That’s quite a lot to put on an individual responsibility.

So, hei whakakopi, like I said, Rocket Lab is doing some great stuff but there are lessons to be learnt there about the involvement of mana whenua, because, like I said, whenua is for ever and kaitiakitanga is for ever, and that relationship needs to be from the start and enduring. So on behalf of the Labour Party, I commend this bill to the House.

Dr VANESSA WEENINK (National—Banks Peninsula): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise in support of the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill in its third reading.

I’m the MP for Banks Peninsula, where we have Tāwhaki based. That’s a wonderful partnership between the Crown and two of the local rūnanga. It’s a real exemplar of how the Crown and Māori can work together, and given that it is a site of advanced aviation and potential space industry, I commend this bill to the House.

Hon PHIL TWYFORD (Labour—Te Atatū): The concluding remarks, really, in this debate from me are just to observe that this bill is filling a gap in our regulatory framework. I noted earlier in these debates that many other like-minded countries have modernised their regulatory framework to properly keep an eye on, and control the use of, ground-based space infrastructure to protect national sovereignty and to protect their national interests, including other countries who have space programmes, and so it’s right that the regulatory framework that was largely developed from an economic development perspective to support the growth of the New Zealand space programme is improved in this way.

Notwithstanding all of the debate we’ve had over the last 24 hours on this bill, I think it is a no-brainer that we should be supporting it, because it is putting in place a mechanism that will allow this and future Governments to protect New Zealand’s national interest.

I’ve actually enjoyed the debate, notwithstanding the fact that urgency has meant that it’s been pretty challenging to tease out some of the detail and complexity—collectively, I think—to get our heads around the detail of the bill, but I think it hasn’t been too bad a discussion in spite of that. We remain, on the Labour benches here, disappointed that the Government has not supported Rachel Brooking’s tabled amendment that would have added a post-enactment review. We think that, on a matter of this importance with some granularity in terms of the processes and the systems in place, it would have been much better. Given that it’s been rushed through under urgency without any select committee scrutiny or expert or public submissions, it would have been a prudent thing to do to legislate that review. This House is very familiar with the defects and the flaws of law that is too rushed.

I’ve enjoyed the discussions that we’ve had around the national interest test and national security. I remain of the view that this regulatory framework would benefit from the additional principles that support the application of the national interest test in relation to the launch of payloads from New Zealand. Those principles spell out a much more precise definition of things that would prohibit certain payloads being put up. I think that when we consider the potential threats posed by ground-based space infrastructure, there are some parallels there, and I think that a much more precise definition of the national interest test would be good for New Zealand.

I thought one of the interesting things that came out of the debate, from my perspective, was what I call the Waihopai principle, where, actually, ground-based space infrastructure managed by the GCSB, our signals intelligence agency, over quite a long time in New Zealand was found to have been conducting mass surveillance on New Zealand’s friends and neighbouring countries with little to no public oversight or parliamentary scrutiny. We should learn from that episode in our history. In the modern era when much more advanced technology and much smaller kit is available to a range of private-sector operators, we should be vigilant that ground-based space infrastructure cannot be used for that purpose in New Zealand without proper scrutiny and oversight. My hope is that this legislation will enable this and future Governments to take that responsibility seriously.

Finally, I remain intrigued by the possibility that some future Government may regard the ground-based space infrastructure of some embassy in New Zealand to be conducting a regulated activity under this law and, therefore, exercise some oversight and control over that. Foreign embassies here, and all around the world, routinely use ground-based space infrastructure for the purposes of intercepting communications and carrying out intelligence-gathering activity and surveillance. That’s no secret, and, in general, Governments tend to turn a blind eye to that sort of activity. But the intent and the substance of this bill really asks us to consider whether or not we would consider that that sort of activity carried out in New Zealand for purposes that may or may not be consistent with our national interest should be properly regulated. I commend this bill to the House.

DANA KIRKPATRICK (National—East Coast): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I am pleased to rise and take this last and final call on the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill. We fully support the bill. We are pleased to see a regulatory framework for ground-based space interests. I’m not the MP for Māhia, but I am a frequent visitor. I am just next door, and my good friend and colleague Katie Nimon is the MP for that area. So on behalf of both of us, I commend the bill to the House.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Amendment Bill be now read a third time.

Ayes 117

New Zealand National 49; New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 5

Te Pāti Māori 5.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read a third time.

Bills

Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill

Second Reading

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister of Justice): I present a legislative statement on the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): That legislative statement is published under the authority of the House and can be found on the Parliament website.

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH: I move, That the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill be now read a second time.

This bill aligns New Zealand’s laws with the requirements of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Convention. The Budapest Convention is the first binding international treaty on cyber-crime, and it aligns members’ national laws relating to computer-related offences, improves investigative techniques, and streamlines evidence sharing. By acceding to this convention, we join almost 80 countries party to the convention who are committed to working together to tackle cyber-crime. This positions New Zealand to negotiate further agreements creating key infrastructure, and underpins international criminal justice cooperation.

Now, what does this mean for New Zealanders? Why do we care about all this? Well, obviously, the Government has a very clear target to reduce the number of victims of serious crime and to restore law and order more broadly. The broad area of fraud and cyber-crime has been growing significantly over time. The Ministry of Justice public perceptions reporting shows that 78 percent of New Zealanders are worried about this, as they should be. Over the past three months of 2024, for example, the National Cyber Security Centre reported that New Zealanders lost $6.8 million worth to cyber-crime; a 91 percent increase in 12 months—so it’s a big issue; it’s a real concern.

The purpose of this legislation is to enable us to be part of this Budapest Convention and to share more information more quickly, deal with evolving threats more quickly, and it helps us to be part of a coordinated international response to the broader issue.

The bill was reported back to the House from the Justice Committee. I want to thank the committee for their careful consideration of the bill. I want to thank the submitters who took their time to share their views.

From copyright infringements to computer-related fraud, violations of network security to child exploitation material, this bill will help safeguard New Zealanders from cyber-crime. It makes several important amendments. The bill amends the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 to introduce a new tool for law enforcement called a “preservation direction”. A preservation direction enables law enforcement agencies to require a person in a company to hold a specific document to preserve it for a specified period, protecting vulnerable evidence, such as digital records, from being deleted or destroyed. So that’s important. We’ve got new disclosure requirements. Further amendments to the Search and Surveillance Act create an offence for everyone affected by a preservation direction to disclose that the direction exists. Where police have a warrant to undertake surveillance, it will be an offence for anyone who assists them to carry out that warrant, to disclose its existence—that’s obviously important for successfully achieving that.

Then, we’re making an amendment to the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992, which governs the assistance we give to other countries in criminal investment investigations. The bill enables police to apply for production orders and surveillance device warrants in response to a request for assistance from a foreign country. That’s how we share our information.

Then, to safeguard human rights, all existing requirements in the Search and Surveillance Act and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act must be met before a production order or a surveillance device warrant can be issued for mutual assistance purposes. So those are very important protections, by allowing only a mutual assistance order or warrant to be issued by a High Court judge. Collectively, these amendments will enable New Zealand to accede to the Budapest Convention.

Now, the Justice Committee recommended some important changes to strengthen the policy of the bill. Two amendments to clause 37: ensuring the judge considers the public interest in both avoiding prejudice to proceedings as well as investigation, and ensuring the seized thing is not sent out of New Zealand before the person concerned has the opportunity to challenge. It also recommended clarifying section 10(1)(b) and (c) of the Telecommunications Interception Capability and Security Act 2013 to not require an internet service provider to obtain traffic data—that is, information identifying the nature of the telecommunication—if the telecommunication is not the internet service provider’s own product. So we welcome those amendments.

In conclusion, this is an important part of our effort to meaningfully cooperate with other nations in our fight against cyber-crime, and will ensure that our laws protect New Zealanders in the digital age, and will send a strong signal internationally of our commitment to combat cyber-crime while upholding a rules-based international order that protects fundamental human rights. On that basis, I commend this bill to the House.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): The question is that the motion be agreed to.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central): Kia ora. Thank you, Madam Speaker. Oh, the Minister’s approaching me across the—no, he’s not. The Labour Party supports this bill. This is a convention which was acceded to, I understand, in the last Labour Government. I do want to point out that these cross-border matters raise some quite difficult questions. When we get to committee stage, I do want to interrogate the Minister on New Zealand’s approach to this, because cyber-crime in particular is borderless, and the whole point of the Budapest Convention is to ensure that the response to cyber-crime is borderless, as well. That means ensuring that telecommunications—which is, in one form or another, pretty much the vehicle for cyber-crime—can essentially be searched and surveilled effectively. But we in New Zealand and in the common law world hold dear privacy and freedom from arbitrary search and seizure.

So here in this bill, we need to make sure that the framework on this, around these telecommunications, is robust and consistent both with the Budapest Convention but also with the things that we hold dear. The main innovation or new aspect in this legislation is, as the Minister said, the preservation direction. That is the direction that a telecommunications provider essentially hold and preserve information that might have content; it could be an email or a text message, something of that nature, or it could simply be traffic data—there were telephone calls that went in this direction, or there were encrypted messages between these two parties.

Now, again, there needs to be more than just an interest, and I think it’s important to recognise that not all countries have the same robustness in their criminal justice procedure as we do. Equally, not all countries have the kind of scrutiny about what ought to be criminalised as we do. There’s always a risk, particularly when we’re assisting foreign nations, that we are assisting them in doing things that we wouldn’t accept in New Zealand.

We have to be very careful when the authorities here—and the Attorney-General has an important role in this legislation—when those authorities are given, we need to have more than just a weather eye; we need to be vigilant that we are not being unwittingly used to further either political ends or to allow a foreign State to pursue a proceeding against something that might be a crime in a foreign nation, but it certainly isn’t a crime in New Zealand and shouldn’t be something for which criminal sanction follows.

So that’s what I mean when I say these cross-border matters raise really significant issues, because we do not want to be essentially assisting foreign States in oppressing others. The Minister mentioned the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, and if we look at the parties to that, that is to say those foreign States who we are required to assist, that includes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. We know that some of the things that are criminalised there are very much free speech here. So that’s this kind of thing. We certainly don’t want to be having surveillance orders and preservation directions in respect of messages which are simply political activities in New Zealand, so we need to be very careful about that. I think we also need to make sure that we’re not subjecting people who are innocent parties to inappropriate surveillance.

Of course, one of the things that this bill does, because aspects of it are quite technical, is it shows the pathways of communications. People might want to know, for whatever reason, where messages are routed and who has passed those on. So those kind of things need to be examined, as well. The legislation creates a raft of new offences which I think, again, any time an offence is created—they’re generally offences about non-cooperation or destruction of material—we need to make sure that they have the right settings; that a criminal offence shouldn’t exist unless there’s, particularly, an appropriate mens rea element.

A lot of these offences are organisational offences, because if you’re going to be seeking preservation directions from a telecommunications company, you’ve got to make sure the left hand knows what the right hand’s doing—and if some junior member of the organisation deletes files in a routine way, we’ve got to be cautious about imposing genuine criminal liability for that.

So there’s a whole lot of stuff in this legislation, but at the same time, the Budapest Convention is a convention which requires New Zealand to essentially take a cooperative attitude. I must say, one of the challenges in cross-border enforcement is timeliness. Whilst the timeliness aspects in the domestic setting in this legislation, you know, I think are pretty much OK, if you look at the length of time that orders can exist in respect of cross-border orders, it seems quite extraordinary. The length of time seems very long, and so information can be held in abeyance.

I guess the other thing that I’d point out and try to preface what I intend to raise in the committee stage, is the suggestion that there can be essentially secret seizures—that items can be seized, including communications, and sent to a foreign State, and the person who is affected doesn’t know. Now, “secret” and “justice” are two words that don’t usually go together. So I want to know—I will be wanting to know—exactly what the kind of threshold is for us sending secret evidence to foreign States, especially when we think about some of those foreign States that will be asking for it and their own record.

So there is actually a lot in this bill. To the uninitiated, it’s a very dry piece of legislation. But in fact, it touches on freedom from arbitrary search and seizure, it touches on open justice, and it touches on criminal offending. They’re all, actually, pretty important matters. It might not be as kind of headlining as some of the criminal justice material that comes before this House, but it is important. And to be honest, the Minister did make a good point when he said cyber-crime—crime which often is scams; is often depriving people of their hard-earned money—is serious criminal offending and it’s very hard to detect. We need to absolutely be pursuing those crimes, because they cause real harm. For the victims, it can cause extreme financial distress to lose tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars to scams and other cyber-crime.

And of course, hacking—the space bill we’ve just done, essentially underlying that is a hacking issue that, you know, the idea of blackmail by hacking is another massive issue. We need to be on top of that. It’s a massive security risk as well as a commercial risk.

So yes, we do support this bill, but I do think that, particularly as it’s being heard under urgency, a robust committee process will be important, and I look forward to that shortly.

KAHURANGI CARTER (Green): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I take this call on behalf of the Green Party to speak to the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. The Green Party have reviewed this bill carefully and in good faith throughout first reading and select committee stage. At the first reading, we supported it through to select committee, as this is the place where we sought to raise concerns with how this bill is currently drafted. It should be of the utmost importance to all MPs to make sure that our laws that we are creating are fit for purpose.

I want to be clear that the Greens are committed to the underlying kaupapa behind this bill and acknowledge that the implementation of the Budapest Convention was a recommendation of the royal commission of inquiry into those horrific 15 March attacks, where it was clear that our laws and our processes did not protect the people of Aotearoa. We are committed, across this House, to ensuring that those atrocious acts never happen again here in Aotearoa. Here in the submission from the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ) to the royal commission of inquiry into the attack on the Christchurch mosques, I just want to start by showing the 51 names of the people who lost their lives in that attack in my hometown of Christchurch. It is so important that we listen to the people that were most affected by those attacks. We all recognise the responsibility that we as a legislator have in ensuring that our policy settings in Aotearoa are safe and protect all of us.

The Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill amends two key pieces of legislation, the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992, to better equip our collective resistance against cyber-crime, because cyber-crime knows no bounds and no borders. Offenders can be located in one country, their victims in another, while the evidence is stored on a server in a third. The Budapest Convention, which this bill implements, provides a framework that allows countries to work together on criminal investigations. It covers critical cyber-crimes such as the deployment of virus software, fraud, the distribution of child exploitation material, and terrorism.

With that responsibility comes the responsibility to make sure that we are passing the best law possible that seeks to achieve the intent it says it will. At the first reading and throughout the select committee stage, we engaged constructively and worked across the House to raise concerns on some of the specific clauses and sections in this bill. However, as the bill has not subsequently addressed these concerns in its current form, we cannot at the Greens support this bill in good faith.

I want to be very clear that if these concerns are addressed in the committee of the whole House stage, which is coming up just after lunch, and our Amendment Papers are agreed to—Amendment Papers that we have created through consultation with our trusted stakeholders like FIANZ—then we will passionately support this bill. We have a responsibility to ensure that Aotearoa is safe for all of us.

The Greens remain concerned about the definition of “an offence”, specifically the use of terminology such as “improper conduct”, which remains unacceptably broad. This could leave interpretation open as to whether individuals or groups could be operating as part of a foreign power when engaging in non-violent protest or criticism of the state. The language used in this bill leaves open the possibility that an individual engaging in political protest, in solidarity with an international movement, could be swept into the scope of an offence. If we narrow this definition, it will make it much clearer that we will be sticking in line with the laws of Aotearoa New Zealand.

This bill does not make the distinction clear, and the Greens are committed to passing legislation that is fit for purpose and achieves the intent of keeping communities safe. Now, while we support the intent of this bill, which was to strengthen international cooperation on cyber-crime and protect victims, there are provisions that, as currently drafted, raise serious concerns and must be improved at the committee of the whole House stage, which I’m looking forward to getting into with my colleagues after the break.

Specific concerns are new section 88A(4), which could allow surveillance of political refugees simply because their country of origin is a treaty partner. This risks undermining human rights obligations—something that we don’t want to do in Aotearoa. Further, new sections like 88B and 88V in Subpart 1 of the bill, and new sections 20A and 43 in Subpart 2 of the bill, lack clear human rights and proportionality safeguards. We can put these safeguards into our legislation, and that is what the committee of the whole House stage is there for. Without these, New Zealand might be required to assist in investigations into conduct that isn’t even a crime here, or cooperate with countries that do not meet basic standards for a fair trial or privacy protections. Furthermore, the Greens remain concerned about the new offences introduced in Part 2 of the bill, particularly new sections 253 and 254. This is work we will continue to push for—and across the House—at the committee of the whole House stage.

I would also like to take this call to raise my disappointment in the consultation process of this bill. A big failing of this process was not hearing from FIANZ. I spoke with our trusted stakeholder, the Federation of Islamic Associations New Zealand, and their representative Atif, who expressed their concern around the lack of consultation, and they have provided a quote here: “Despite being the community most directly impacted by the March 15 terrorist attacks, the national umbrella body FIANZ was not consulted. The royal commission of inquiry clearly recommended that meaningful consultation with affected communities must be a core part of the Government process. With the release of the New Zealand National Security Strategy, it is essential that such consultation becomes standard practice, ensuring that communities are not only informed but actively involved in shaping the politics that affect them.”

So, on one hand, we are bringing in one of the recommendations of the royal commission of inquiry, but whilst ignoring another one, and we can do better than that. I urge the Government to actively consult with FIANZ moving forward to ensure the best possible outcome for this bill.

To conclude, the Green Party acknowledges the sobering context which led to the introduction of this legislation. The royal commission of inquiry into the March 15 terrorist attack made it clear that together we must strengthen our collective ability to prevent harm, particularly where online platforms are being used to spread extremist content and incite violence.

We must protect our sovereignty and our core values as Kiwis. We need to be careful that we are not upholding laws from other countries that do not even fit with our own laws. While we cannot support this bill in its current form, we are working to put forward constructive amendments to address these concerns. We continue to do so in good faith and in the hope that with the support across the House, this legislation can be strengthened to achieve the outcome we all want: a safer Aotearoa for everyone.

LAURA McCLURE (ACT): Thank you, Madam Speaker. I rise in support of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill, on behalf of the ACT Party. Firstly, I’d just like to acknowledge the previous speaker’s acknowledgment and recognition of the victims of the mosque terrorist attack. Also from Christchurch, I feel that really deeply, as do all the members of Parliament here in New Zealand, and I acknowledge that this was also a recommendation of that report, to ratify or to enact our agreement as part of the Budapest Convention.

I was actually in the EU—was it last week? Gosh, I can’t remember—a couple of weeks ago, with my colleague James Meager, who I believe sits on this committee, and I actually had some meetings with our counterparts around a lot of these kind of issues and where we could work together in order to make New Zealand and the world a safer place.

I share some of the same opinions as the Hon Dr Duncan Webb around privacy and around foreign States and how they may manipulate this legislation in order to harm individuals that are New Zealand citizens. I do share those concerns, but I think, on balance, we need to think about some of those countries and what they’re doing in the space of cyber-crime and how that does, in fact, cause foreign interference here in New Zealand. I think that in itself is one of the main reasons why we need to work together with other like-minded countries when it comes to these issues. We need to make sure that our sovereignty and our security is, in fact, protected. Being a tiny island nation at the bottom of the planet in a digital world, we need to make sure that we do have strong links and strong ties with other like-minded countries in order to tackle these really big issues. We don’t want to be left behind.

So I’m really keen to hear some of the points hashed out in the committee of the whole House stage because, like I said, the ACT Party does always consider the sovereignty and security of our residents here in New Zealand—our citizens—and we do take that really seriously, but I do commend this bill to the House.

ANDY FOSTER (NZ First): Thank you, Madam Speaker. It seems a very appropriate time, given the two previous pieces of legislation we’ve considered—this Budapest Convention is our ratification of an international treaty, in effect. That’s, essentially, exactly what we were doing yesterday in ratifying the UAE trade agreement. So we are showing ourselves as a responsible partner—in that case it was a one-to-one; in this case, it’s a multilateral arrangement—as a responsible part of the global community.

The other piece of legislation, of course, which we just considered was the one relating to outer space. Why is that relevant? That’s an area which is changing very, very fast. So is the area of cyber-crime, and so this is about us responding to a fast-changing situation, as well. We talked, in those discussions, about being a responsible global citizen. That’s true here, too. What this legislation is all about—what the convention is all about—is encouraging and allowing for a cooperation between what we’ve heard is over 40 nations to combat cyber-crime, which is obviously something which we experience ourselves here directly. I mean, even this Parliament has been under attack in terms of cyber activity, and so we are well aware of that.

The legislative statement, interestingly, says that it ensures that New Zealand’s legislation fully aligns with the requirements of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (the Budapest Convention). But it’s interesting that the Justice Committee actually says that there are a number of areas where legislation in New Zealand needs to be tweaked to ensure that we do actually fully comply. So there’s a slight discrepancy there in terms of the language that is being used. It’s all about preservation of documents—so if the document is suspected as being something related to cyber-crime, it requires that preservation, that prevents disclosure of that. So there are some very useful initiatives which are being taken there.

I did hear the concern about some of the broad definitions. I guess one of the things that I would say is—and I’m asking questions of the Minister about whether this is the same language that other countries which are signatories to this convention are also using. I note, also, that there are a number of reservations that would not apply to New Zealand: the reservation about the range of offences—so they are more severe offences, more significant offences, rather than relatively minor ones; and the second reservation that would limit New Zealand’s ability to prosecute New Zealanders who commit cyber-crimes outside New Zealand to only those most serious and severe offences, such as terrorism and human trafficking.

I look forward to the ongoing discussion about this. But this is about us being a responsible player in the global environment in the area of cyber-crime. I commend the bill to the House.

Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you. Madam Speaker, I rise on behalf of the Green Party to speak on the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. Now, as the previous speaker has already mentioned, this particular legislation does amend two key pieces of legislation: the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992. Also, there are different elements of the Crimes Act in there, as well.

This is something that is addressing an issue that we’re currently seeing manifesting in a greater capacity due to the prevalence of online presences, in general, in our daily lives. One of the other things that is also really important, as a result of this legislation, is that it does come on the back of the recommendation from the royal commission of inquiry into the 15 March attack. I want to really acknowledge my colleague Kahurangi Carter who, in her speech, talked about the way that we have supported this in the first reading. It has gone through the select committee in good faith in order to try and get an outcome that both addresses the concerns but also doesn’t diminish the rights of people here in Aotearoa New Zealand. Unfortunately, during the select committee stage, we haven’t really got to that stage, so the Green Party cannot support this bill in its current form in the second reading. But, of course, if the Minister is open to conversations and discussions and amendments in the committee stage, we may revisit our position in the third reading.

Just in terms of the process itself, we have heard from a range of submissions around this particular bill during the select committee stage, but I think it is important to, again, highlight the fact that while this bill was a recommendation of the royal commission of inquiry into the 15 March attack, one of the most affected communities as a result of that attack was not consulted as part of this—we heard that loud and clear from the Federation of the Islamic Associations of New Zealand, FIANZ, in their submission—which is disappointing because it is something that we were hoping would strengthen our domestic legislation and make our people safer. But there are certain parts of this bill that do fall short of that.

I think the other really important thing, as we’re looking at it from a New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (BORA) perspective, is the way that this legislation that provides the ability for people to conduct search and seizure, and also investigation, does touch on a number of New Zealand Bill of Rights Act concerns, specifically things like clauses 14, 15, 17, and 21—anything from freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of association in terms of religion and also thoughts and thinking, and also the conditions around unreasonable search and seizure. The reason that this bill touches on a lot of these particular areas and has drawn BORA concerns from the Green Party is the ability for us to investigate or even survey people here in Aotearoa who are captured and who are protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act on the basis that our treaty partners, potentially, would consider these people to be a threat without us, at least from a legislation perspective, going into the detail of whether those requests from our international treaty partners are in line with our domestic value and the value that we hold really close to our hearts in Aotearoa New Zealand—and that’s particularly from the perspective of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, as I have mentioned.

There are specific concerns that we have seen, and I think the consistency report that we do see against BORA doesn’t quite go far enough to unpack the severity of this. Finally, I want to say that one of the things we’re also going to be looking into a lot more as a result during the committee of the whole House stage is the Amendment Paper that the Minister has also released, which wasn’t seen during the select committee stage. We look forward to that in the committee stage, as well.

TOM RUTHERFORD (National—Bay of Plenty): Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. It gives me great pleasure to rise in support of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. To our friend from Te Pāti Māori—who has turned up to give a contribution, which is great—I want to clarify for him that this bill fully aligns with the requirements of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, hence why it is known as the “Budapest Convention”, which is quite useful and quite good to clarify for members across the House. I know others will have substantive contributions on the material involved with this legislation. I commend it to the House.

Hon GINNY ANDERSEN (Labour): Thank you very much, Mr Speaker, for an opportunity to take a call on this bill. The Budapest Convention is designed to update New Zealand’s legal framework to combat cyber-crime more effectively. It paves the way for New Zealand to be able to join the Budapest Convention, and it also enhances our international cooperation in this space. Can I just highlight how important it is, particularly in cyber-crime, to have those international connections when we know that cyber-crime criminals, those operating in this space, specifically work to exploit where there are gaps between countries and to exploit those gaps for their own financial and personal gain. So the more that we can join up and have a network of agreed rules and how we cooperate with each other—it reduces the opportunities for those cyber-criminals to be able to carry out their work.

This bill introduces new tools to be able to do that work, new tools for law enforcement such as limited data preservation orders—sounds long, but we’ll talk about that later; big fan of limited data preservation orders. This helps to secure digital evidence—really critical to trace who is doing the crime on the internet and, also, how we try and hold those individuals accountable. That is an incredibly difficult thing to do in cyber-crime.

This also improves the mechanisms for accessing electronic data and cooperating with other countries on cyber-crime investigations. That’s an important note to make. I think it’s important for anyone who’s been a victim of cyber-crime, who understands the different forms it can come in—whether it be phishing scams that we’re all trained here in Parliament not to click on the links; ransomware attacks; identity thefts; financial fraud that’s online; and also hacking into computers—we are all familiar with those and how cyber-crime operates.

But it is interesting that in New Zealand, what I often hear in terms of electorate inquiries is that if someone has been a victim of identity theft or someone has been a victim of cyber-crime, it does appear that the threshold for law enforcement action is a lot higher than it would be if it happened in real life. So if shoplifting—we know that under $500 under National is not investigated by police, but say it’s over $500—is over $500 and you get someone turning up to investigate that crime, whether it’s been shoplifting or a burglary, that threshold for cyber-crime does appear to be quite a bit higher. So when you have someone who’s been a victim of a scam and they may have lost $10,000, they’re often directed to simply go through their bank or go through other channels as opposed to trying to actually have a proper investigation on that.

It doesn’t seem right that we have different thresholds for the fact that things happen online as opposed to in real life, because what that does is that sends a green light to criminals who operate in this space that if you’re wanting to take people’s money, then you’re less able to be held accountable online than in real life. That is why having these agreements in place but also backing up these agreements with the appropriate resource so we have a specific unit that is able to investigate and hold criminals accountable for cyber-crime, whether they are based in New Zealand or whether we are cooperating with our international counterparts—we want to be able to share that information and hold people accountable, because the tighter the net is around these areas, it reduces the chances of people being scammed and losing their savings, particularly for those who are new to using the internet.

I think of people in my parents’ demographic, where they’ve clicked on links and had themselves exposed to ongoing text messages or ongoing scams to try and extract money. It can be really stressful for people who’ve retired, who’ve got their fixed income, who have their retirement savings. They are targeted often through operations such as this.

What this bill does, in fact, is it amends the Search and Surveillance Act, which was passed back in 2012, and it also amends the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act. The primary change to the Search and Surveillance Act introduces preservation directions in support of domestic criminal investigations and also overseas criminal investigations and proceedings. It establishes an agreed network of cooperation to minimise the opportunities for criminals to use online tools to extract money and to extract threats from people.

This bill enables the Commissioner of Police here in New Zealand to issue a preservation direction requiring documents—and that includes computer data, it’s important to note—to be preserved where there are grounds to believe that documents are particularly vulnerable to loss or modification. A preservation direction is an interim measure, and that interim measure ensures that the evidence—in the form of documents—is preserved before a production order is sought requiring those documents to be produced. It’s essentially an evidence-gathering tool that can be used not only to trace who is doing the offending but also to hold them accountable from where they’re operating from. If those actions are taken earlier on, then it shuts down that operative from preying upon more and more individuals, whether they be here in New Zealand or in other countries across the world.

This bill also requires a person who is subject to a preservation direction or assisting in executing a surveillance device warrant—such as, for example, a telecommunications provider—to keep the existence of the direction or warrant confidential for a period of time to avoid prejudice in a criminal investigation. We know from the select committee process and from hearing some excellent evidence and information provided from telecommunications providers that there were some concerns about how long they would have to hang on to large amounts of data. And so we talked through all of those issues in detail to be able to understand how we can make sure that the telecommunications providers are still able to operate effectively, but, at the same time, they are also doing their bit to enable that data capture to occur when required.

As mentioned, this bill also amends the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to enable production orders and surveillance device warrants to be applied for in support of international criminal investigations and proceedings. This is about New Zealand doing its part, because we do know that those cyber-criminals are operating in big-scale scams right across the world. So if we are participating alongside other nation States, then that reduces those opportunities for them to take advantage of people and their savings. There are appropriate oversights to ensure that human rights are upheld, and this ensures that the full suite of investigatory tools are available in New Zealand, where appropriate, to be able to support those international criminal investigations and proceedings.

Labour supports this bill because we support the Budapest Convention in order to try and fight cyber-crime. We believe that we have a clear role in taking up our part in a global fight to increase cyber-security capabilities and international cooperation. This bill builds on Labour’s previous efforts to join the Budapest Convention, and it also implements the recommendation from the royal commission of inquiry into the Christchurch terror attack. It also has the benefit of modernising New Zealand’s legal framework to effectively combat cyber-crime, and that is important. It maintains a balance with privacy and human rights protections while also ensuring we increase our cooperation and ability to get on top of cyber-crime.

The legislation strengthens our law enforcement tools, improves international cooperation, and demonstrates our dedication in Labour to have public safety in the digital age—so incredibly important. By joining the Budapest Convention, we aim to position New Zealand as a responsible global actor in addressing cyber-threats. And we know that this crime area is growing; this is an area where there’s more crime happening. Not only do we need to make sure that we’re signing up and participating, but also in making sure our law enforcement agencies here in New Zealand are adequately resourced so that we can take our part on the world stage to reduce cyber-crime.

PAULO GARCIA (National—New Lynn): Thank you, Mr Speaker, for the opportunity to speak to the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. The Budapest Convention is the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime. With cyber-crime posing a serious and significant threat to the public, and because our international partners are mostly already signed up as parties to the convention, and because we take cyber-crime seriously, we support the bill and the cross-border mutual cooperation to enforcement that it enables. I commend this bill to the House.

REUBEN DAVIDSON (Labour—Christchurch East): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I stand to take a call on the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill, which Labour continues to support. We signed up to the Budapest Convention, so it’s good to see that this important work continues.

A number of speakers have already discussed the borderless nature of cyber-crime, and that’s what can make it so difficult to detect and to prosecute offenders unless we have an appropriate level of international cooperation. That’s what the Budapest Convention sets out to achieve. When these offences are committed online, you can have an offender in one jurisdiction, the victim in another, and the evidence of the offence being held in a server in a third country or territory. It can be very difficult, with various countries’ legislation, to join all of that together to be able to track down and, ultimately, apprehend and prevent further cyber-crime from happening.

Cyber-crime can take many forms, and I think it’s worth taking a moment, as we step through this legislation that we all agree on, to look at a particular example of some fairly abhorrent cyber-crime that has happened here in Aotearoa New Zealand, where a Taranaki grandmother has lost close to a quarter of a million dollars to an AI deepfake that featured Prime Minister Christopher Luxon—an online, manipulated video purporting to be a message from the Prime Minister. As a result, this person has lost a quarter of million dollars online into cryptocurrency.

The way that this happened was that a video advertisement appeared; the person listened to the message, apparently from the Prime Minister, and started to engage with what they thought was an investment advisor online. Over a series of weeks, $20,000 each time was taken out of term deposits that were, in fact, the victim’s inheritance. A lot of the funds were also earmarked for the victim’s grandchildren. No one can afford to lose a quarter of a million dollars, but this was someone for whom that was essentially their life savings, and, over a series of days, the funds were drained and transferred, converted into cryptocurrency in a foreign account, and then bounced away out of reach of the New Zealand-based victim.

Potentially the worst part of this, because the scammer was able to access this person’s online banking and watch and manipulate her actions—the last words that the scammer ever said on the phone while speaking to the victim was an aside to someone else in the scam centre they were operating from. They simply said, “This woman has no money.”—“This woman has no money.” That scammer had literally drained all of the funds out of that victim’s account and only stopped when there wasn’t a single dollar left for them to take. That’s why legislation like this is so important to be able to track down people operating from other territories that do those kinds of attacks.

There was an interesting comment—because the Prime Minister, rightfully, was questioned about this and said that he would never endorse a particular investment, and the best way for people to protect themselves was to be vigilant and aware of risks. To a point, absolutely, that’s true, but, also, legislation like this helps to protect people and helps to provide international cooperation around enforcement.

On that note from the Prime Minister, that very sage advice where he says the best way for people to protect themselves is to be vigilant and aware of the risks—that comes with any scam. If, for example, 21,000 people are promised that they will be eligible for FamilyBoost and only 153 are actually delivered the funds that were promised, then that, potentially, could fall into a scam, as well, and, in my opinion, should be a risk that all New Zealanders need to be aware of. Whether it’s a deepfake or a shallow fake, a promise that’s not delivered and a promise that’s broken is shameful. But I do commend this bill to the House.

DAN BIDOIS (National—Northcote): I’m glad we can all agree that rising cyber-crime is of great concern for New Zealanders. That’s why we’re here in the House today supporting the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. This legislation improves cross-border investigations and prosecutions related to cyber-crime, all while upholding human rights and, particularly, the right to be free from unequal search and surveillance. It’s all a part of our plan to restore law and order and to restore real consequences for crime. I commend this bill to the House.

VANUSHI WALTERS (Labour): Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise in support of this bill. As the House has gone a little bit quiet, I thought I’d speak about urgency for a little bit, because we are still an urgency—we are still in urgency. I was just wanting to make a brief point and then extend—I was going to say, “extend a fig leaf”, but no—an olive branch to the other side, because I do think the issue of urgency is an important one for the House to think about when we use it.

I did obtain some research from the Parliamentary Library on the hours that the House has been in urgency this term compared to last term. In the 53rd Parliament, the House was in urgency for 15.7 percent of those total hours. For this Parliament, up until 9 May, the House was in urgency for 22.6 percent of the total hours. There absolutely has been an increase in terms of hours, but I also do think, particularly for my National Party colleagues, that it does a disservice to the people of New Zealand when we point fingers at each other, both ways.

In truth, there is a sense that urgency is being used more often than it should be, and there is an opportunity, as the Standing Orders Committee considers the Standing Orders, to think about the parameters under which urgency should be used. You will not find an objection, in terms of my Labour Party colleagues and I, that there are good reasons for using urgency. The question is simply when it should be used and how legislation that has gone through the House under urgency should be reviewed. I did speak earlier about other countries who’ve adopted various measures, including post-legislative scrutiny; including sunset clauses, as well. I do hope that members opposite will take that on board as we head into a period of reviewing the Standing Orders.

I do rise in support of this bill. As my colleagues have pointed to across the House, cyber-crime is absolutely an issue for New Zealand, and it’s an increasing issue. The Ministry of Justice’s Crime and Victims Survey 2019 showed that over 320,000 people experienced one or more incidents of fraud or cyber-crime in the 12 months preceding the survey. But as my colleague Ginny Andersen also pointed out, there is an issue in terms of policing this and monitoring it and ensuring that people get a response. I do think this legislation is important, but I also do think we need to think about how we give it effect.

Interestingly, this isn’t the only international convention in existence, in relation to cyber-crime. There is the Budapest Convention; there is also a draft UN cyber-crime convention—and I think, in the international space, sometimes there’s confusion between the two. I wanted to briefly just set out the differences between the UN draft convention and the Budapest Convention, because I think it points clearly to why New Zealand is using the Budapest Convention as the model under which we’re developing legislation.

The UN convention, firstly, is broader in scope. It goes far beyond what would be considered cyber-dependent crimes. The UN convention also creates new offences that aren’t in the Budapest Convention, so it’s far broader. It has also expanded jurisdiction, and what was interesting when the UN convention was being negotiated was that there were countries, like Russia and China, who wanted to include what are called “content” offences. This is where you might find freedom of speech significantly limited, and that was absolutely the intention: to reach into quite a different space in terms of monitoring what, potentially, their citizens were saying overseas, as well as others.

The UN convention also has fewer human rights safeguards, and that, alongside these extensive criminal definitions, I think, is problematic—and certainly a lack of safeguards in terms of procedural requirements, which members have spoken about today, in terms of the person who is accused. While I do think that the Budapest Convention is a better model for us to develop legislation, we do also still need to be careful that we’re managing the fine balance of preventing global cyber-crime while also protecting the rule of law and, certainly, rights against unlawful search and seizure.

I did want to speak to a couple of aspects in this regard. Firstly, in relation to the requirement that requires a person subject to a preservation direction to keep the existence of the order confidential—keeping this confidential from the individual who is accused, if you like—not only do we have the protections and legislation; I think often, in the House, we forget that we also have principles of common law that apply in this case. The duty of candour is essential in our law, and, essentially, it provides that, where there are adversarial proceedings, ordinarily you will have a right of response if you’re accused of something. For obvious reasons, when it comes to a search warrant or it comes to situations like this, you may not want to, for obvious reasons—the information may be destroyed—so you may not be able to provide that information to the individual.

The duty of candour, in my view, still applies. You would still have a circumstance where the application for a preservation order would need to consider any potential objections that could be made before it is granted. While I couldn’t find case law precisely on this point, there is case law in terms of search and seizure, or certainly search, where the individual isn’t notified before a search is conducted. The case of Hager v Attorney-General is looked to fairly frequently in this regard. It says that that obligation must be satisfied. You have to look at how the individual might object.

The other issue is, of course, what happens when information is seized and then sent out of the country. This is an issue that the select committee raised, in terms of amending clause 37. The bill now includes a requirement that people affected by search are notified before seized material is sent out of the country. This is, essentially, so they can potentially bring a judicial review claim should they wish to prevent that information going out of the country. Interestingly, this was a point that also came out of case law in the Dotcom v Attorney-General case.

The reason this is important is something that my colleague the Hon Dr Duncan Webb pointed to, which is that there is misuse—or there can be; there’s potential to be misuse—in terms of requiring that information is sent overseas. Part of the misuse is due to a lack of dual criminality—if there are criminal offences that exist in a foreign country that simply don’t exist in New Zealand—and, sadly, around the world we’re seeing more of what’s called “transnational repression”. This is Governments who are actively looking to target often their own citizens and prevent them from speaking out against human rights violations. Certainly, the likes of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have commented on this very frequently.

We need to be extremely cautious that we’re not aiding that, in terms of potentially extraditing individuals—or even, without extraditing them, putting them in harm’s way because they have family members in a home country and evidence would be supplied by New Zealand to show that they were a dissident in some way that was considered illegal in their home country. Certainly there are many examples of that happening, even in terms of foreign nationals who are in the US. There were some fairly famous cases in the early 2000s of attempted kidnappings of Iranian nationals who were human rights activists. Now, of course, we haven’t seen that happen here, but what’s interesting is that, before those kidnappings happened, there were other measures that those Governments took to try and stifle their free speech.

I am supportive of this bill, but I do think it’s a very careful line that we have to walk. It’s a piece of legislation that I do hope we will rigorously examine, in terms of the committee stage, which I look forward to doing. Kia ora.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Teanau Tuiono): Before I take the next call, what I will do is take the National Party call and then I will come to the Te Pāti Māori call.

Dr VANESSA WEENINK (National—Banks Peninsula): Thank you, Mr Speaker. It’s a pleasure to rise in support of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. This is a sensible piece of legislation. We’ve well discussed it throughout the House today; many really excellent points about the requirement to make online activity a lot safer and to tighten things up. I commend the bill to the House.

MARIAMENO KAPA-KINGI (Te Pāti Māori—Te Tai Tokerau): Mōrena. Tēnā koe, Mr Speaker. Tēnā tātou e te Whare. Exactly like my colleague on the right, I would repeat comments made this morning that unless the House recognises, appreciates, and completely embeds in any of our debates in this House and into legislation Te Tiriti o Waitangi—unless that occurs in a genuine and real way, we’re screwed. So here we go.

Just to say it is obviously easier to go from a “no” to a “yes”. We can’t support this, because it doesn’t quite have enough in it, from our point of view and from our experience, for us to support it going forward. Any international treaty on security must come with firm assurances. This is especially important when our own Government refuses to uphold Te Tiriti o Waitangi, our founding document. So when we discuss cyber-security, our security more broadly, we need to understand it through more than the Western lens or the comfortable and privileged lens. What security means to Māori may look very different, and it absolutely does. For us as Māori, security must include direction from Te Tiriti o Waitangi, particularly in the protection of Māori data sovereignty. And within the context of this bill, security must also protect us from Government overreach that disproportionately harms our communities.

Very recent history—let me recall it—when security powers are misused: the Government-sanctioned raids on Tūhoe, where false accusations of conspiracy led to a deeply harmful and unjust operation on one of the most recent large-scale examples of this behaviour. That poorly managed Government-sanctioned response costs lives. We cannot afford to open that door to that kind of behaviour again. Yet we need only fast forward to the absolute tragedy of the Christchurch mosque attacks. Where was the security for this community? A deeper look into the prevention failures from Government revealed that resources had been misallocated, driven by bias and prejudice against our Muslim communities. Once again, lives were lost.

This bill risks continuing that pattern by expanding surveillance and international data-sharing powers without explicit safeguards for Māori rights. That speaks directly to the issue of Māori data sovereignty. Our data and our information should be just that: ours. What this treaty risks is the ability for our people to exercise mana motuhake over our data. This is critical to the success of Māori self-determination for whānau, hapū, and iwi Māori businesses. Unlocking economic and social potential is enabled by Māori data collection and analysis. Māori must own Māori data, Māori future, Māori mokopuna, Māori whenua.

We do recognise here that there are some upsides to this bill but, like I started off, it’s easier to go from a “no” to a “yes” than a “yes” to a “no”. We’re still in the “no” lane. We acknowledge the kōrero that other members of the House have provided, but our role here has been and will always be to advocate for mokopuna Māori, for whānau Māori. Nō reira i runga i tēnā [And so, on that], just to again remind us that unless the House fully recognises—to my left and to my right—that Te Tiriti o Waitangi is and always for be our founding document. And just to encourage the House: please read some more. That would be really helpful. I think just filling that gap of knowledge, like my colleague on my right said very early in one of his first calls in this House, there’s such a huge gap of knowledge. So I’d encourage you please read some more. Kia ora tātou.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): This bill is set down for committee stage immediately. I declare the House in committee for consideration of the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill.

In Committee

Part 1 Amendments relating to investigatory tools

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Members, the House is in committee on the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill. We come first to the debate on Part 1. Part 1 is the debate on clauses 3 to 53, “Amendments relating to investigatory tools”, and Schedules 1 and 2. The question is that Part 1 stand part.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central): Thank you, Mr Chair. I’d just like to preface the remarks, because, obviously, this a pretty technical and detailed bill, and sometimes I think we kind of can fail to see the forest for the trees, or fail to see the water for the stormy seas, as they say—and I do want to first say that, yes, we absolutely support this bill. But I want to note the overarching concerns, which are twofold. One is to identify that this is an exercise of State power against citizens, and we want to make it clear and put on the record exactly where that balance is struck. The second part or theme that my comments and questions will identify is the difficult tension in the New Zealand State in exercising its powers against citizens assisting foreign States, and particularly in assisting—I’m going to be frank about this—repressive foreign States, those foreign States who don’t have the same human rights values as we do.

From that, I’m not going to dilly-dally, but I’m going to get straight into it, and a lot of what I’m going to do is simply to invite the Minister to expand and explain to the public, for the record, what it’s all about. At the centre of this, one of the keystones of this legislation is preservation directions. So whilst we’ve already got production orders—that is to say, telecommunication providers can be ordered to go and find and present the particular information—this preliminary step is seen as important to make sure that whilst those production orders are being sorted out, no one goes around hitting the delete button, in short.

The first thing I want to ask about is on page 14 of the bill as reported back, and I’ll just talk about the new sections. New section 79A in clause 18 talks about “enforcement agency”, and I do think it’s quite important to understand what that means in terms of who has these powers. In terms of the mutual assistance provisions, it appears to be the police, and I’ll be interested in the Minister’s comments on whether an enforcement agency simply means the police and, obviously, things like Crown Law when they’re taking advice and so on, or whether it will extend to other enforcement agencies—like, a classic one would be the Customs Service—or, in fact, whether it could go broader than that, because, certainly, if we were to say that it was prosecuting agencies, there’s a plethora of prosecuting agencies in New Zealand.

That’s my first question and that’s actually a question of clarification, and then my second question is kind of an invitation to explain, because the very next definition talks about “pathway information”, because we know telecommunications data can be routed through numerous servers and so on. I’m asking this genuinely because I don’t quite understand it: why is pathway information important in a criminal investigation? I can understand why the sender and recipient information is important, but I’d be curious to understand why we’d need to know that it was routed through—or “rowted”, if you say it that way—this server or that server, and so on and so forth, particularly if we know that the telecommunications provider holds the relevant data, and they’d have the text message, or whatever it might be.

I’m going to just keep cracking on because this is a bill we agree with and I’m not going to hold things up, and so I’m going to squeeze another question in, as well. It’s around new section 79B in clause 18, which is entitled “Enforcement officer may apply for preservation direction”. It’s about the threshold, because it says that the enforcement officer can apply for it if that officer “is satisfied that conditions in section 79E for making a direction against that person are met.” Whenever you’re exercising search and surveillance powers, it’s all about suspicions and about the reasonableness of those suspicions—you know, reasonable grounds to suspect, reasonable grounds to believe, and those kinds of thresholds. You don’t often see a kind of very subjective test that the enforcement officer “is satisfied”. So I’ve managed to squeeze in three queries in there, and I will do a bit more later.

KAHURANGI CARTER (Green): Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m just looking here at Part 3 of the legislation, under “Subpart 1—Interpretation”, at new section 88A—and that’s actually on page 28 of the bill as it stands; I want to explore the rationale and ask the Minister to explain the reason for using certain definitions in the clause 88A(4), particularly regarding—

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Could you just give us that page number again?

KAHURANGI CARTER: Sure. It’s on page 28—thank you—and it’s section 88A(4) in new Part 3A, under Subpart 1. This definition is regarding offences of “political character”. I’m wanting to explore that, and I would love the Minister to engage with my question around why the standard political offence safeguard appears to be narrower than in comparable legislation. Is there a reason for that?

I think it’s really important that when we are looking at bringing in a law that potentially opens us up to laws that don’t belong to New Zealand but that belong to other countries, but through this convention we would have to uphold them because of certain treaties we have with other countries. I think that us, as a country, and the everyday people out there really want to know that we’re not doing anything that goes against our national identity, but would want to ensure that our citizens are not being asked to uphold laws that don’t belong to us and that do not represent who we are as New Zealanders and our country of Aotearoa.

I guess that takes me into the next part. Just in this same section in new Part 3A, can the Minister clarify whether the term “serious offence” in section 88(1) is subject to any threshold test? We’d really want to make sure that any proportionality or dual criminality under New Zealand law is actually met, so we’re looking at whether that “serious offence” has been tested against what we in New Zealand deem as a criminal offence in New Zealand. I’m just really going back to that core concern that we have heard from trusted stakeholders like the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand, and I’m asking the Minister if you could please explain whether there are any safeguards in place to ensure that preservation directions are not guaranteed in relation to offences that would not be recognised as criminal in New Zealand. We just really want to make sure that in New Zealand, we are a place where we’re living by our laws, and we’re not importing laws that don’t belong to us and aren’t fit for purpose here in Aotearoa.

Just one more question on section 88A in new Part 3A, in clause 19: can the Minister explain the basis for new section 88A(4)(b), and how bilateral agreements are assessed to ensure they are consistent with New Zealand’s human rights obligations? We have our New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, which we commonly call BORA, and we have our Auditor-General, who audits and measures the things that we do here as a Government—our Government actions and our legislation—to uphold our laws and our citizens’ human rights, so we just want to make sure that that is being done here, in this law. So I ask if the Minister can explain how the bilateral agreements are assessed to ensure that they are consistent with New Zealand’s human rights obligations.

MARIAMENO KAPA-KINGI (Te Pāti Māori—Te Tai Tokerau): Mōrena, Minister. My questions in relation to this bill are centred on Māori data sovereignty, and you might have picked that up in my speech. I’m keen to just question why the Minister has not considered including provisions that would safeguard our people.

Māori have the right to control their own data—that might be a clue in there. Crown agencies could or should consult with Māori, including iwi authorities or relevant stakeholders. There should be an establishment of a Māori advisory panel to monitor how preservation directions and data sharing are used where Māori and Māori data are involved.

There should also be—if I might mention this before my question, which is coming—a cultural impact statement when sharing evidence internationally that involves Māori individuals, organisations, iwi authorities, and culturally sensitive information. This will protect against the misuse of Māori data, particularly in international contexts where tikanga Māori is not understood.

So, Minister, I’m looking at clause 4, which amends section 3(1) and inserts the definition of “surveillance power”. This clause updates the definitions in the Act to include new terms like “surveillance power” and “traffic data”, and states the relevant agencies involved in intelligence and enforcement, which is an oxymoron, sometimes, in this country—I’m just saying. Can the Minister confirm why, in clause 4, the definition of “surveillance power” does not include criteria that would safeguard Māori from disproportionate levels of surveillance or discrimination, especially in the context of the Tūhoe raids, which happened only a little while ago?

Speaking to the same section, Minister, I note there’s no reference to Māori data considerations in the definition of “traffic data” as it has been drawn from section 3AB of the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013. However, I would question whether the Minister considers inserting provisions here to state and define Māori data or culturally sensitive data so that it better protects Māori interests. If he does not agree, I would ask the Minister to explain the reasons for that—this is us trying to get from the “no” lane to the “yes” lane, Minister. Kia ora.

VANUSHI WALTERS (Labour): Thank you, Mr Chair. Like my colleague Dr Duncan Webb, I just have some questions in relation to the restraint of power, because, obviously, these are considerable powers in terms of search and seizure, and, certainly, in terms of the preservation of documents, which to my mind triggers privacy issues. I’m just looking at clauses to see whether they’ve been drawn down or reasonably limited to ensure that we are walking that line.

I’m looking on page 12 at clause 10, which inserts new section 64A. This one is about the destruction of information that is found as part of that surveillance warrant process, and it says that “(2) The person must ensure that, as soon as is reasonably practicable after the warrant expires, that record—(a) is destroyed; or (b) is given to the law enforcement agency”. The first question is around whether there was consideration that that language should be restricted, as it’s very hard to determine what “reasonably practicable” may be in relation to.

The second question is in relation to clause 12, which inserts new section 71(2)(i), which says, “if the documents are sought to be produced on an ongoing basis, the facts relied on to show reasonable grounds to believe that those documents—(i) are in the possession or under the control of the person against whom the order is sought;”. There are two questions. The first is that if this is referring to documents that are produced on an ongoing basis, was there consideration of slicing that up to ask for a production order for each of those documents, as opposed to the set of documents, and the second is about the definition of “under the control of the person against whom the order is sought; or (ii) will come into that person’s possession or under their control”? Again, there’s no restriction in terms of timing there, but it stretches out to a document that will at some stage come into their position or under their control. All of that language is extremely broad. I have a question about whether there was consideration of bringing that down, as well.

In terms of new Subpart 2A, this is the start of the preservation directions section. I was first wondering about comparability of definitions across borders with countries of like jurisdiction whom we would be communicating with and whether the preservation order provisions are the same—that’s the general question.

The specific question is around an issue raised by the Privacy Commissioner, which is the fact that the Commissioner of Police is able to issue those preservation orders, and the Privacy Commissioner considered that to be quite unusual. The proposal from the Privacy Commissioner was that that’s the type of order that ought to require judicial oversight, and, certainly, that would be the more responsible thing to do, given the nature of the power, where someone is having information collected and held about them without knowing that that’s the case. So I’m asking whether there was consideration of just drawing that down and asking how that compares internationally. Thank you.

DANA KIRKPATRICK (National—East Coast): I move, That the committee report progress.

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Leave is sought for that purpose. Is there any objection? There is objection. [Interruption] Could you repeat your contribution?

DANA KIRKPATRICK (National—East Coast): I move, That the committee report progress.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the committee report progress.

Ayes 102

New Zealand National 49; New Zealand Labour 34; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 20

Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 5.

Motion agreed to.

Progress to be reported.

House resumed.

CHAIRPERSON (Teanau Tuiono): Madam Speaker, the committee has considered the Budapest Convention and Related Matters Legislation Amendment Bill and reports that it has made progress on the bill. I move, That the report be adopted.

Motion agreed to.

Report adopted.

DANA KIRKPATRICK (National—East Coast): Madam Speaker, I’m not sure of the protocol, but I’m informed that the House intends to lift urgency.

ASSISTANT SPEAKER (Maureen Pugh): The Government has indicated that urgency will conclude. Therefore, the House stands adjourned until 2 p.m. today.

The House adjourned at 12.55 p.m. (Wednesday)